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Abstract
This thesis explores transnational institution building for local development through the 
prism of European Union Cohesion Policy in two Objective 1 regions, Ireland and 
Sardinia, It is essentially concerned with examining how Cohesion Policy affects 
institutions. The theoretical tools of institutionalism and Europeanisation are employed 
in order to build a framework. The development of Cohesion Policy is appraised and the 
increasing importance of local (as opposed to regional) development is established. For 
analytical purposes, its division into programming periods is embraced: a first period 
from 1989-1993 and a second from 1994-1999. Policy misfit was established in both 
empirical cases in the run up to and during the first programming period in which 
outcomes already begin to differ: Irish pragmatic adaptation contrasts with Sardinian 
failure to comprehend Cohesion Policy tenets. In the second period of programming 
outcomes continue to differ: Ireland seems to demonstrate a move towards 
transformation whereas Sardinia is only beginning to come to terms with Cohesion Policy 
-ju st as funds are about to dry up. The main factors affecting Cohesion Policy's ability to 
influence institutions are: salience of the policy in the case-study; proximity to power; 
orientation of policy or problem-solving (performance versus procedure); degree of local 
imprint on experimentation; space accorded for creativity; leadership and its attitudes to 
policy; and the strength of local institutions.
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Introduction
This thesis presents an analysis of the difficulties of building institutions and making 
them effective in the context of the deliveiy system of the European Union’s Cohesion 
Policy. Cohesion Policy is a transnational policy of considerable importance - it accounts 
for approximately one third of the budget for Community policies and almost 0.5 per 
cent of annual EU GDP. It was chosen because it is divided along development problem 
types as opposed to according to member states and thus enables us to examine the same 
policy in two different national contexts. Furthermore, as we shall see further on, the 
European Commission specifically equipped Cohesion Policy with institutional-building 
capacities, in particular through the introduction of the concept of partnership. Cohesion 
Policy refers to the EU's regional/structural policy, the instruments of which are the 
Structural Funds.1
Here the concern is with how the European Commission has sought to build institutions 
in Objective 1 regions. It has sought to do this in order to promote its goal of 
inclusion/partnership/participation, subsidiarity and decentralisation, and in order to 
make Cohesion Policy more than a mechanism for inter-state transfers or payoffs to the 
poorer member states for the single market and Economic and Monetary Union. This 
becomes clear when we look at how the European Commission countered the shift in 
favour of state control with the Treaty on European Union by linking employment -  a 
primary EU policy concern -  with local development, involving an even more complex 
array of actors. Moreover, such a strategy explains how the EU’s institution building is 
both a cause and an effect of its desire to include sub-national actors with which it can 
ally in order to increase its own influence.
Cohesion Policy not only operates according to these principles however, it also has a 
prescribed modus operandi for programming resources, implementing programmes, 
financial control, monitoring and evaluation, its so-called delivery system. This delivery 
system does not reflect the variety' of possible implementation strategies inherent in a 
collectivity' such as the EU, where institutional arrangements differ enormously from one
1 The Structural Funds are made up of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF), the guidance section of the European Agriculture Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF or FEOGA) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and 
the Cohesion Fund. The Cohesion Fund is based on a project-financing approach while the four 
Structurai Funds operate within a single Community-wide framework according to common 
principles.
5
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member state to another -  take federal Germany and centralised Ireland, for example. In 
fact, the European Commission usually seeks to use programmed strategies of 
implementation which attempt to ensure uniform and precise implementation and 
translate the European Commission’s intentions into practice even at the cost of 
unresponsiveness to local conditions and uneven and slow implementation (McAleavey, 
1995:190).2 In other words, in seeking to develop strategic programmes, the European 
Commission tries to impose a fairly tightly designed response to the needs of a region 
(McAleavey, 1995:191). This tightly designed response imposed by the European 
Commission, even at the costofunresponsiveness o f policy to local conditions, is a form 
of institution building as regions must adapt to the delivery system of Cohesion Policy in 
formulating development policies rather than vice versa. This scenario emerges clearly in 
the cases studied in this thesis, Ireland and Sardinia, where the delivery system of 
Cohesion Policy has led to the creation of myriad committees, partnership bodies and 
even local development bodies.
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section contains Chapters 1 and 2. 
Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework drawing heavily from new institutionalist 
literature across the social sciences. The degree to which institutions matter, how' 
institutional change is engendered and the role of actors is explored through a review o f 
the main literature. Differences in emphasis proffered by the different new 
institutionalist schools lead to a theoretical quagmire which is ably bridged by recent 
literature on Europeanisation. In fact, the latter may be employed as a means of 
understanding domestic institutional change in the EU. That the same environmental 
change (in this case Cohesion Policy) may provoke a different impact according to 
degrees of institutionalisation of organisations is explored drawing on the literature on 
Europeanisation which provides a useful lens with which to view domestic changes in the 
European Union. The chapter subsequently deals with different depictions of Cohesion 
Policy in the copious literature produced from the early 1990s to 1998 in order to better 
understand the institution building aspirations of the European Commission. The 
delivery system proper of Cohesion Policy is then presented and its various pillars are 
deciphered. Exogenous change is not independent of endogenous institutional factors 
and hence these must be at the basis of any hypotheses. Hypotheses are thus elaborated 
and cover domestic factors affecting institution building and change. Finally the research 
design is presented along with working questions and data sources. Chapter 2 charts
- Programmed strategic** contrast with adaptive strategics of implementation which, although 
taking into account the peculiarities of different member states, tend to generate considerable slippage 
from initial objectives (McAleavey. 1995:190).
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the development of Cohesion Policy since its inception and constitutes an historical 
background. The development of Cohesion Policy has led to the emergence of several 
other factors that enhance the institution building capacity of the Commission. For 
example, within Cohesion Policy discourses and rhetoric, the shift in emphasis from 
'regional' development in favour of ‘local’ development has extended the institution 
building capacity of Cohesion Policy at a sub-national level in member states to a sub­
regional level. It elucidates how the various principles and programmes came into 
existence. Key moments in this history are the 1988 reform likened to a paradigm shift, 
and the shift from regional to local development in the late 1990s.
Section II ventures into domestic compatibility with Cohesion Policy’s delivery system 
and seeks to establish the degree o f  misfit’ before and during the first period of Cohesion 
Policy implementation which corresponds to the first programming period from 1988- 
1993. In C h a p te r 1 we borrow the term policy misfit from the literature on 
Europeanisation to describe the discrepancies between Cohesion Policy and local 
development policy in the elected cases, Ireland and Sardinia. C h apters 3 and 4  found 
that policy misfit obtained in both cases even though many of Cohesion Policy’s ideas had 
previously existed on paper (the need for local involvement, partnership etc.) In sum, 
considerable, albeit different pressure for change existed in both cases and as can be 
expected, institutional responses also differed. In Ireland, due to the immediate saliency 
of Cohesion Policy, moves were made to fill the local institutional gap, bypassing local 
government, in order to be able to draw down structural funding. In Sardinia, Cohesion 
Policy became salient at a slower pace due to the existence of other sizeable funds 
provided by development policy for the Mezzogiorno. Attempts to reform existing 
institutions in order to implement Cohesion Policy ensued. But efforts to draw down 
structural funds were not as successful as in Ireland. C h a p te r  3 outlines the Irish 
experience with territorial development policies prior to Cohesion Policy' and its attempts 
to accommodate Cohesion Policy tenets subsequently. What emerges is significant misfit 
exemplified by the dearth of sub-national institutions and a significant departure from 
policy intentions and statements when implementing policy. The advent of Cohesion 
Policy witnessed massive interest in the Structural Funds and therefore a concerted drive 
to maximise funding by adapting. C h ap ter 4 shows that in Sardinia too, a high degree of 
misfit was found especially in terms of implementation slippages. Interestingly the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes had provided a sort of trial of the new' Cohesion 
Policy. However, due to an initial lack of interest with Cohesion Policy mainly because 
other (better funded, less complicated) development policies steered by the Italian 
central government were in operation, attempts to adapt were slow to emerge and when
7
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they did they were characterised by failure to comprehend what the policy enabled and 
prohibited.
Section III examines how the case-studies coped with misfit during the second 
programming period and accommodated Cohesion Policy: Chapter 5 treats of the 
creation o f myriad new structures in Ireland and Chapter 6 charts attempts to reform 
local institutions in Sardinia. In both cases institutional change came about in response 
to an exogenous element, Cohesion Policy. The Irish approach was more successful in 
terms of Cohesion Policy performance than Sardinia’s. Thus, the upshot is that the 
European Commission has been more able to ‘permeate’, influence and ultimately build 
institutions in Ireland than in Sardinia. Chapter 5 presents the Irish experience 
characterised by a drive to perform well due to the importance of the transfers inherent 
in Cohesion Policy. Much innovation resulted in this period with much spill over onto 
existing institutions. Ireland would appear to be heading towards some sort of 
transformation in terms of institution building. However, a few cynical exercises may 
jeopardise that experience. Chapter 6 illustrates how first the Italian central 
government was slow to take actions to ensure effective implementation of Cohesion 
Policy and when it did, a very controlled experimentation period which paradoxically 
stifled innovation, ensued. Sardinian authorities were slow to come to terms also and the 
necessary institutional change was not engendered due to a lack of fundamental factors.
Finally, the Section IV  brings together comparative empirical findings and theoretical 
approaches in order to explain institutional change. Chapter 7 offers explanations for 
the degree of the European Commission’s success in institution building at the local level 
in the case-studies. A state has more discretion than a region in inventing new laws and 
new organisational forms. Institutional change at the local level is largely due to 
permeability among institutions. The low degree of capacity of local government 
authorities as well as their weak institutionalisation in Ireland enabled the setting up 
organisational forms in the short-term to implement Cohesion Policy. These 
organisational forms generally came with a ‘sell by date. However, they gradually 
acquired a life of their own (through own resources and subsidiary' actors) although they 
could not be described as being highly institutionalised. In fact, there has been little 
institutional underpinning or ‘mainstreaming although the proliferation of new bodies 
and their perceived success has led to the need to reform existing local institutions and 
‘rationalise’ the local institutional fabric. The approach has been successful in terms of 
Cohesion Policy performance. Institutional change has evolved from experiments and 
central government has had a huge role.
8
In Sardinia, the approach to policy misfit has been characterised by incomprehension of 
or disinterest in Cohesion Policy at early stages followed by attempts to formally reform 
existing institutions and in some cases increase their roles notwithstanding their 
capacities, introducing forma! institutional mechanisms in existing institutions that 
prescribe action in a legalistic framework. Cohesion Policy's organisational forms were 
introduced into existing institutions with much more difficulty. Legal and administrative 
changes involve material and political high costs which public authorities are reluctant to 
bear. Cohesion Policy’s organisational forms have stirred a lame process of institutional 
reform, the results of which are slow to emerge. This approach has not been very 
successful. The implementation of Cohesion Policy encountered different problems at the 
local level, namely the presence of entrenched and bureaucratic institutions unable to 
deal with Cohesion Policy’s organisational forms in the short-term. The high degree of 
institutionalisation and thus impermeability of these institutions blocked any kind of 
swift innovative response to Cohesion Policy. Institutional change has been prescribed 
and the role o f the regional administration and that of central government is important. 
The thesis ends with a Conclusion to recap its main tenets.
9
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Chapter i
Conceptual Fram ework: Institutions and Change
Introduction
Since the inception and within the operation of Cohesion Policy, the European 
Commission has consistently sought to involve sub-national actors irrespective of 
existing institutional structures, mainly in order to access information and resources.'1 
This inclusion activity is a form of institution building, as the participation of sub­
national actors often requires an institutional grounding. Since the Commission has no 
legal or constitutional right or power to directly or formally build or alter institutions or 
administrative structures, it has sought to do so indirectly and informally through the 
delivery system of Cohesion Policy. The dellvery system of Cohesion Policy is made up of 
four principles. The principle of partnership is defined as “close consultations between 
the Commission, the member state concerned and the competent authorities designated 
by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting in pursuit of 
a common goal”-». This principle has often entailed institution building within member 
states as in some cases existing institutional arrangements for co-ordination, 
consultation etc. were lacking or inadequate. The other three principles, that is 
concentration (providing for the targeting of resources), programming (providing for 
mid-term planning) and additionality (meaning that EU resources must not substitute 
for national spending), also enabled the European Commission to involve sub-national 
actors and build institutions. In fact, the Commission has made significant advances on 
these four principles since they were introduced with the 1988 reform of the Structural 
Funds, as it “has been actively using Cohesion Policy to generate regional and local 
demands for greater cohesion and to provide them with an organisational underpinning” 
(Hooghe & Keating, 1994:379). •
• This dot's not wish to imply that this is the only reason for European Commission institution 
building. This point is developed further on.
A Framework regulation EEC 2052/88 0.1 1.185 24/06/88.
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Research Question
The central research question can thus be formulated as follows; how are institutions 
built indirectly and what is the nature o f  transnational institution building ivhen 
translated to the local level? In more general terms, what are the difficulties o f  building 
institutions indirectly and what are the difficulties o f  making institutions effective? 
Chapter 2 looks at how the European Commission has tried to build institutions and 
Sections II and III look at whether the exigencies of Cohesion Policy result in the 
creation o f new or altered institutional arrangements at sub-national level as well as the 
nature o f these arrangements. Whether for instance partnership is a “robust and 
adaptable means of implementation ... adaptable to all types of programme and to 
different national circumstances” (European Commission, 1999) will be explored. 
According to the European Commission, Cohesion Policy plays a role as a force for 
change and innovation and it empowers grassroots, making a contribution to the wider 
process o f European integration (European Commission, 1999:93). Whether this obtains 
in our cases will be explored in Sections II and III.
Before the background of Cohesion Policy is presented in Chapter 2, this chapter sketches 
the theoretical orientation and research design. First, it considers the literature on 
institution building in the social sciences, especially the contributions offered by 
Europeanisation, and subsequently it contemplates the literature on Cohesion Policy. 
The main features of the delivery system of Cohesion Policy are then introduced followed 
by the formulation of hypotheses on the conditions for as well as potential obstacles to 
institution building. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the research design 
and method of the study. It is to institutional-building in the social sciences research that 
the chapter now turns.
Institution building in the social sciences
Most o f the more recent work on institutions emanates from the new institutionalist
paradigm developed in organisation theory and economics (Weaver & Rockman 1993). In
political science, new institutionalism emerged as a criticism of behaviouralist,
structuralist and system-theoretical approaches which ignored the particularities of
political organisation. These approaches stress the politically relevant behaviour of the
individual or power or interest structures as determinants of political decisions (Mayntz
& Scharpf 1995:39-72). In essence, new institutionalism posits that public institutions
“are not neutral in relation to the policies that they host. Public institutions matter, 
it is claimed by both the major contraiy interpretations within the new 
institutionalism, namely the sociological version of institutions as more than the 
sum o f their pails (holist version) and the economic version of institutions as
12
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rational responses to individual interests and their aggregation into collective 
action (atomistic version)” (Lane 1993:168).
From the sociological perspective, March and Olsen (1984; 1989) hold that interests 
cannot be separated from institutions and institutions determine interests. Furthermore, 
they presuppose a more autonomous role for political institutions as they are not mere 
mirrors of social forces (1989:18). Within the economic strand of new institutionalism, 
problems of exchange, transaction costs and property rights are emphasised. From this 
perspective, institutions are not taken as given but they may be chosen in a rational way 
(by an institutional entrepreneur, for instance). This involves deliberating about the most 
appropriate rules for societal interaction patterns (Lane 1993:176). Clearly, sociological 
and economic new institutionalism differ from each other to a considerable extent. The 
differences essentially relate to the perception of the individual and rationality. Economic 
new institutionalism sees institutions as the result of a rational choice made by 
individuals for collective action purposes, whereas sociological new institutionalism 
postulates that institutions determine interests and considerably minimises the role of 
the individual. New institutionalists of all persuasions, however, agree that institutions 
matter. They also agree that institutions shape actors' identities, power and strategies to 
a certain extent. New institutionalism has been criticised, however.
Dowding (1994:107-109) criticises March and Olsen's new institutionalism in relation to 
three elements: the apparent anti-individualism; the autonomy of institutions which is, 
in fact, an automatic state thesis; and the concentration on process to the exclusion of 
outcome/* In relation to economic new institutionalism, Lane doubts whether institutions 
can be chosen rationally, as this implies that “somehow society arrives at the best 
solution despite all kinds of opportunistic behaviour” (Lane 1993:184V Eggertsson (1990) 
identifies the most serious weakness of new institutionalism in its lack of precise 
understanding of the relationship between formal and informal institutions and how 
informal institutions change overtime.
Levi (1990) laments the fact that much of the extensive literature on institutions neglects 
defining the term. On the contrary, however, in the literature there are many, often 
conflicting, views on what constitutes institutions. North (1990a; 1990b) conceives of 
institutions as obligations to action, they are informal or formal humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction, producing a structure to everyday life 
(19903:3-5). He holds that institutions “consist of informal constraints and formal rules 5
5 Dowding is essentially concerned with demonstrating that new institutionalism is compatible with 
rational choice and behaviouralism (1994).
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and of their enforcement characteristics” (19905:384). They reduce transaction costs (the 
costs of making and sustaining a contract), but can also raise them. They constitute the 
rules of the game. North’s definition embraces a juridical view of institutions. Further, he 
makes a conceptual distinction between institutions and organisations. Organisations6 
are defined as a “response to the institutional structure of societies” (North 1990^396) 
and accordingly, as “agents of institutional change” (North 19903:5). Lane concurs with 
this distinction and asserts that social outcomes depend on the institutions through 
which interaction takes place and not just the interests involved in collaboration and 
confrontation. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish conceptually between the 
institutions of a social system on the one hand, and the individual preferences or group 
interests that motivate people in the system on the other (Lane 1993:175-176). Parsons 
(1937) and Alford et a i  (1985) define institutions as regulatory principles of action which 
is essentially a prescriptive view. Institutions are conceived of as persistent modes of 
behaviour - a structural view - by, inter alia, Weber (1922) and Meyer (1977). From a 
cognitive viewpoint, Berger (1967) and Rowe (1989) see institutions as constituent 
elements of social reality.7 Hurvvicz (1993: 51) makes a distinction between institutional 
entity which refers to organisational entities such as a bank or a state and institutional 
arrangement which refers to rules or behaviour patterns such as private property or 
representative democracy. He also summarises the important and related distinction 
between endogenously developed institutions and consciously created (designed) 
institutions and between viewing institutional arrangements as stable behaviour patterns 
and seeing them as sets of rules governing behaviour. He opts for denoting rules rather 
than behaviour as institutions as “from the point of view of policy choices and design it 
seems clear that it is the rules that are susceptible to conscious change, with the 
behaviour changes as a consequence” (Hurwicz 1993:58).
Lane describes the main problem with the definition of institutions inherent in new' 
institutionalism,
“is an institution a set of behav iour or a set of rules or maybe both? And would any
set of behaviour or rules qualify as an institution?” (Lane 1993:171)*
!) Organisations operate within an institutional environment made up of sets of rules, regulations and 
principles as well as institutionalised models of behaviour from which they glean principles for 
functioning (North 1990a).
‘  It is not necessary to recapitulate the different definitions of institutions in depth, as this has been 
done elsewhere. See Lane (1993) for a broad overv iew of new institutionalism and Lun/alaco (1995), 
who provides a useful typology o f the different definitions from which 1 have drawn here. For an 
overview of new institutionalism in political science and sociology, see Koelblo (1995). For a critical 
rev iew of institutionalist research on the EU, sec Dowding (2000).
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Broad definitions of institutions restrict the scope for actor behaviour and are unable to 
account for changes in behaviour despite an unaltered institutional context. A narrower 
conception of institutions allows a distinction to be made between behaviour that is due 
to institutional regulation and behaviour that can be related to a specific actor (Mavntz & 
Scharpf 1995:39-72). It is to such a definition that this chapter now turns.
Defining terms: Institutions, institutionalisation and institution building 
There are three defining and distinctive characteristics of the concept of institutions. 
First, differentiation/typifying of behaviour models and social relations. Whether 
institutions are seen as rules constraining action or norms that guide action, institution­
building implies typifying certain social practices, and differentiating specific behaviour 
from other types of behaviour that are not prescribed or that are prescribed by other 
institutions. Institutionalisation marks the boundaries of the institutional domain, that 
is, it defines who is in and who is out.8 Second, self-referential and ceremonial validation. 
Institutionalisation means relieving certain elements from efficacy (technical- 
instrumental) evaluations and entrusting them to institutional and ceremonial processes 
of evaluation. Third, depersonalisation. The institutionalisation of social relations means 
that they are independent of the discretion and subjectivity of individuals (collective 
unconscious customs) (Lanzalaco 1995).
Institutionalisation or institution building is defined as the process through which social 
relations and behaviour are differentiated from other models, have an intrinsic value 
(that is, rules that are legitimate per se and are adopted ceremoniously, independently of 
technical-instrumental processes and reasons for their formation), and are 
depersonalised, that is independent of individuals. Thus an institution can be defined as 
every social relation, behavioural model (procedure, form of collective action), value and 
social knowledge that has to a certain extent undergone a process of institutionalisation 
(Lanzalaco 1995:61).
The role of actors is also considered in the institutionalisation process: subsidiary' actors 
are created whose funotion is to legitimise new institutions and mobilise resources 
necessary for the process of institutionalisation. Insofar as the institutionalisation 
process is successful, subsidiary actors undergo legitimation and institutionalisation 
which confers autonomy on these actors, whose interests may differ from the
8 In relation to organisations, institutionalisation implies the acquisition of a distinctive identity with 
respect to others. In public policy analysis, institutionalisation of a policy area happens if it is distinct 
from other types of policy through the circumspection of a policy domain (Lanzalaco 1996).
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institutional groups that control the inter-organisational field. Thus, they may seek to 
intervene in structuring processes representing an important element of change and 
innovation.
Rational choice institutionalists contend that for a given institutional change to be 
adopted, it is necessary that there be players who desire that particular institutional 
change, and secondly that they have the means to prevail (assets) - political power, 
personal charisma, financial clout. Hurwicz (1993) calls a player with motives and assets 
for effecting institutional change an intervenor* which may be an individual, an 
institutional entity, an organisation etc. When the intervenor’s assets are strong enough 
relative to opponents, institutional change is likely to occur. The existence of a demand for 
institutional innovation will, o f course, increase the probability of the intervenor’s success. 
The intervenor also participates in enforcement. Using an intervenor helps explain why 
certain reform efforts change - either through lack of adequate ‘assets’ on the part of would- 
be reformers, or due to lack of clarity or intensity in their preferences for the relevant 
institutions. The presence of successful intervenors is helpful in effecting change and/or 
maintaining institutions (Hurwicz 1993: 62-3).
Institutional change: exogenous and endogenous variables
The interest herein is with exogenous institutional change or institution building effected 
by the European Commission in member state local development spheres, prodded by 
the intricacies of Cohesion Policy implementation. Exogenous, because Cohesion Policy 
is a supranational policy the tenets of which are essentially formulated by the European 
Commission. The most widespread explanations o f institutional change refer to external 
institutional variables such as changes in resource allocation, changes in actor 
preferences or technological changes etc. that disturb the institutional balance and 
generate conditions in which the validity of consolidated rules, relations and behaviour 
models are questioned and new ones emerge. For economic institutionalists, change 
occurs if some actor (institutional entrepreneur) considers it convenient to invest 
resources to change institutions (North 1990a). Others (DiMaggio 1988) attribute change 
to political factors, that is, pow er distribution among actors. Changes in technological or 
environmental characteristics alter power relations among actors and thus those 
favoured by redistribution seek to renegotiate formal rules that regulate relations and stir 
processes of institutionalisation of those elements that legitimate their position. Both *16
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' An intervenor is the same as a poliev entrepreneur.
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models attribute change to exogenous factors or shocks that are fundamental to 
prodding institutional change (Lanzalaco 1995).
The three resource dependency approaches (liberal intergovernmentalism, 
supranationalism and multilevel governance) contend that institutions change as a result 
of a redistribution of power resources which changes the dependencies among actors and 
restructures their relationships. Redistribution of resources results from the emergence 
of a new political opportunity structure, the EU, which provides some actors with new 
resources while depriving others (Borzel 2002:20). However, degree and outcome are 
contended. First, the liberal intergovernmental persuasion (Moravcsik 1993, Kohler- 
Koch 1996) conclude that national governments increase control over policy outcomes by 
transferring policy competencies to the European level. The result is increasing 
independence for national governments and a low impact on domestic institutions. 
Second, neo-functionalism and supranationalism (Marks 1992) posit a more significant 
impact on domestic institutions as domestic actors increase control over policy outcomes 
by bypassing national governments in European policy-making, and the state’s role is 
progressively eroded. Third, multilevel governance literature (Kohler-Koch 1996) 
suggests a transformation of the state by increasing mutual dependence of actors on each 
other’s resources, thereby leading to cooperative governance and chipping away at 
sovereignty, statehood etc. They agree on an outcome of some sort of convergence among 
member states leading to a strengthening, weakening or transformation of the state, even 
though empirical evidence for convergence is meagre (Borzel 2002:21). On the contrary, 
empirical variation in impact is rife and has not been accounted for by these three 
approaches because explanations based on exogenous factors are empirically incomplete 
as the same exogenous shock can provoke different changes in different institutions. This 
is because the influence of external changes depends on factors that are endogenous to 
institutions for three reasons. First, environmental change must be ‘interpreted* by the 
cognitive maps and organisational paradigms present in an institution and may thus take 
on a different meaning according to the way it is deciphered. Second, the ‘permeability* of 
an institution vis-à-vis the environment, its capacity to neutralise environmental change 
and preserve its stability depend on its degree of institutionalisation. Thus the same 
environmental change (in this case Cohesion Policy) may provoke a different impact 
according to the degree of institutionalisation of an organisation. Institutional 
permeability is a fundamental mechanism of institutional change as it extends the 
validity of legitimation principles from one organisational field to another in an 
unforeseen and unexpected way. It thus generates processes of change in principles that 
regulate actor behaviour and relations among actors in an institutional sphere (Lanzalaco
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1995^4 2)- Third, ‘innovative’ responses of the institution to change depend on its 
epistemic and cognitive heritage as well as the institutional sources from which it learns 
and thus the same change can lead to different innovative responses (Lanzalaco, 1995). It 
also depends on the degree o f ‘leeway’ or ‘room for manoeuvre’ open to an institution in 
interpreting the same exogenous change.
Institutional change is therefore a process of institutional adaptation through which new 
rules, norms and practices are incorporated. A major causal mechanism of adaptation 
underlined by sociological institutionalism is isomorphism, which proposes that 
frequently interacting institutions may develop similarities in organisational structures 
etc. over time (Borzel 2002:23; Olsen 1996). This does not adequately account for 
variation in institutional adaptation to a similar environment (Borzel 2002:23). 
However, path dependency (Lindner 2003) offers a solution in the form of the concept o f 
institutional paths: adaptation takes place along institutional paths in an incremental 
fashion and rarely abruptly veers off these paths.10 Another factor that is significant in 
explaining variation is the interaction between the new institutional paradigm and the 
existing domestic one in terms o f match: establishing goodness-of-fit (Bailey 2002) is 
important in order to ascertain the degree to which institutions will adapt. In other 
words, the more that European norms or practices resonate with those at the domestic 
level, the more likely will they be incorporated into existing domestic institutions (Olsen 
1996:272; Borzel 2002:24). This is not sufficient however, as adaptation may vary despite 
similar degrees of misfit. Stacey and Rittberger (2003 859) affirm that “to date, 
institutionalist theory has been much more successful in accounting for institutional 
stability than for institutional change”. But while economic institutionalism more readily 
explains change, historical and sociological institutionalism more readily account for 
stability. The formers explanations weigh too heavily in favour of agency, neglecting 
structure and the latter’s propositions disregard agency and overemphasise structure 
(Borzel 2002:26). The literature on Europeanisation has amended that situation 
somewhat by bridging the different forms o f institutionalism and resolving questions o f  
agency. It has posited useful explanatory variables to account for differing outcomes o f  
change and stability'. It is to Europeanisation that the chapter now turns.
"* The theory of path dependence, by characterising institutions as paths, “contends that, once actors 
lune made an institutional choice and adopted a set ot rules, they are significantly constrained in their 
ability to leave the path and initiate institutional change. Consequently, political institutions tend to 
remain stable overtime”. However, it tends to overemphasise the permanence of institutions and fails 
to account for change (Lindner 2003.916).
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Institutional Change/Institution Building as Europeanisation?
Recent research has developed the concept of Europeanisation to refer to processes of 
construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal Riles, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are 
first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in 
the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political stnictures and public policies 
(Radaelli 2000:4). Scholars" have attempted to ascertain the domestic effect of 
Europeanisation which can be conceptualised as a process of change at the domestic level 
in which the member states adapt their processes, policies and institutions to new 
practices, norms, rules and procedures that emanate from the emergence of a European 
system of governance (Olsen 1996 cited in Bôrzel & Risse 2000). Europeanisation of 
policy has different forms: it can affect all the elements of policy, that is, actors, 
resources, policy instruments as well as policy style by making it more or less conflictual, 
consensual, corporatist, pluralist or regulative. Attempts at theorising have led to the 
formulation of two conditions for expecting domestic changes/adaptational processes in 
response to Europeanisation. First, Europeanisation must be ‘inconvenient’, i.e. there 
must be some degree of ‘misfit’ or incompatibility between European-level processes, 
policies and institutions on one hand and domestic-level institutions on the other. The 
degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational pressures1 2 which is a necessaiy but not 
sufficient condition for expecting change (Bailey 2002). Misfit can relate to policy or 
institutions. European policies can challenge national policy goals, regulator)' standards, 
instruments or techniques to achieve policy goals and/or the underlying problem-solving 
approach. This can exert adaptational pressure on underlying institutions. 
Europeanisation causes institutional misfit by challenging domestic rules and procedures 
and the collective understandings attached to them. European rules and procedures 
which give national governments privileged decision-making powers vis-à-vis other 
domestic actors challenge the territorial institutions of highly centralised states which 
grant their regions autonomous decision powers. Institutional misfit is less direct than 
policy misfit and although it can result in substantial adaptational pressure, its effect is 
more likely to be long-term and incremental. Policy or institutional misfit is a necessaiy
11 See for example Bache 2000; Bulmcr et al 2004; Conzelmann 1998: Falkner 2001:2003; Grote 
2003; .Jaequot & Woll 2003; Van Keulen 2003: Vink 2002; Mont petit 2000; Borras et at 1998; 
Haver land 2003; Ladrcch 1994.
Knill & Lcnschow (1998) list three degrees of pressure. High pressure arises when EU policy 
contradicts core elements of administrative arrangements. Limited and symbolic adaptations occur. 
Moderate pressure arises when EU policy only changes factors internal to national administrative 
traditions. Actual adaptation may require substantial but not fundamental reforms. The extent to 
which administrative change takes place depends on the nature of the specific actor constellation. Low 
pressure is when member states can rely on existing administrative provisions to implement policy. No 
administrative change occurs (Knill & Lcnschow 1998:6-7).
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condition for domestic change. Second, the effect depends on facilitating factors as a 
sufficient condition of domestic change. There must be some facilitating factors (actors, 
institutions) responding to adaptational pressures.1-'*
In the literature, there are two ways of conceptualising the adaptational processes that 
basically make use o f different facilitating factors: rationalist institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism. These logics of change often occur simultaneously or 
characterise different phases in a process of adaptational change (Borzel & Risse 2000). 
First, from a rationalist institutionalist perspective, which treats actors as rational, goal- 
orient ed and purposeful, the misfit between European and domestic processes, policies 
and institutions provides societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and 
constraints in the pursuance of their interests. Whether such changes in the domestic 
opportunity structure leads to a domestic redistribution of power depends on the 
capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints. 
“Europeanisation is conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which 
offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the 
ability7 of others to pursue their goals” (Borzel & Risse 2000). Two mediating factors with 
opposite effects influence these capacities. First, the existence of multiple veto points 
(Haverland 2000) in a country’s institutional structure can effectively empower actors 
with diverse interests to avoid constraints leading to increased resistance to change. “The 
more power is dispersed across the political system and the more actors have a say in 
political decision-making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus or 
‘winning coalition necessary to introduce changes in response to Europeanization 
pressures. A large number of institutional or factual veto players thus impinges on the 
capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy changes and qualifies their empowerment” 
(Borzel & Risse 2000:7). Second, formal institutions might exist providing actors with 
material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities leading to an increased 
likelihood of change. “The European political opportunity structure may offer domestic 
actors additional resources. But they are not able to deploy them when they lack the 
necessary action capacity” (Borzel & Risse 2000:7). “The existence of multiple veto points 
and formal facilitating institutions determine whether policy and institutional misfit lead 
to the differentia] empowerment of domestic actors as a result of which domestic 
processes, policies, and institutions change” (Borzel & Risse 2000:7).
1: Knill & Lchmkuhl (1999) distinguish three mechanisms through which Europeanisation can affect 
member states: institutional wmpliancc, whereby the EU prescribes a particular model which is 
imposed on member states (positive integration policies); changing domestic opportunity structures 
(negative integration policies) giving rise to a redistribution of resources between domestic actors; 
policy framing (framing policies) which alters the beliefs of domestic actors.
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Somologica] institutionalism argues that actors are guided by collectively shared 
understandings of what constitutes proper behaviour in a given rule structure and 
processes of persuasion. European policies, norms and the collective understandings 
attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes because they 
do not resonate well with domestic norms and collective understandings. 
“Europeanisation is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and 
structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which have to 
incorporate into their domestic structures” (Bòrzel & Risse 2000). Two mediating factors 
influence the degree to which such misfit results in the internalisation of new norms and 
the development of new identities. First, ‘change agents’ or norm entrepreneurs, that is 
epistemic communities, advocacy or principled issue networks for instance, mobilise in 
the domestic context and persuade others to redefine their interests and identities. 
Persuasion and social learning are mostly identified with processes of policy change, but 
they can also have an effect on domestic institutions. Second, a political culture and other 
informal institutions exist which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing. 
Informal institutions entail collective understandings of appropriate behaviour that 
strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors respond to Europeanisation 
pressures. A consensus-oriented or co-operative decision-making culture helps to 
overcome multiple veto points by rendering their use inappropriate for actors. 
Consensus-oriented political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs which 
facilitates the accommodation of pressure for adaptation. A confrontation and pluralist 
culture may inhibit domestic change (Bòrzel & Risse 2000:9). Thus sociological 
institutionalism suggests that Europeanisation leads to domestic change through 
socialisation and collective learning processes resulting in norm internalisation and the 
development of new identities.
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Table 1: Comparison of Degrees of Change Due to Europeanisation
Change Borzel & Risse 
2000'4
Radaelli 2000^ Schmidt 2 0 0 i1(> Here
First Absorption -  low Inertia -  no change Inertia -  low Inertia -  low
Second Accommodation 
-  modest
Absorption - modest Absorption -  
modest
Absorption
modest
Third Transformation - 
high
Transformation
high
Transformation 
-  high
Transformation
-h ig h
Fourth Retrenchment -  
policy becomes less 
European than it was
The degree of change provoked by adaptational pressures range from none to high and 
even retrenchment (see Table 1). Inertia denotes no change at all: when a member state 
finds that EU policies are too dissimilar to domestic practice, inertia may occur in the 
form of delays and even resistance to EU-induced changes (Radaelli 2000). Moreover, 
actors feel little economic pressures to change, would prefer not to change or are unable 
to achieve change. With inertia, policy legacies and preferences are maintained at the 
price of adjustment (Schmidt 2001:7).
The second outcome is absorption: intermediate domestic structures and policy legacies 
absorb certain non-fundamental change but maintain the core of policy legacies and 
preferences at no cost at all. It denotes accommodation of policy requirements without
1! Absorption: member states incorporate European policies or ideas and readjust their institutions 
respectively without substantially modifying existing processes, policies and institutions. The deg ret* of 
do mestic cha n ge is It >\v. Accom mtx la tion: m em be r states acct mi m odate E u rt > pea nisation press u re be 
adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features and the 
underlying collective understandings attached to them. One wav of doing this is to patch up new 
policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter. The degree of domestic change 
is modest. Transformation: member states replace existing policies, processes and institutions by new. 
substantially different ones or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the 
underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed. The degree of domestic change is 
high (Borzel & Risse 2000).
Inertia - i.e. lack of change. When a member state finds that EU political architectures, choices, 
models or policies are t<x> dissimilar to domestic practice, inertia may occur taking the form of lags, 
delays, implementation as transformation and sheer resistance to EU-induced changes. Absorption - 
i.e. change as adaptation. Domestic structures and policy legacy provide a mix of resiliency and 
flexibility. They can absorb certain non-fundamental change but maintain their core. It is the 
accommodation of policy requirements without real modification of essential structures and changes 
in the logic of political Ixhaviour, Transformation - i.e. third order or paradigmatic change d la Hall in 
the core. Retrenchment - i.e. a paradoxical effect that implies that national policy becomes less 
European than it was (Radaelli 2000:13-15).
’*'■ Inertia: resistance to change appears when actors feel little economic pressures to change, see little 
‘fit’ in terms of long-standing policies or policymaking institutions, would prefer not to change, have 
little capacity to negotiate or impose change, and/or have no discourse that could persuade of the 
necessity and appropriateness of change. Absorption: accommodation occurs without significant 
change, given a good ‘fit’ with national policy legacies ami preferences as well as institutional 
capabilities for adaptation. Transformation: changes occur that reverse policy legacies and go against 
traditional policy preferences, which often assumes significant economic vulnerability and political 
institutional capacity, which in turn presupposes a ‘transformative’ diseoui*se. (Schmidt 2001).
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changing essential structures and or behaviour logics (Radaelli 2000), and neither 
politics nor economics are at issue (Schmidt 2001). The third outcome is transformation 
which denotes changes that reverse policy legacies and go counter to traditional policy 
preferences, a sort o f third order change (Radaelli 2000). Generally this is accompanied 
by significant economic vulnerability and political institutional capacity and the price of 
adjustment is the end of policy legacies and preferences (Schmidt 2001).
The literature on Europeanisation has significantly bridged the divide between the 
different schools of institutionalism by taking adequate account both of agency and 
structure. The four intermediary variables or mediating factors developed chiefly by 
Borzel & Risse (2000) -  multiple veto points, formal facilitating institutions, norm 
entrepreneurs and consensual/conflictual political culture -  can be taken together to 
provide a useful frame to explain differing degrees of adaptation to EU policies. This 
thesis employs this theoretical framework to seek to ascertain the impact of Cohesion 
Policy on local institutions.
Cohesion Policy — Literature Overview
There has been an immense growth in the literature on changing governance structures 
due to the internationalisation and the scientification of policy issues in recent years. 
International regimes such as the EU have added new dimensions to the analysis of 
governance and institutional structures. The EU’s Cohesion Policy is seen by some 
analysts as differentiating it from other international regimes and it has hence been the 
subject of many attempts to develop theories aimed at conceptualising EU governance 
(see Christiansen 1994). Much of the literature on Cohesion Policy is concerned with how 
it alters territorial relations within member states and whether regions are equipped at 
Brussels level. The main questions asked relate to whether regions by-pass the nation­
state gate-keeper. What follows is a brief foray into the main groups of literature. The 
first group, the ‘true cohesion’ scholars, endeavour to determine whether real cohesion 
has occurred as a result of Cohesion Policy and they often differ in the conclusions they 
reach as a result of a priori differences in methodology employed (see inter alia Leonardi 
1995‘7; Keating 1997; Tondl 1998 and more recently, De Rynck & McAleavey 2001). In 
the mid 1990s economic convergence was being mooted by some (Leonardi 1995) only to 
be refuted by others (Keating, 1995; Tondl 1998). Later studies emphasise the 
distributive role of Cohesion Policy rather than its cohesion ethos once it has left the
SL.CT1Q S  ] - (JxtpifT / Coiurptajl tmm ru ork and K/tt>mh Drsr^n
Sec the debate in Hestem European Politics in 1995 between Leonardi and Keating.
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intergovernmental bargaining table (De Rynck & McAleavey 2001: 548). Yet as Grote 
(1994) outlines,
“a cohesion policy proper ...would not limit itself to only consider economic 
development differentials among the regions o f Europe, but would take into 
account the entire range o f factors determining their social and economic 
performance”.
Through Cohesion Policy, the European Commission has actively sought to involve
regional/local actors in formulating and implementating policies. Much literature has
been concerned with regional mobilisation and regions influencing policy (Keating, 1993;
Jones & Keating I98s ; i995; Marks, 1992; McAleavey 1994; Balme 1994; Keating 1992).
The conclusion reached can be summarised as follows:
“The political weight of European regions varies considerably according to their 
economic importance, their political skills, their administrative infrastructure and 
their ability to mobilise civil society behind the efforts o f regional governments” 
(Hooghe & Keating, 1994:375)-
Depictions of Cohesion Policy as a mechanism to alter territorial politics are generally to 
be found in analyses of the EU as a system of multi-level governance (Scharpf 1994; 
Marks et at 1996a; 1996b). Cohesion Policy is a mechanism to alter territorial political 
exchange as the European Commission is starved of resources and thus wished to extend 
participation to gain information and expertise (McAleavey, 1995:143). The research 
focus is on the policy process and especially the implementation stages. Empowered sub­
national authorities, albeit to differing extents, is the outcome. Many single case-studies 
or comparative case-studies have been forwarded to demonstrate this empowerment.'8
In the context o f liberal intergovernmentalist or realist state-centricist analyses of the 
EU, Cohesion Policy is characterised as a side-payment to the poorer countries for their 
participation in first the Single Market, and second, Economic and Monetary Union. The 
research focus is on Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) and Summits of the Council of 
Ministers or the ‘big moments' in the development o f the EU. A consolidation of the role 
of the nation-state is the conclusion reached by proponents of this characterisation (see 
inter alia Moravcsik 1993; 1998).
Neo-functionalist views of the EU generally see Cohesion Policy as an incentive for lobby 
groups and focus on the agenda setting stage of the policy process and the proliferation of 
EU-wide regional and sectoral interest group offices in Brussels. The conclusion reached *24
See for example Hooghes (1996) volume as well as Le Gales & Lesquesne (1997).
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is that although there is an increased bout of lobbying vis-à-vis EU institutions, this is not 
at the expense of national governments (Mazey & Mitchell, 1993).
There tends to be a lack of comparative studies on the effects of institution building at a 
local level in member states or that perceive Cohesion Policy as a tool to bring about 
indirect institutional change or to build institutions. The focus here is on the extent to 
which the European Commission has been able to build institutions, in an indirect way, 
that reflect its own objectives. The European Commission’s institution building drive has 
not only been motivated by adaptation, it has also been motivated by the desire to 
resuscitate the dwindling European project in the 1980s by adding a redistributive 
dimension to the Common Market, which was also intended to correct its apparent 
failures. In the 1990s it has been motivated by the need to bridge the distance between 
citizens and European institutions. What happens to the European Commission’s 
institution building at a local level is explored in the two empirical sections (II and III). 
The chapter now turns to how Cohesion Policy facilitates institution building.
Institution building and Cohesion Policy’s Delivery' system
The delivery' system of Cohesion Policy requires some clarification. It entails a ‘multi­
lever system of governance within which relationships between different levels are 
characterised by partnership and negotiation rather than hierarchy. As can be seen in 
figure 1, Cohesion Policy’s delivery system is built on two main operational elements: 
programming and implementation. The main actors involved in the former are member 
states and the European Commission, and in the latter, member states and monitoring 
committees. There are also three feedback loops: monitoring, financial control and 
evaluation. Monitoring involves the European Commission, financial control involves 
member states and the European Commission, and evaluation normally involves 
independent experts. Thus, the main actors in programming and implementation as well 
as monitoring and financial control are member states and the European Commission. 
Formally sub-national actors are involved only insofar as they are included in monitoring 
committees nominated by member states. It is up to member states to decide who 
participates. This is illustrative of the fact that the Commission’s institution building is 
indirect, as it specified that sub-national actors had to be included but it could not 
directly nominate them.
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Fig. 1: Cohesion Policy’s Delivery System
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Source European C onim uoion (E>9v:Cii)
As aforementioned Cohesion Policy also has several principles, namely concentration or 
targeting, partnership and additionality or leverage effects. These principles constitute 
the pillars of the European Commission’s institution building as in order to respect them, 
member states have to modify existing practices. The chapter now examines these 
principles or institutional pillars, which we call the pillars of the Commission’s institution 
building, in more detail.
First, concentration means that Cohesion Policy seeks to target particular areas or groups 
in order to have maximum effect rather than be dispersed across the EU. The European 
Commission’s approach is to target particular types of activities, localities or groups 
according to the programme in question. This means that Cohesion Policy becomes more 
than a mechanism for inter-state transfers as the target groups or localities are 
necessarily small and thus at a sub-national level. It also ensures a greater role for the 
European Commission as it must approve the target groups or localities and a greater 
role for sub-national authorities or groups as their co-operation is necessary for the 
success of programmes in terms of the resources (local knowledge, involvement etc.) they 
bring. Thus, concentration has brought about an increased role for the sub-national level
and this is a form of institution building as where they had no role hitherto, an
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organisational dimension to their role almost inevitably results. Where they had a role on 
the other hand, some changes have had to have been wrought in order to facilitate their 
inclusion according to the principle of partnership.
Second, Cohesion Policy’s delivery system is based on medium-term programmes. In 
general terms programming is characterised by three phases. First, the problem is 
diagnosed. Second, a strategy is formulated and third, the concrete objectives to be 
achieved are defined. In Cohesion Policy, programming is carried out at two levels. At the 
first level, the definition of objectives and the development strategy as well as the 
distribution of financial resources are carried out at what can be called the strategic 
programming stage (European Commission 19963:112-113). Second, detailed 
programming is involved in the implementation of the strategy when sub-programmes 
and measures are outlined (ibid.). This latter phase of the delivery system takes place 
between the European Commission and member states in order to draw up a Community 
Support Framework or Single Programming Document, which set out the strategy, 
resources and time-frames over a period of five years. In some cases, according to the 
European Commission, programming has been adopted in member states as a means of 
implementing non-EU policies and has led to some administrative reorganisation. This is 
because, again according to the European Commission, experience shows that the task of 
designing and implementing strategies often motivates those involved and releases local 
potential, stimulating the development of policy measures tailored to local circumstances 
(European Commission, i996a:ii3). The increasingly pervasive nature of programming 
illustrates how this principle is one of the European Commission’s institution building 
pillars.
Third, Cohesion Policy’s delivery system is supported by systems of monitoring, financial 
management and control. Monitoring determines whether the programme is going 
according to plan and assesses physical output. Financial control assesses compliance 
with the rules for spending funds. Moreover, evaluation, both ex* ante and ex* post is 
encouraged in order to stimulate best practice. Evaluation assesses the final impact in 
socio-economic terms and considers the effectiveness of the delivery mechanism. The 
very introduction of these elements has entailed institution building in most member 
states as these concepts were quite new. These principles have also led to greater 
transparency in the delivery system in member states and this ‘exposure* has led to 
institution building in order to ‘make a good impression’ in evaluation reports.
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Fourth, the European Commission purports that Cohesion Policy's delivery system is 
driven by subsidiarity' and partnership. In other words, the European Commission seeks 
to involve the beneficiaries o f programmes in their implementation through the 
principles of partnership and subsidiarity. The Christian democratic concept of 
subsidiarity emerged from the 1931 papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno and can be 
defined as the process whereby the larger unit assumes functions insofar as the smaller 
units of which it is composed are unable or less qualified to fulfil their roles. The EC’s 
definition is somewhat different as Article 3b asserts that the EU shall take action if the 
objective desired cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member state or if it can be better 
achieved by the EU. Thus, although formally in EU terms, subsidiarity is supposed to 
regulate competency squabbles between the EU and member states, informally, in 
principle as well as in practice, it means that an action should be taken at the lowest 
possible level. It entails the involvement o f those nearest the problem for which solutions 
are being sought.1-» The precise method o f this involvement is however to be decided by- 
member states in accordance with the principle of partnership.
According to the European Commission (19993:68), partnership, by mobilising regional 
and private sector involvement, improves the effectiveness of Structural Funds by 
bringing additional resources and knowledge and by building public, private and mixed 
networks. Partnership takes place at different phases of the policy process and this form 
of institution building involves a long lead-time and the Commission contends that 
partnerships are likely to deepen in the future. The advantages of partnerships are 
manifold. First, they give access to the strengths of partners and less bureaucracy in the 
public sector. Second, they lead to high levels of co-operation and ownership although 
procedures can sometimes lead to frustration. Third, they lead to the creation of local 
networks that decentralise implementation to a local level and the spread of consensus as 
well as regional innovation strategies and institution building. Partnership is supposed to 
facilitate trust and the exchange and sharing of resources. It is a new approach to policy 
problem solving. The European Commission (19963:114) holds that partnership has 
proved “a robust and adaptable means o f implementation” at national level and at local 
level, partly because it is adaptable to all kinds of programmes and to different national 
circumstances. Moreover, the European Commission holds that the development of a 
vigorous partnership that is genuinely accountable, helps ensure that programmes are
t<( “The notion of subsidiarity in public policy reflects a recognition of the virtues of 
decentralisation, involving the relevant authorities at all levels in the pursuit of agreed objeothes and 
the sharing of responsibilities for decision-making between central and lower tiers of government 
closer to the grass-roots. This is important, since it means the involvement of those nearest to the 
problems for which solutions arc being sought” (European Commission, 1999a:! 14).
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adapted to the needs of beneficiaries, that there is support for policies among people and 
that a wide range of measures are co-financed. The principles of subsidiarity and 
partnership are the European Commission’s most significant institution building pillars. 
Even though both concepts are certainly not widely accepted or even familiar across the 
EU, their categorisation as ‘principles’ o f EU Cohesion Policy has meant that they are 
measures of ‘success’ of projects and programmes and so actors in member states 
attempt to conform. As Hooghe & Keating (1994:376) illustrate, “by proposing 
partnership arrangements, the European Commission was attempting to institutionalise 
links of access and support between regional actors and the European level of decision-
Fig. 2 Cohesion Policy Principles
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making”.
Fifth, additionality ensures that the Structural Funds do not substitute for member state 
spending. Cohesion Policy seeks to ensure additionality and leverage effects through 
attracting additional resources from the public and private sectors. In recent years, 
additional resources from public and increasingly private sources in member states are 
being brought into play. Such leverage effects are often the direct result of the devolution 
o f policy implementation and of the mobilisation of support from widely drawn groups of 
the population. According to the European Commission, this mobilisation is often 
reflected in greater contributions of matching finance from public and private sectors. 
The European Commission also holds that there is a corresponding improvement in the 
effectiveness of programmes (European Commission, 19993:112-114).
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Again, the European Commission’s attempts at institution building are apparent as the 
stipulation of the need for private sector funding in Cohesion Policy programmes has led 
to the an increased role for the private sector in development programmes.
Hypotheses
According to Hooghe (1995:1), “the main challenge of the EU was and is to fashion 
structures and procedures of governance that facilitate the accommodation of policy with 
contrasting national policy and institutional practices”. In order to facilitate the delivery 
of Cohesion Policy, the European Commission has set about institution building through 
the principles of Cohesion Policy. Territories have to adapt to Cohesion Policy’s delivery 
system rather than vice versa. Thus, rather than directly pushing for institutional reform, 
imposing a rigid delivery system has led to the necessity for change. As it stated (1999a), 
in accordance with changes in the philosophy of public sector organisations, the 
European Commission seeks to include wider public sector representation and that of the 
private sector in policy-making. This is at the basis of Cohesion Policy’s deliver)' system 
that in principle has the following characteristics: multi-level governance within which 
formally autonomous levels of government work together in partnership with sub­
national authorities but also with the private and voluntary sectors with different 
partners bringing different strengths and perspectives; economies of scale are obtained 
as local knowledge is tapped; there is a sharing of responsibilities, and co-operation and 
negotiation as opposed to hierarchy prevail; different perspectives lead to full and open 
discussion of objectives and can potentially increase transparency and the quality of 
planning; horizontal networking is promoted which is ideal for transmission of tacit 
knowledge and innovation and the accumulation of social capital (European 
Commission, 1999a).
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Figure 3 illustrates how the multi-level system of governance works. Through Cohesion 
Policy, the European Commission seeks to contribute to improving the institutional 
structure of regions in two ways. First, by mobilising partners and their strengths, that is, 
know-how and resources. Second, innovation, which it holds, naturally results from 
partnership among actors and instruments. Although the European Commission cannot 
directly shape administrative structures, through the operation of the Structural Funds, 
assisted regions have had to set up new or modify existing structures to deal with, inter 
alia, evaluation, co-ordination and the establishment of networks. According to the 
European Commission (1999a), these structures give rise to economies of scope, as they 
are applicable for other purposes. Thus, they give spin-off improvements to public and 
private institutions in the regions and countries concerned.
The European Commissions institutional creation has been made possible by the 
requirements of Cohesion Policy’s delivery system: in order to avail of funds, fixed 
procedures must be followed. Consequently, existing institutions have to be adapted or 
new ones created. This brings us to the first hypothesis.
First Hypothesis -Institution Building
The European Commission has been able to trigger off a process of differential 
institutional reform at local level in member states through Cohesion Policy. This has 
been done through building or changing institutions as a result of significant misfit. The 
European Commission’s capacity to build institutions is constrained by a number of 
factors. First the existence of multiple veto points inhibits Cohesion Policy's institution 
building because changes pioneered by one organisation may be blocked at different 
points. Second, a conflictua! political culture may hold back necessary' collaborative 
efforts to bring about change. Third, the absence of norm entrepreneurs espousing 
domestically Cohesion Policy's tenets constrains change. Fourth, where formal 
facilitating institutions fail to materialise, change is unlikely. It follows that Cohesion 
Policy’s institution building capacity is facilitated by the reverse of the above four factors: 
absence of multiple veto points; a consensual political culture; presence of norm 
entrepreneurs; presence of active formal facilitating institutions. Given the above, it is 
possible to hypothesise that in cases where no development institutions exist locally 
(absence of veto points), institution building is easier. In other wfords, it has been easier 
to accomplish when local development is bereft of local institutions than wrhen local 
development is dealt with by local institutions. Ireland was bereft of development 
institutions prior to the advent of Cohesion Policy as development policy' and processes 
tended to be rather centralised. By contrast, local development in Sardinia was dealt with
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by several sub-regional institutions and therefore, tended to be decentralised. Thus, 
institution building should be easier in Ireland than in Sardinia.
Second Hypothesis -  Institutional Innovation
Cohesion Policy’s institution building has tended to set off domestic experimentation and 
change the nature of local institutions involved in local development. Loose 
experimentation enables creativity' and facilitates the emergence of new institutional 
forms. Moreover, institutional permeability may lead to changes spilling over to existing 
institutions. In Ireland, the kind of institutions that have been generated as a result of 
Cohesion Policy’s delivery system tend to tie development to participation rather than 
representation. There is a shift away from local government to local ‘management 
structures’. In Sardinia, it has been difficult to siphon off ‘development power’ from 
embedded local representative institutions and institutional experimentation, because it 
was procedurally rigid, did not allow for the same degree of institutional creativity'.
Third Hypothesis -  Institutional Effectiveness
The third hypothesis is that the effectiveness of these institutions, and therefore of 
Cohesion Policy implementation, ultimately depends on the openness of existing 
domestic institutions and their willingness to make them work. What do we mean by the 
openness of existing institutions? Openness of institutions refers to their willingness to 
enable new structures to work insofar as they participate in the structures or work with 
them. Do they try to obstacle their work or contribute to their functioning? I f  they 
participate through their representatives, is their participation collaborative? How do 
we measure effectiveness?
The European Commission’s characterisation of reality' in relation to Cohesion Policy’s 
deliveiy system and in particular partnership will be evaluated in relation to the 
institutional structures set up in our case studies. The Commission itself points out some 
of the pitfalls of partnership. For instance, it admits (19993:70) that there can be a trade­
off between efficiency and the scale of participation, particularly when the number of 
partners involved exceeds a certain level and the system can become unwieldy. In 
addition, local partners tend to have less Structural Funds-specific expertise so there is a 
strong need for the Commission and national authorities to provide technical assistance. 
This may lead to a dependency relationship rather than a relationship among equals. 
Other analysts articulate additional nuances of partnership. Hooghe & Keating 
(1994:376) hold that while partnership itself is “presented in the language of consensus 
[it] is inherently political since it brings together actors with potentially differing
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perspectives and interests and with no pre-established hierarchy’'. Mackintosh 
(i992:2io-2ii)20 outlines that “partnership schemes are rarely well defined one-off deals 
between partners with clearly defined goals, but rather sites of continuing political and 
economic renegotiation”. The following are the main ideal working characteristics of 
partnerships as laid out by the European Commission: they give access to the strengths of 
partners and less bureaucracy in the public sector; they are characterised by high levels of 
co-operation and ownership; they facilitate the creation of local networks that 
decentralise implementation to a local level; they lead to a spread of consensus; they give 
rise to regional innovation strategies; they facilitate trust and the exchange and sharing 
o f resources; if  genuinely accountable, they ensure that programmes are adapted to the 
needs of beneficiaries, that there is support for policies among relevant population and 
that a wide range of measures are co-financed.
Several other factors may contribute to making these institutions effective. Besides the 
openness of existing institutions: approaches to problem-solving, strong or weak 
interests, strong or weak preferences, governance structures, political traditions and 
culture, central-local relations. It is undeniably difficult to definitively separate these 
components and to nominate one single explanatory factor. Reality probably suggests 
that all of these components combined with their constant interaction comprise any 
explanation. Here the hypothesis is that the openness of domestic institutions is the main 
overriding contributory factor to the effectiveness of the ‘new’ institutions insofar as the 
quality of their participation is incisive. That is to say, central government openness to 
the tenets of Cohesion Policy and its delivery system is crucial to its successful 
implementation in sub-national arenas. Without policy leadership nationally, very little 
can be accomplished by way of change locally: the state is gate-keeper as it filters through 
change in the implementation of Cohesion Policy. It may not agree with the institution 
building propensities of the European Commission but it may choose to acquiesce in 
order to draw down funding. New institutional forms take shape and acquire a life and 
logic of their own. Institutional effectiveness is examined in the case-study chapters in 
terms of policy implementation performance. The expectation is that innovative 
institutional forms are more effective than traditional ones because traditional ones are 
not equipped to deal with Cohesion Policy. In fact, Cohesion Policy is the European 
Commission’s tool to reform local institutions.
In MeAleavey (1995:300).
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Research design and method
It is worth dwelling briefly on some of the terminology employed herein. Firstly, although 
cohesion, regional and structural constitute very different concepts in terms of 
development policy, the view taken here, which is consistent with that of the EU. is that 
they all refer to the same policy. The term cohesion, as opposed to regional or structural 
is opted for here essentially to avoid confusion, especially since both the policy and thus 
the thesis deal with different territorial levels and sectoral orientations. Ambiguities 
inherent in the term cohesion (see McAleavey & De Rynck, 1997) are therefore of no 
concern here.21 Cohesion policy denotes the EU’s specific mandate to reduce disparities 
among regiom  in the Single European Act22, rural areas in the Treaty on European 
Unions and islands in the Amsterdam Treaty2-». Secondly, as aforementioned, the term 
‘region’ refers to a miscellaneous array of different territorial and constitutional entities 
which is reflected in our choice of cases-studies: “from the outset, the term [region] was 
highly indeterminate — floating between the specifically territorial and the genetically 
sectoral, and lending itself to any number of metaphorical applications or extensions” 
(Anderson, 1994:6). Once again, mainly in order to counter potential confusion, we 
resort to ‘Euro-speak’, that is we take the definitions offered by the ELJ and thus both of 
our case studies (Ireland -  which is a state and Sardinia -  an administrative region) are 
‘Objective 1 regions’ at the same NUTS level (Nomenclature of units for territorial 
statistics2*). Third, institution building refers to structures/institutions/institutional 
arrangements set up as a consequence of or in order to deal with the implementation of 
Cohesion Policy.
-* 1 The First Cohesion Report distils the EU’s general aims of solidarity and mutual support into 
substantive and measurable economic and social targets and takes Article 130a of the TEU as its 
inspiration. Herein, cohesion is explained in terms of “harmonious development” with a specific 
geographical dimension and aims at “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions". As the report sums up. “This 
reflects an explicit recognition that wide disparities are intolerable in a community, if the term has any 
meaning at all” (1996a: 13).
-- Article 130a o f the Single European Act reads, “In order to promote its overall harmonious 
development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its 
economic and social cohesion. In particular the Community shall aim at reducing the disparities
1 >etween the v arious regions and the backwardness of the least-fav oured regions".
-" Article 130a was amended in the Treaty on European Union to read, “In order to promote its 
overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions m leading to the 
strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular the Community shall aim at reducing 
the disparities between the lev els o f  dev elopment o f  the v arious regions and the backwardness of the 
least-favoured regions. including rural areas”.
Article 130a was once again amended with the Amsterdam Treaty and reads. “In order to 
promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions 
leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular the Community shall 
aim at reducing disparities between the levels o f development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions or islands, including rural areas”.
NUTS refers to the system of classifying different territorial units for statistical purposes set up 
by the Commission in order to collect regional statistics.
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In order to test the hypotheses, a comparative analysis of the two Objective one regions, 
Ireland and Sardinia was deemed optimal for four reasons. First, the thesis is concerned 
with local development in territorial rather than sectoral terms and thus, it examines 
institution creation through Cohesion Policy in Objective one regions. Objective one 
regions, in fact, are defined according to territorial (GDP per capita etc.) as opposed to 
sectoral indicators. Objective 1 regions were chosen because they are the poorest in the 
EU and have tended to benefit from concerted policy efforts over long periods and across 
multiple sectors. Objective i denotes the development and structural adjustment of 
regions where development is lagging behind, including rural areas. This constitutes the 
major priority of Cohesion Policy. About 26.6 per cent of the population live in these 
areas which account for two thirds of funding. Second, cases were selected according to a 
variation in institutions. Thus, the only state that has been defined as a region for 
structural funding purposes - Ireland - was chosen. Sardinia was chosen for its 
institutional differences with Ireland. Third, from a longitudinal point of view, Ireland 
has been at the receiving end of European Cohesion Policy from the initial stages as have 
southern Italian regions, including Sardinia. Fourth, although institutionally different, 
Ireland and Sardinia were chosen because of similarities in territorial and economic 
terms in the late 1980s. That is to say, Sardinia was similar to Ireland along other 
dimensions such as territory and economic indicators etc. but not in relation to the 
intervening variable. The choice of two islands is further bolstered by the specific 
recognition accorded to islands in the Amsterdam Treaty's amendment of article 130a. 
Moreover, the declaration on ‘island-regions’ in the same treaty recognises that “island 
regions suffer from structural handicaps linked to their island status, the permanence of 
which impairs their economic and social development [and that) Community legislation 
must take account of these handicaps and that specific measures may be taken, where 
justified, in favour of these regions in order to integrate them better into the internal 
market on fair conditions” (Declaration on Island Regions).
To recap therefore, both of our cases are Objective 1 region-islands, super-peripheries 
(Loitghlin, 1992:619) and had similar features of “structural backwardness”. 
Furthermore, they were both long-dependent on agriculture which declined in the last 
two decades and have relatively small internal markets as well as a low population 
density (Ireland's population density is almost a third of the EU average and Sardinia’s is 
half)- They are also characterised by young populations (44.5 per cent of the Irish 
population and 37.3 per cent of the Sardinian population are under 25 years). When 
research for this thesis commenced, both regions had unemployment rates that amount 
to about twice the Community average and GDP per capita was well below the EU
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average. The situation has changed somewhat for Ireland, which has undergone 
something of an ‘economic boom’ in the last few years. Both islands have witnessed a 
massive increase in service employment over the last two decades (an increase of 13.5 
and 19.5 per cent in Ireland and Sardinia respectively).
The comparative design breaks from traditional research practices that situate Ireland in 
the “Celtic periphery” and Sardinia in southern Europe or in the southern half of the 
north-south dualistic Italian structure (see inter alia Putnam, 1993). This provides 
several advantages. Firstly, comparing these regions gives 11s an insight into the nuances 
of development and institutions that are not immediately evident when these regions are 
studied in the framework of their immediate geographical contexts. Secondly, it breaks 
with the usual north-south European dichotomy from which several generalisations 
emerge in order to make more non-geography-specific generalisations in relation to 
development and Cohesion Policy within the EU.
Variation in institutions therefore lies at the basis of the choice of cases. The institutional 
context obviously differs in a state-region and region-region. Evidently, there are 
significant difficulties involved in a comparative analysis o f ‘regions’ in the EU: regions 
for Cohesion Policy range from states to regions to counties. Definition is arbitrary as in 
Ireland or historically legitimised as in Italy26. Ireland is an Objective 1 region within a 
sovereign state and Sardinia is an Objective 1 region within a sovereign state: this avoids 
most of the problems arising from the comparative design. In any case, we compare the 
cases through the effects of Cohesion Policy, a policy common to both cases. Nonetheless, 
the fact that Sardinia is a part o f Italy means that it has less leadership capacity than 
Ireland. Elements of leadership capacity are access to negotiating tables; ability to 
identify interests and represent them; and ability to build consensus around strategies 
pursued. Ireland is clearly at an advantage as it enjoys all the resources of a state 
(knowledge, human, powder etc.) and yet it is a region for the purposes of Cohesion Policy. 
The interests of region-Ireland are readily identified and pursued by state-Ireland in 
different institutional settings, wrhereas Sardinia's interests are not so readily identified 
nor represented by Italy. State-Ireland can wield its authority and build consensus 
around strategies adopted by region-Ireland at a national level more readily than 
Sardinia. In sum, state-Ireland adds capacity to region-Ireland in a way that Italy does
Tills refers more to the so-called ‘special’ regions which were established in the post-war period 
rather than the ‘ordinary’ legions established in the 1970s especially since there were some 
controversies surrounding the latter see O’Neill (1996).
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not vis-à-vis Sardinia. The consequences of this difference are explored in the empirical 
chapters and issues o f leadership are discussed in Chapter 7.
An obvious question that arises from our comparative design is whether the fact that EU 
Cohesion Policy is directed at all sorts of ‘regions' leads to different institutional 
outcomes. Is institution building easier in state-regions than regions? Why? Are the 
results more durable in the former than in the latter over time? Do they constitute the 
kind of institutional reforms envisaged by the European Commission or are they mere 
expedients in order to access Structural Funds? Another question that emerges is the 
extent to which the move from ‘state-to-region-and-back-to-state’ emphasis in EU 
Cohesion Policy is an accurate characterisation of reality in terms of power-shifts. 
However, it is not enough to explain differences between the cases in terms of state 
versus region. Furthermore, we are not concerned with showing the differences between 
states and regions in EU Cohesion Policy processes. The thesis also looks at the sub-state 
and sub-regional level since the emphasis is on local development. Thus, the fact that one 
of our cases is a state and the other is a region does not reduce the comparison to a state- 
region comparison.
The period of study begins with the advent of the ERDF and continues up the third 
programming period currently underway. For analytical purposes the examination of the 
case-studies were divided into two periods which correspond to Section ÏI and Section III 
respectively: the first period of Cohesion Policy and the second one. The case-studies are 
presented separately in two chapters each in these two sections. Comparative lessons are 
drawn in Section IV to inform the initial theoretical framework.
Working questions
Section II addresses the kind of mismatch between the cases and Cohesion Policy’s 
delivery system. It explores if, how and what kind of institutions were built in the first 
programming period of Cohesion Policy. The European Commission tries to impose a 
fairly tightly designed response to the needs of a region (McAleavey, 1995:191). Section 
III investigates whether these institutions bear the imprint of the European Commission 
or of member states. Are institutions effective? That is to say, do they fulfil the tasks for 
which they wrere set up or is there a slippage from initial objectives? Why? Is it due to 
contextual factors or openness of existing institutions to new structures and EU policy? 
Are the structures responsive to local conditions? To what extent are institutional 
structures of partnership designed to ensure local flexibility and adaptability to unfolding 
circumstances? As we have seen in general, the new institutions created are partnerships
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as the Commission has tended to make ali parts of Cohesion Policy rotate around 
partnership as a structure. How do these partnerships work? Do all actors all have the 
same ideas and priorities? Is there clarity and agreement on functions? Is partnership 
conducive to decision-making, communication and co-ordination? Is partnership a 
method that works?
Moreover, through examining experiences with local development, Section III attempts 
to characterise institutional change in the cases and following questions are addressed. Is 
it easier to build institutions at a local level in centralised unitary states or in 
decentralised autonomous regions? Why? If so are institution changes wrought by 
Cohesion Policy more valid in central unitary states? In other words has the involvement 
of actors with little or no experience led to the improvement of policy? What explanatory' 
variables can be mooted to interpret the answers to these questions.
Research data sources
A wide variety of sources were put to use in this research. Publications and articles on EU 
Cohesion Policy continue to multiply due, inter alia, to the changing nature of the same. 
Such proliferation requires a lot of effort on behave of researchers to keep abreast. 
Institutional and local development literature were perused in order to set out the 
theoretical framework of the research. As is evident in Box 1, the primary sources 
employed include official reports from EU institutions, the Irish government and 
Sardinian authorities as well as press cuttings from Irish and Italian newspapers.
Box 1: Sources employed
Seconda ry literature;
Official reports (Irish, Italian, EU);
Policy documents (Irish, Italian, EU);
Press cuttings (Irish, Italian, International);
Programme evaluations (Irish, Italian, EU);
Over 50 actors interviewed over different time periods;
World wide web
Programme evaluations provide useful data and discussion points but are treated with 
some circumspection as the fact that they are commissioned by actors involved in 
programmes means that conclusions are not always entirely objective. As Majone 
(1989:156) illustrates
“evaluators of administrative programmes are justiflcationists at heart -  their 
working hypothesis is that the programme is accomplishing what it set out to 
do -  but falsificationists bv necessity. [..] We can say that the target of the
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arrow of evaluation is shaped while the arrow is already in the air. Evaluation 
does not assume a fully articulated policy or programme; it builds it.” .
Interviews were unconstructed and open-ended and took place between 1995 to 1997. 
Government and Commission officials as well as officials of local bodies, councillors, 
MEPs and regional and local authorities and policy analysts were interviewed. The world 
wide web has constituted a revolution for researchers: it has been an important data 
source enabling constant consultation of copious documentation and keeping abreast of 
developments.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored institutionalist literature and embraced the bridging faculties 
o f Europeanisation literature in order to set out a theoretical framework for ascertaining 
how the European Commisssion builds institution in member states through the delivery 
system of Cohesion Policy. In particular, the principle of partnership, an integrated 
approach and the need for evaluation have enabled the European Commission to build 
institutions in Objective 1 regions, albeit informally. As we shall see in the next as well as 
subsequent case-study specific chapters, partnership makes it necessary to build review 
or monitoring structures; the Community initiative LEADER requires\\\ Local Action 
Groups; local development requires local partnerships; an integrated approach requires 
co-ordinating structures both locally and nationally; evaluation leads to structures for 
policy learning. The ethos behind all of this is decentralisation, partnership and 
subsidiarity. The extent to which the European Commission has been able to build 
institutions in Objective 1 regions through the delivery system of Cohesion Policy varies 
in member-states. The comparative design described herein provides a useful frame for 
determining the causes of variation as the cases have different institutional 
characteristics. This kind of study provides insight into the influence of the European 
Commission as well as its ability to bring about the kind of reforms it wishes indirectly. 
More generally, it illustrates the potential and limits of indirect institution building as 
opposed to direct institutional reform in a transnational policy context. Furthermore, it 
points out existing institutional and non-institutional obstacles to institution building. 
The next chapter of this section forays into the development of Cohesion Policy from its 
inception through its several reforms, thus setting the context for the subsequent case- 
study sections (II and III).
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Chapter 2
Polic>T Context: The Development of Cohesion Policy’
Introduction
“Cohesion Policy more than any other EU policy area, provides a compelling 
field of analysis to ascertain the extent to which a ‘supranational’ common 
policy changes or is changed by entering into contact with EU regions and 
localities” (Hooghe 1997).
This chapter charts the development of Cohesion Policy, from the inception of the 
European Regional Development Fund in 1975 to the recent Amsterdam treaty. Through 
Cohesion Policy the European Commission has sought to build institutions equipped 
with an economic, social and political rationale (Hooghe & Keating 1994). Its economic 
rationale stems from the fact that intervention is necessary to overcome the adverse 
effects of market integration on poor regions. A commitment to protect workers from 
adverse consequences and disruptions entailed by market integration is at the basis of its 
social rationale. Lastly, the political rationale arises because of the legitimacy it lends to a 
new economic and political order, especially in regions that may lose out from change 
(Hooghe & Keating i994:368-370).This ‘institution building’ strategy culminated in 1988 
with the reform of the Structural Funds and the introduction of partnership, only to falter 
with the 1993 reform. It reached its peak subsequently, however, with first, the shift of 
emphasis in development terms from regional to local, second, the shift of policy concern 
to employment issues, and third the linking of policies to combat unemployment and to 
build new employment with the local spatial scale. In a way, the kind of institution 
building that the European Commission has hoped to engender regionally has been 
extended to the local level.
Hooghe (1997:1) asserts that Cohesion Policy is a fascinating area of study because of the 
tension that exists between EU policy and regional diversity. Moreover, it is highly 
suitable for our study of institution building for three reasons. First, EU Cohesion Policy 
is the only explicit redistribution policy for member states as competition niles narrow 
the options of states with developmental problems. In fact, Cohesion Policy is at the heart 
o f  the “social Europe” and attempts to eschew the US model. For this reason, it is 
important to decipher whether Cohesion Policy’s development objectives are enhanced or 
constrained by institutional issues. Second, whether or not it constitutes a side-payment 
to the losers of the free market and Economic and Monetary' Union at an inter-
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governmental level is not of relevance here. What is important, by contrast, is its 
usefulness as a tool for institution building and in local development. From forays into 
local development theoretical literature, it is assumed that increased attention to 
institutional issues in local development elicits far more dividends in the long-term than 
large infrastructure projects such as roads. Third, the degree to which Cohesion Policy 
can impact on local development structures is to a large extent affected by pre-existing 
institutional structures. However, these ought to be taken account of from the initial 
region-specific formulation of policy programmes. In fact, Cohesion Policy provides 
insight into how a supranational common policy looks different when implemented in 
different member states due to variations in political practice, institutions and actors, 
and the effects o f failure to take these variations into account. The vast literature that 
Cohesion Policy'' has evoked tends to overlook these factors. For many (Hooghe 1996; 
Marks 1993) Cohesion Policy represents part of the Commission’s strategy to penetrate 
the politics and society of member states. However, the nature of this penetration at a 
local level, arguably the most relevant level for the citizen and thus EU legitimacy, is 
rarely considered. Moreover, much of the literature is concerned with how Cohesion 
Policy alters territorial politics within members states (McAleavev 1995), how' as a 
consequence of Cohesion Policy, some regions mobilise and are represented in Brussels 
(Hooghe 1995)» and how some regions can by-pass the national gate-keeper (Bache 
1998). Little analysis is offered of changes wrought vis-à-vis local development as 
opposed to vis-à-vis EU institutions or changing structures for local development. 
Furthermore, modifications in regions' prevailing strategies-? with respect to local 
development practices do not elicit much academic discussion.
The unit of analysis is policy for two reasons. Firstly, in cross-national comparison, 
formal organisations are less important as units of analysis than policy processes 
(Bogason 1995). This is because formal organisations are more difficult to compare 
across states than policy processes, and in particular, supranational policies. Second, 
analysing institutions per se, can result in a static analysis and risks missing out on some 
of the nuances linked to the process nature of policy. Policy components are instrument 
settings, instruments and the hierarchy of goals behind policy (Hall 1993: 279). We take 
the core of the EU’s Cohesion Policy (that is the supranational part) as given and analyse 
it at the point in which it begins to interact with sub-national institutions. This is 
because, although Cohesion Policy is a supranational policy it does not translate equally 
in all regions. Rather, a region-specific policy document emerges from negotiations
Scharpf (1984:257-290) defines pix'vailing strategy as “[..] an overall understanding, among those 
w h o  e x e rc is e  e ffe ct ive  p o w e r ,  o f  a  se t  o f  d e c is io n  p r e m is e s  in t e g r a t in g  w o r ld - v ie w s ,  g o a ls  a n d  m e a n s " .
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between the Commission and regional authorities: the Community Support Framework 
(CSF) and its Operational Programmes (OPs). The CSF thus reflects differing priorities 
and approaches that are formulated according to the prevailing strategies of negotiators. 
Some elements of Cohesion Policy, such as Community Initiatives remain largely similar 
across regions. While acknowledging that Cohesion is “an inherently ambiguous concept*' 
(McAleavey & De Rynck 1997:4), we do not dwell upon its ambiguity. Rather, Cohesion 
Policy here refers to the ElFs objective of cohesion pursued under the auspices of the 
Structural Funds.
Instruments o f  Cohesion Policy
The instalments of Cohesion Policy are the Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF) and 
the Cohesion Fund. The European Regional Development Fund was set up in 1975 in 
order to strengthen economic potential in assisted regions by supporting structural 
adjustment and helping growth and lasting employment. Between 1989 and 1993, ERDF 
resources accounted for 45 per cent of total EU structural intervention. The European 
Social Fund was set up under the Treaty of Rome and since 1988 has aimed to combat 
long-term unemployment, improve the employability of young people and, since 1993, 
promote adaptation to industrial change. It accounted for 31 per cent of overall 
intervention in 1989 to 1993. The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
was established in 1962 as part of the Common Agricultural Policy to promote structural 
adjustment in agriculture in the context of the overall reform of the CAP through 
measures to modernise production and develop rural areas. Between 1989 and 1993 it 
accounted for 17.6 per cent of overall intervention. The FIFG was established in 1994 and 
was granted 1.9 per cent of total resources. Finally, the Cohesion Fund was set up in 1993 
to help prepare poorer member states for European Monetary Union and it is principally 
governed by a ‘compensatory mechanism*. Before the most recent reform of the funds in 
1999, in w'hich much rationalisation was undertaken, there were seven objectives, four of 
which w'ere regional and accounted for 85 per cent of funding, and 3 Community-wide, 
which accounted for 15 per cent. A share of 9 per cent of Structural Funds went to 
Community Initiatives, which are used principally to explore innovative approaches, and 
1 per cent to fund technical assistance and other innovative measures. Now there are 
three broad objectives and three Community' Initiatives. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with the ERDF because it is directly concerned with local development rather 
than the ESF w'hich deals with training and human resources elements. Community 
Initiatives are also of interest, and in particular, the LEADER initiative.
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From Redistribution to Cohesion
European Cohesion Policy evolved first, from the mere co-ordination of national regional 
policy measures in order to ensure conformity with the treaties (from 1973 to 1979), to 
second, creating specific Community hinds for regional development (from 1979 to 1988) 
to third, attempts at a positive Community Cohesion Policy by amalgamating Cohesion 
Policy instruments with coherent programmes (from 1988 to 1993) (Keating 1995:13). A 
retreat to a more national style came about subsequently (from 1993 to 1999), and finally, 
an overhaul was scheduled ostensibly due to new and imminent member states, leading 
to rationalisation and the incorporation of efficiency considerations (in 1999). These 
development will now be examined in more detail. The nature of the original Cohesion 
Policy of the EEC stretches both the concepts of policy and cohesion to a considerable 
extent. Helmut Schmidt’s characterisation of the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) which constituted the Community’s cohesion policy28 is much more appropriate:
“..a mechanism for redistributing finance clothed in a pair of bathing trunks
with ‘regional policy painted on them” (Millan 1990:126)
This was the case in spite of the fact that from the outset, harmonious economic 
development had been a concern of the EEC as is evident from the regional dimension 
added to the Social Fund and the EIB in the Treaty of Rome. In fact, Cohesion Policy 
began to take shape only after the first enlargement in 1973 as a consequence o f the 
potentially adverse effects of individual member states’ regional policies on the very 
ethos of the Community, which was largely free market orientated. Initially, the policy 
had no specific rationale and was a rather haphazard affair since the very nature of the 
policy was to be an accompanying measure to the plethora of other functions and policies 
for which the EEC was responsible. Furthermore, it was linked to the political bargaining 
process of decision-making (Mawson et a l  1985). The ERDF, which appeared in 1975, 
was a paltry measure and certainly not the first step on the way to an integrated 
Community policy for regional development. In the words of an anonymous Commission 
official,
“[t]he Fund is an alibi for inaction, instituted because it was the only regional
policy on which the Heads of State could agree” (George 1991:194)
The birth o f the ERDF is to be seen in the context of the first enlargement (to the UK and 
Ireland). A favourable coalition o f member states (the UK, Ireland and Italy) secured the 
fund and it was linked to their participation in the European Council (Ireland and Italy), 
as well as putting up with the ills of the CAP (the UK). The negotiations for the ERDF 
centred on three main issues: size, definition of eligible areas, and mechanisms for the
Regional. Structural and Cohesion refer to one and the same thing.
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allocation of assistance (Mavvson et a/. 1985:25). Loans from the EIB were also a part of 
this putative Cohesion Policy and a Regional Policy' Committee was established to 
observe the development of the regions and advise the Commission and the Council. The 
problem at this stage was that national interests varied greatly due to the diversity of 
socio-economic conditions (Kiljunen 1980:219). The w'ay the ERDF was allocated, that is, 
according to regulation specific national quotas, illustrates the nature of this embryonic 
policy: the Community funded national measures and, most of the time Community 
funds replaced national spending and certainly did not constitute an additional source of 
finance.
Cohesion Policy began to gain momentum in 1977 in the wake of the Commission's 
Guidelines for Community Regional Policy. In 1979 the ERDF was reformed and a 
quota-free section was introduced. This section, which accounted for 5 per cent2? of total 
spending, entailed a Community dimension for the first time as it was to operate 
according to the Commission’s own criteria. Despite the fact that it was a limited amount 
o f money, this section enabled the Commission to innovate and introduce the so-called 
‘programme contract* which constituted a co-ordinated package of initiatives agreed 
between the Commission and member states, and targeted at a specific regional problem 
(Armstrong 1989:176). However, there were no contacts with sub-national actors. 
Furthermore, the quota system (absorbing 95 per cent of the fund) constrained the 
Commission’s room for manoeuvre as applications went through national ministries on a 
project-by-project basis. Nevertheless, the first attempts at programming are evident 
herein, and a regional impact assessment system was set up in order to take into account 
the regional implications of other Community policies.
Several criticisms can be raised in relation to the ERDF at this stage. Firstly, it was 
inherently ambiguous as although it was supposed to alleviate regional problems of a 
structural backwardness nature, a quarter was spent in regions undergoing industrial 
decline (Latella 1990:235-43). This was because the system used to measure imbalances 
and the sectoral and geographical distribution of ERDF allocations were faulty'. Secondly, 
Cohesion Policy was diluted by virtue of the fact that it sufficed for member states to 
present problems of industrial decline in order to avail of moneys. Thus there was no 
selective intervention (ibid.) nor control o f applications (Croxford et al. 1987:26-8). 
Thirdly, the fund was simply too small to make any real impact. Fourthly, expenditure 
w'as not co-ordinated and grants wrere allocated ad hoc to individual projects. Fifthly,
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The Commission had initially proposed to allocate 13 per cent to the quota-free section hut failed to 
secure agreement at the Council of Ministers.
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there was no concentration of resources (ibid.). Tsoukalis explains the main, recurring 
problem with the fund:
“It is highly indicative that for years the overwhelming majority of projects 
receiving ERDF assistance had begun before application for funds was made 
by national governments [as] in the attempt to achieve high absorption rates 
of funds allocated by the Commission, national and regional administrations 
were often tempted to sacrifice economic efficiency” (Tsoukalis 1991:214).
At this stage, regional problems were considered to be within member states and not 
between them which partly explains the lack of support for reform and the emphasis on 
drawing down funds as opposed to policy formulation.
Once again in 1984 Cohesion Policy was reformed. The Commission proposed that the
ERDF should concentrate on two types o f regional problems: regions characterised by
structural under-development for which the quota section should be reserved; and
regions in industrial decline or suffering from the adverse effects of Community policies
for which the non-quota section was to be reserved and raised to 20 per cent of the
ERDF. These proposals which, to a certain extent, presage the reforms carried out in
1988, were not accepted so readily and thus underwent modification. The final proposal
resulted in the abolition of the distinction between quota and non-quota sections and the
introduction instead of indicative ranges for each member state’s share.'*0 In essence, this
meant increased discretion for the ERDF in financial allocation. Five absolute priority
regions were identified and the concept of programming was introduced in two forms.
First, Community Programmes w^ ere to be initiated by the Community to help solve
problems affecting the socio-economic situation in regions: these generally involved
more than one member state. Second, National Programmes of Community Interest
(NPCI) were to be initiated by member states with the approval of the EC (Armstrong
1989: 177). Priority was given to the former and the Commission laid down criteria for
evaluating both national and Community interest programmes. Moreover, the Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes (IMP) were introduced in 1985 for France, Italy and Greece
and constituted the first attempt at integrated planning. They were primarily intended to
compensate for the adverse effects of the CAP in the Community’s southern regions,
(Tsoukalis 1991:215) and to boost economic development in Mediterranean regions
exposed to competition from Spain and Portugal. As Bianchi ( i9 9 3 ;49) illustrates.
“[...] the IMPs have in many wavs and for the first time instilled a proper 
planning attitude in regions where planning had been absent; they initiated 
an unprecedented institutional partnership among regional, national and 
Community authorities; and they have stimulated some genuine participation
-• Regulation 1787/84.
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by local officials and interest groups in the decision-making process regarding
the formulation and administration of regional social and economic policies”.
He considers the IMPs to be “a major break with previous trends in the Community’s 
regional policy and the precursor to the formulation of the Community Support 
Frameworks'’ (Bianchi 1993:49 )* The IMPs introduced three principles: integrated 
development, evaluation and control as well as a policy to be conceived and implemented 
at a pertinent geographical level (spatial concentration). Integrated Development 
Operations (IDO) were also introduced to resuscitate inner cities.
The 1984 reform was in some ways a big change in emphasis and procedure for the EC’s 
Cohesion Policy. However, some fundamental problems and continuities remained. 
Firstly, although the introduction of the indicative range system was supposed to 
stimulate more applications and increase the Commission’s discretion in order to render 
the ERDF less like a grant for national regional policies, the so-called “community 
interest” of applications was difficult to assess due to vague criteria. Secondly, the 
programme approach had a difficult teething period because of increased administrative 
costs. The costs stemmed from the stipulation that member states had to submit 
information on development in the assisted regions in a common format on a regular 
basis. Thirdly, infrastructure projects continued to receive the lion’s share of spending. 
Fourthly, evaluation was difficult as was monitoring. On the basis of these problems, 
Mawson et a l  conclude that the 1984 reform constituted “largely procedural changes to a 
marginal policy” (1985:46-55). However, the Commission did gain discretion, which was 
put to good use in the next reform. Furthermore, the period up to 1988 can be considered 
a trial period for further reforms as initial problems were taken into account in 1988. Not 
all problems were however catered for in the 1988 reform, as difficulties in the post-1988 
period were already evident during the 1984 to 1988 period. It is to the 1988 reform, 
arguably the most important one in the development of the policy,»1 that the chapter now 
turns.
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Paradigm shift
“Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can 
be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are 
meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993:279-280).
3« Most authors concur on this point. See for example, Bailey & Do Pmpris (2002),
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The above interpretative framework refers to what Hail (1993) calls a policy paradigm. A 
policy paradigm, or the hierarchy of goals behind policy, is extremely influential because 
it is not open to scrutiny or questioning. The other components of policy, instrument 
settings and instruments can be modified without affecting the policy paradigm. A 
paradigm shift occurs when the above interpretative framework is altered and this often 
depends on the effects of exogenous factors on the power of one set of actors or the 
positional advantage o f competing factions. Furthermore, it is likely to be preceded by a 
shift in the locus of authority over policy as well as policy experimentation and failure 
(ibid.). The 1988 reform constitutes a paradigm shift as the hierarchy of goals behind 
Cohesion Policy changed. In fact, European Cohesion Policy moved from a mechanism 
for inter-state transfers of moneys to a genuine Cohesion Policy. It was achieved through 
incremental alterations at the margins o f policy throughout the 1980s. This last point is 
borne out by the fact that the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes contained many 
elements of the 1988 reform and can thus be seen as the harbingers of 1988. 
Furthermore, examining the policy from 1975, when the regional fund was instituted, 
until 1988, it becomes evident that the Commission was attempting to bring about 
changes that were often blocked at the Council of Ministers. Favourable circumstances 
had a lot to do with the pulling through of these reforms in 1988. For instance, the reform 
must be seen in the context of the Single European Market (SEM) project. In fact, 
Cohesion Policy became a constitutional provision in the wake o f  the Single European Act 
(SEA). The effects of the SEM were generally perceived to be positive for core as wrell as 
periphery areas o f the Community as is evident in the Cecchini report on the internal 
market. In fact, Cecchinis conclusions demonstrated a rather sanguine view and if it had 
been the only report to emerge in this period, perhaps the Commission’s proposed 
reforms would not have been so readily accepted. In contrast to Cecchini, the Padoa- 
Schioppa report commissioned by the Commission was less optimistic and displayed 
some degree of caution with regard to the effects of the internal market in the absence of 
policies to enhance the competitiveness of the less developed areas of the Community. 
Thus. Padoa-Schioppa favoured the Commission’s proposals for reform and legitimised 
its initiatives. The reform also has to be seen in the context o f enlargement with the 
addition of the Iberian Peninsula to the coalition of less developed countries. Hence, now' 
more than ever a cohesion policy was necessary. The shift in regional economic 
development theory from large scale infrastructure projects and from an emphasis on 
exogenous development to endogenous development, which required the participation of 
local actors, favoured the Commission’s new approach and provided yet another 
rationale for a paradigm shift.
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The 1988 reform is therefore due to a several factors. It can be seen in terms of issue- 
linkage, as it is doubtful whether it would have come about in the absence of the SEM 
and the Commission was careful to link the two directly. George holds that the reform 
came about as a result of an “old-fashioned package deal”, which fits in to the “general 
rule” dictating that “successful policies at the Community level have resulted from a 
commitment by the member states to a package of interlocking measures which has 
offered something to each of the participants” (1991:199-200). In this case all of the 
participants got “something” because the reform was tied to the SEM. A favourable 
coalition of member states with the addition of Spain and Portugal ensured peripheral 
state support for the Commission’s proposals. The “paying” countries’ support was 
secured because of the perceived advantages to be gleaned from the internal market. 
Furthermore, reduced Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) expenditure opened the way 
for more money to be spent on structural policy. Not to be overlooked however, is the 
policy entrepreneurship or leadership of the Commission, which exploited these 
favourable circumstances in order to push through its reforms.'12 As shall be seen below, 
these reforms increased the power and control of the Commission, provided an 
increasing role for sub-national authorities and, decreased the role of member states in 
the finer points of policy formulation once the broad objectives and spending limits were 
decided in the Council of Ministers. It is to the details of this reform that the chapter now 
turns.
The ERDF, the ESF and the guidance part of the EAGGF/FEOGA had been amalgamated 
and became collectively known as the Structural Funds with the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986. This amalgamation meant that they became more responsive to a strategic 
view (O'Dwyer 1993:19). The 1988 reform:« emphasised the co-ordination of the funds 
and a new Directorate-General for Co-ordination (DG-XXII) was established. Funding 
was doubled from 7 billion ECU to 14 billion ECU for the first round of the Structural 
funds which ran from 1989 to 1993 and became known as Delors I. One of the principles 
of the reform was concentration, which meant that funds were to be taigeted on specific 
objectives that classified the different regional problems (see Table 2).
^ Hooglic and Keating explain the reform by the “presence of a winning coalition: leadership from the 
Commission; a policy rationale; and a value framework” (1995:373).
The reform was based on five regulations which in turn were largely based on Articles I30d and 130c 
of the Treat)’ of Rome and became operational on 1 January 1989: framework regulation N0.2052/88; 
coordinating regulation No.4253/88; and implementing regulations Nos.4254/88, 4255/88, 4256/88 
(Mulreany et u/, 1993:194).
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Table 2: Cohesion Policy Objectives
Prion ties Meaning Instruments to be used Spending 1989-1993
Objective i regions whose development 
is lagging behind (GNP per 
capita is no more than 75 
per cent of the EC average
ERDF, ESF, EAGGF 
guidance. EIE. ECSC(80 
percent of ERDF resources 
devoted to these regions)
77til
Objective 2 industrial declining regions ERDF, ESF, EIB, ECSC
Objective 3 assistance for the Iong-term 
unemployment
ESF, EIB, ECSC #
Objective 4 occupational integration of 
young people
ESF, EIB. ECSC 9%
Objective 5a* adjustment of agricultural 
stnjctures especially 
production, processing and 
marketing structures in 
agriculture and forestry
EAGGF, guidance section
Ohjectivesh development of rural areas EAGGF, guidance section, 
ERDF. ESF, EIB
6%
Legend: # - s , ___ ^
are taken together: * - Object iv
3 an
in the context of the reform of the CAP.
The programme approach that had been tentatively introduced with the IMPs was 
consolidated and based on three elements: Development Plan, CSF, OP (O’Dwyer 1993:8- 
9). Table 3 outlines the programming process.
Table 3: From Development Plans to Operational Programmes
Development Plan provided by the member to include
states -an analysis of problems 
-strategy
-principal measures to be used 
- ft n a 11 ci a 1 res< >u i ces 
-assistance sought from the 
funds
-anticipated private sector 
participation
Com munity Support drawn up by the to include
Framework (CSF) Commission -priorities for joint Community 
and national action 
-a 3 to 5 year integrated 
programme
Operational Programmes (OP) the basis for Community 
assistance
A crucial principle^ of the reform and one that has given rise to much academic analysis 
is the principle o f partnership. Partnership refers to the
0 Subsidiarity is also supposed to be a principle of inter alia EU regional policy. No attempt will he 
made here to debate the meaning and consequences of this political principle for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is an example of language "bearing multiple meanings” (Golub. 1996:1) and thus means different 
things to different people. Secondly, it applies exclusively to Comm unity/Union-mem her state 
relations at the request of the majority of member states. Since this thesis is not concerned with either 
state-Community relations or the wav the power pendulum swings, this principle, as defined by the 
EU, is not relevant hero.
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“close consultation between the Commission, the member state concerned, 
and the competent national, regional, local, or other competent authorities 
designated by the member state on a national, regional, local, or other level, 
with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal” [emphasis 
added] (European Commission 1989).
It is supposed to be taken into account in the preparation, financing, monitoring and 
assessment of the effects of structural measures. This principle had several consequences 
for the operation of Cohesion Policy in institutional terms and in terms of power 
distribution. Firstly, it was institutionalised “by way of a cascade of co-decision 
committees and supporting rules” bringing several actors in the policy process (Hooghe 
1995:4 )* Secondly, in terms of power distribution, partnership constituted “the most 
sustained and most comprehensive effort to bring together policy actors at different 
levels of governance” thus giving responsibility to actors previously excluded from the 
process (ibid.). Evidently, the operationalisation of partnership varied from state to state 
and depended to a large extent on existing power structures as well as the degree of 
decentralisation. Furthermore, it is up to member states to designate the competent 
authorities.
Although additionality was not a new principle and had been introduced with other
reforms, it was a slippery principle and there were no mechanisms to ensure it was
adhered to. It essentially means that Structural Fund finance should “induce additional
investment, not simply substitute for domestic investment” (Matthews 1994:22). Hence
it is supposed to ensure that the funds have a
“genuine additional impact in the regions concerned and result in at least an 
equivalent increase in the total volume of official or similar (Community and 
national) structural aid in the Member State concerned, taking into account 
the macro-economic circumstances in which the funding takes place” 
(European Commission 1989:31).
Conditionality, which means that funds are not simply doled out to member states to use
as they please, had been introduced earlier but was enshrined in the 1988 reforms. It
meant that funds had to be invested according to the framework of Commission policies
(Matthews 1988:181). In this way, the Commission was to be saved from being caught up
in the details of minor projects. Conditionality was defined as
“the Community's scope for ensuring that the objectives which it has set are 
complied with and thus making its assistance subject to its own consideration 
of effectiveness” (European Commission 1983:6).
Conditionality combined with additionality gives up another principle: complementarity.
It ensured an increased power and status for the Commission (Matthews 1988:180-181).
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The so-called Community Initiatives were introduced in the 1988 reform (see Table 4)'1-'. 
The Commission holds responsibility for these trans-national, cross-border and inter­
regional initiatives, which are characterised by an ethos of bottom-up development. They 
were aimed at resolving problems associated with other Community policies and were to 
receive between 7 and 9 per cent of total structural funding. Since the Commission 
controls them, it has gained in terms of room for manoeuvre to innovate.
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Table 4: Community Initiatives
Programme Objective Budget in million 
ECU 1980-93
Rechar conversion of coal-mining areas 30 0
Ei wireg protection for the environment in lagging regions 500
Stride improve innovation and R&D capacity of lagging regions 400
1 n terreg prepare border regions for in tenia! market completion 800
Regis assist integration of most remote (overseas) regions 200
Regen encourage development of natural gas and electricity 
networks in lagging regions
300
Prisma improve infrastructure and business services in lagging 
regions
lO O
Télématique encourage use of advanced telecommunications in 
lagging regions
200
LEADER foster innovative approaches to rural development 
planning
100
Euroform cultivate co-operation between educational authorities 
leading to new qualifications
300
NOW support integration of women into the work-force 120
Horizon aid economic and social integration of handicapped
people
180
Source: Mazey (1995:85).
The LEADER programme is the most relevant Community Initiative of interest for this 
thesis because it is geared towards fostering an integrated approach to rural development 
and is separate from the measures for rural development under the CSFs.
In terms of Cohesion Policy, 1988 represents a watershed. Thus, for the purpose of this 
study, it is considered the most significant reform for a number of reasons. Firstly, by 
creating direct links between the Structural Funds and regional institutions, centralised 
decision-making was challenged within member states (Marks 1992:213). In 
decentralised states, regional authorities acquired more input into the policy process and 
other local actors were also included. Thus the importance of the role to be played by 
sub-national authorities was recognised. Although Marks (1992:213) claims that the 
reforms initiated a process of institution building that “in a narrow sense.. depoliticizefs] 
.. a key and growing policy area”, the opposite is held to be the case here. That is to say, 
by stipulating the inclusion of multiple actors in the policy process, the policy area was
Regulation No.4254/88
removed from the reserve of national governments and the Council of Ministers. The 
process was no longer exclusively inter-governmental or supranational. O f course, 
funding was still decided at the Council of Ministers and the Commission laid down the 
1988 regulations. However, the policy became more visible and more politically salient at 
a sub-national level and hence at a local level it became more rather than less politicised. 
Much has been written on the Commission's strategy in this regard. Matthews 
(1988:180-1) holds that it sought to maximise its power and status while Marks 
(1992:213) maintains that it sought to “technocratize" Cohesion Policy in order to control 
it further. .Jones sees the Commission’s strategy as one of encouraging regional lobbyists 
to generate institutional innovations at a regional level. He calls this process “leakage" 
which refers to the increasingly important role for sub-national authorities informally as 
opposed to formally (Jones 1985:235-6). This is evident in the fact that most member 
states adjusted administrative organisations in accordance with the rules laid down by 
the Commission (Bianchi 1993:39). The novel stipulation of monitoring resulted in the 
creation of monitoring committees composed of Community, national, regional and local 
actors (Coombes & Rees 1991:214). This resulted in the de facto  delegation of control to 
the regional level.
Some problems also emerged with the operationalisation of the reform. First, the ERDF
operation as well as the operation of the other funds has shown up the lack of efficiency
o f some regional and national administrations or what G rote (1995) has called,
“competence disparities". This is because the partnership relationship was to a
considerable extent dependent on existing institutional structures. Taking this argument
further, the implication is that decentralised and functioning administrations are at an
advantage as institutional structures exist for them to implement partnership and hence
perform better, while unitary states with functioning or dysfunctional administrations
are at a disadvantage as they do not have the kind of institutional structures necessary to
implement partnership and hence perform badly in relation to Cohesion Policy. In fact,
Bailey and De Propris (2002:408) argue that
“heterogeneity in the forms of local governance across the European Union 
has undermined the success of structural policies and therefore the 
achievement o f the broader aim of economic convergence".
Second, the administrative limitations of the Commission were exposed because there
was no concurrent alteration of the Commissions administrative procedures with the
increase in its workload (Tsoukalis 1991:219-20). Third, often the programming
approach proved to be too complicated, a point that was conceded in the mid-term
review. This was once again because of capacity or capability' disparities. For example, a
state with an unwieldy bureaucracy such as Italy, which is accustomed to longer time
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periods for public works etc. has many problems with Cohesion Policy and in particular, 
with meeting deadlines (for spending, committing etc.). Fourth, the Commission's 
Com mu nit)- Initiatives were criticised for being too dispersed in the mid-term review. 
The fact that they operate independently of the other programmes leads to overlap and 
confusion. Fifthly, the notion o f “region" has deliberately been left vague with the result 
that regions are defined by member states.^6 In an extreme case, a state defined itself as a 
region (Ireland), thus apparently scuppering any (perceived or real) attempts on behalf of 
the Commission to encourage a decentralisation of administrative structures.
Maastricht, the Cohesion Fund and beyond
The Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht) made cohesion one of the three 
pillars (the other two are EMU and the single market) of the EU, thus consolidating the 
EU’s commitment to cohesion. It also provided for the Cohesion Fund in the protocol on 
economic and social cohesion. This fund was directed at peripheral states subsequently 
known as the Cohesion four (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal). The policy emphasis 
was on environmental projects and trans-European networks, it came about mainly due 
to the intense pressure exercised by the Cohesion four (especially Spain) during the 
Maastricht negotiations. Once again it was linked to another Community policy, this 
time Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and thus can be conceptualised as a side- 
payment or part of a package deal. Suffice it to say that it cannot be explained in the 
absence of some sort of issue-linkage. What is significant about the Cohesion Fund is the 
fact that it is directed at states not regions. Thus the unit of analysis for developmental 
purposes moved in the opposite direction to the 1988 reforms, that is to say, from region 
to state. It was justified by the fact that EMU regarded states and not regions. However, 
Gonzalez (the then premier of Spain) wpas responsible for this shift in emphasis as in this 
way, four states rather than multiple regions qualified for assistance. This put the reins of 
policy control firmly back into the central state's hands. It also led to the exclusion of 
Objective 1 regions such as the Italian Mezzogiorno. Interestingly, Italian policy-makers 
were not particularly vociferous in their objections to the state emphasis in the Cohesion 
Fund.
The state emphasis in the Cohesion Fund is consistent with the 1993 review in terms of a 
“retreat to a more national style of policy-making" (Hooghe & Keating i994’*386). First, 
this review resulted in the dilution of additionality rules and a narrow escape for
The .so-called NUTS - the nomenclature of regions - denoted three levels of regions for funding 
purposes and was to a certain extent meant to constitute a database of regional indicators.
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partnership, which was becoming unpopular with member states (Hooghe 1997). Second, 
a committee on Community Initiatives was established and increased member state 
influence on these initiatives, which were previously the preserve of the Commission. 
Third, the role of member states in choosing social partners for involvement in various 
programmes was reinforced. Fourth, member states can produce a single programming 
document including their development plan and application for assistance rather than 
waiting for approval of the former, to accordingly draft the latter. This results in a 
simplified and less lengthy process. Finally, member states can draw' up their own lists o f 
eligible areas. Thus the 1993 review sees a shift of balance in favour of member states 
rather than the previous alleged alliance o f the Commission and sub-national authorities.
Enlargement of the EU to Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 led to the tagging on of 
another Objective for sparsely populated areas (Objective 6), which was tailored to the 
latter two states as they are its sole recipients. Since 1988 therefore some piecemeal 
alterations have been made rendering Cohesion Policy unwieldy and blunting its 
objective of concentrating on the most backward regions. For this reason, in its policy 
document Agenda 2000, which was largely approved by the Council, the Commission 
made proposals for change. The first and major change is reducing the current seven 
Objectives to three. Objective 1 will still be for the most backward regions, defined as 
having GDP per capita of 75 per cent less than the EU average. A stricter application of 
this eligibility criterion is proposed but there will be a transitional period for ex-members 
of Objective 1 club.s? Objective 6 is included in the new Objective 1. Objective 2 will be 
directed at economic and social restructuring in regions with structural problems such as 
economic change, declining rural areas, crisis-hit areas dependent on fishing and urban 
areas in difficulty. More geographical concentration is sought, thus there is an emphasis 
on local development. In fact, the Commission aimed to reduce the percentage of the EU 
covered by Objectives 1 and 2 from 51 to 35-40 per cent. In both Objectives, local 
employment initiatives and territorial employment pacts were to be priorities. Whereas 
Objectives 1 and 2 are territorial, the new Objective 3 is horizontal and deals with 
education, training and employment. Concentration is also a priority here and 
programmes will cover the four areas outlined in the European Employment Strategy: 
accompanying economic and social change, life-long education and training, active 
labour market policies to fight unemployment and combating social exclusion. Objectives 
1 and 2 require a single multi-annual programming document, while states can submit a 
national programming document or a set of regional programmes for Objective 3.
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"" This is because previously some member states managed to obtain eligibility for regions that did not 
meet the criterion of GDP per capita less than 75 per cent of the EU average, such as Abruzzo in Italy.
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Community Initiatives will also be cut from 13 to 3 dealing with cross-border, 
transnational, and inter-regional co-operation to promote harmonious and balanced 
spatial planning, rural development and human resources and equal opportunities.-* The 
Cohesion Fund remains (available to member states with a GNP per capita less than 90 
per cent of the EU average) and its “macro-economic conditionality*1 is reinforced. That 
means that Cohesion states must be eligible for the third phase of EMU and must comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. Agenda 2000 also proposes a move towards more 
refundable aid such as venture capital holdings and thus proposes more co-operation 
between the EIB and the Structural Funds. Further, another principle has been 
introduced, that o f efficiency. By retaining a reserve of 10 per cent to be allocated to the 
good performers in the mid-term of the programming period, the Commission aimed to 
improve performance. In relation to financial matters, the Structural Funds remain at 
0.46 per cent of the EU*s GDP as stipulated in Edinburgh, which for the years 2000 to 
2006 comes to 275 BECU. Of this, 45 BECU goes to the acceding new states and the lion's 
share (210 BECU) goes to the existing fifteen. The Cohesion Fund is to be allocated 20 
BECU. Over 60 per cent of funding was proposed for Objective 1 regions, a third for the 
other Objectives and Community Initiatives will account for 5 per cent (European 
Commission 1997)- Agenda 2000 therefore, attempted to tidy up Cohesion Policy. In so 
doing, some regions benefiting from Objective 1 funds in this current round will be 
progressively excluded. Accession of Eastern European states, which lag in terms of GDP 
below the EU average provided further rationale for excluding some states in the name of 
equity and efficiency.
The period from 1975 to 1988 was largely a static period in terms of Cohesion Policy. It 
gained considerable momentum with the reform in 1988 but due to a series of factors, 
this momentum began slowing down again in 1993 and until 2006 at least, Cohesion 
Policy will retain its current budget percentage. The period from 1988 to the present 
seems to be the heyday for concepts such as partnership, and sub-national actor 
involvement in EU policy. Whether this is the case in the case-studies will be examined in 
the two empirical sections. Before concluding this chapter, the increasing importance of 
local development will be briefly charted.
The Emergence of Local Development
Local development has become increasingly salient within EU Cohesion Policy. Until the 
1990s, Cohesion Policy was about ‘regions* and ‘regional development1. Often however,
: 8 They were, in fact, cut to 4: 1NTERREG (cross-border, inter-regional co-operation), LEADER (rural 
development). URBAN (cities) and EQUAL (equal opportunities).
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regions refer to states (e.g. Ireland) and regional development refers to preparing states 
for EMU (the Cohesion four). Now local development is acquiring more importance than 
regional development because of links (real or perceived) with the prime EU polity 
concerns of the moment, namely unemployments Using the simple measure of the 
frequency of the adjectives ‘local’ and ‘regional’ in the Commission’s document (May 
1997) on Priorities for the Adjustment o f  the Structural Funds to the end o f  1999. 
Commission Guidelines which attempts to encourage redirecting Structural Funds to 
employment measures in line with the increasing concern with EU unemployment, the 
former appears 25 times while the latter does 15 times. The memorandum from the 
Commission President concerning the European Pact o f  Confidence for Employment 
which constitutes the first progress report of the White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment, illustrates the new association between employment 
and local development at Commission level: regional appears 5 times and local 21 times. 
The Commission’s First Report on Local Development and Employment Initiatives 
(November 1996b Working Paper sec (91)) further testifies to the policy linkage being 
forged between employment and local development at Commission level. In fact, 
Cohesion Policy and employment are being finked and local development has been 
earmarked as the most innovative way of dealing with employment. Hooghe (1997) 
provides evidence that the employment agenda was tagged onto Cohesion Policy in order 
to ensure the survival of the latter which had been falling out of favour due to poor 
results in terms o f real cohesion and in terms of policy effectiveness. McAleavey and De 
Rynck (1997) demonstrate that the Commission’s Cohesion Policy search for partners is 
moving towards localities and away from regions. This is due to, inter alia, the increasing 
concern with territorial concentration of resources (as evident in Agenda 2000 which 
cuts seven objectives to three), as almost all member states are ‘on the take’ from 
Cohesion Policy. Since the problem of unemployment has become an issue of major 
political salience and of huge economic and social consequence, the EU’s (and the 
Commission’s) legitimacy hinges on its tackling (or at least perceived tackling) in policy 
terms. The Luxembourg employment summit demonstrated the Commission’s zeal (DG- 
V) in this respect as it managed (against the will of some member states) to impose 
guidelines on member states along the lines of the Maastricht guidelines for EMU, albeit 
without similar sanctions. Thus, the EU’s legitimacy is tied to dealing with 
unemployment and since resources are scarce, unemployment has been stapled to the 
back of Cohesion Policy. The realisation that jobs are not created by economic growth
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De R>nck & McAleavey (2001:549) point to three developments in the 1990s that illustrate the 
increased concern for local deprivation: ERDF Article 10 and ESF Article 6 actions; URBAN 
Community initiative and the enhanced local targeting of Objective 1 and 2 resources.
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alone, as well as the fact that the Commission, along with many left-wing-led 
governments, is not keen on sacrificing the ElTs social model in favour of a US-type 
scenario, has led to an elevated emphasis on innovative solutions to unemployment 
through the ‘third sector’ or social economy which are generally locally-based and 
emphasise the role of SMEs.
De Rynck & McAleavey (i997; 2001: 551-553) offer four different explanations for this 
shift from regional to local concerns centred on structure, actors, institutions and policy. 
First, horizontal networking by cities has been accompanied by a process in which 
disparities appear at a more micro level. Second, increasingly political importance of 
local office-holders leads them to attempt to perform on a European stage. Third, 
endowing local actors with more responsibility is a way of taking blame from the 
European Commission etc, for unsuccessful policies. Fourth, social and employment 
issues have assumed increasing importance in the European Commission's policy 
hierarchy and the European Commission is seeking to shift the focus of policy at the 
margins away from purely distributive to redistributive actions given its inability to alter 
the Cohesion Policy paradigm tout court. Having a local focus better enables targeting 
specific functional groups which guarantees a redistribution of income and consequently, 
social cohesion, especially given the implications of enlargement for Cohesion Policy 
(ibid). A Fifth explanation could relate to the wish to bridge the gap between EU 
institutions and its citizens: increasingly local projects are more relevant to citizens and 
generates awareness of and therefore support for EU activities. The increased 
involvement of increasingly disparate and numerous actors, due to the high transaction 
costs the Commission sustains in partnership arrangements, could lead to it 
progressively decreasing its involvement and national bodies acquiring a greater role 
once broad guidelines have been set in Brussels (ibid.). This could also ultimately lead to 
a lesser role for regional authorities.
Conclusion
Even though Cohesion Policy has its genesis in the logic of intergovernmental 
redistributive bargaining, in practice it became a powerful institution building tool for 
the European Commission. Moreover its raison detre, that is to compensate for uneven 
growth, has not diminished in the sense that convergence of development has not 
occurred. In fact, in the EU growth has tended to be concentrated (Rodriguez-Pose 
1994)40 and some EU policies have intensified spatial disparities41. European integration,
1,1 Rodriguez-Pose (1994) illustrates that while peripheral member states have experienced growth, 
their internal peripheries have not.
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the single market and economic and monetary union imply greater spatial imbalances
and the necessity for stronger policy measures to offset divergence among regions (Amin
1992; Rhodes 1995). This has led to an increasing premium on concentration of
resources, which, in turn, has led to the emergence of an important emphasis on local
development within Cohesion Policy'. That which currently constitutes Cohesion Policy
still owes much of its framing to the period in the late 1980s, when the Commission
“managed to redefine the meaning o f cohesion policy [sic] away from a 
compensatory juste retour logic towards its stated regional development 
function” (De Rynck & McAleavey 2001:549).
This chapter has given an account of the development of Cohesion Policy from the 1970s
to the most recent reform in the late 1990s. It provided a necessary context to understand
how this policy is translated in different ‘regions’. While Chapter 1 elucidated the various
mechanisms of institution building of Cohesion Policy’s delivery' system, this Chapter has
put these mechanisms in context. The next section explores our case-studies during their
first experiences with Cohesion Policy.
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j' Wc refer to the CAP, which contradicts Cohesion Policy as its price support mechanism tends to 
favour large farmers, and the EU’s research and technology policy: “The EU technology policy has 
served to strengthen the R&D capacity of the advanced legions which house Europe’s largest IT firms 
or innovative-intensive firms" (Amin ¿Tomaney 1995:176; Bullman 1994; Grote 1993)-
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Chapter 3
Ireland: Pragmatic Adaptation to Policy
Introduction
Ireland has experienced remarkable economic growth over the last decade or so. The
following quotes from The Economist attest to the rapid change in the Irish economy
form the 1980s to the 1990s. First, in the 1980s:
“Take a tiny, open, ex-peasant economy [Ireland]. Place it next door to a much 
larger one, from which it broke away with great bitterness barely a lifetime 
ago [Britain]. Infuse it with a passionate desire to enjoy the same lifestyle as 
its former masters, but without the same industrial heritage or natural 
resources. Inevitable result: extravagance, frustration, debt”. (16 January 
1988)
Second, in the 1990s:
“Ireland’s economy has surpassed Britain’s and now stands close to the 
average for the European Union. [...] Ireland has been growing at an East 
Asian rather than West European pace. [...] Europe’s shining light. [...] 
Europe’s tiger economy. [...] An astonishing economic success [...] one of the 
most remarkable economic transformations of recent times: from basket-case 
to ‘emerald tiger in ten years. [...] The recipe for success was complicated, 
with unusual and sometimes uniquely Irish ingredients” (17 May 1997)-42
In terms of EU Cohesion Policy’, the whole of Ireland was an Objective One region until
this current programming period (2000-2006) when the county was divided into two
regions: the south and east are now in Objective 1 in transition, and the north, midlands
and west remain in Objective 1. The European Commission has been very successful in
building institutions in Ireland, which was hitherto highly centralised in terms of
development policy. From a situation of significant initial misfit -  an overwhelmingly
centralised state and a dearth of any kind of territorially based policies -  Ireland adapted
surprisingly quickly to EU requirements generally, and in relation to local development
in particular. It is quite remarkable that such a centralised state managed to put in place
local development structures so quickly. Chapter 5 considers this institutional change, 4
4- For a less sanguine view, sec Brennan (1997).
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but first this chapter seeks to establish misfit between Cohesion Policy and domestic 
development policies. It does so by outlining Irish experience with development policies 
prior to Cohesion Policy' and then setting out initial experience with the ERDF. It 
concludes with a discussion of the elements of misfit. Chapter 5 goes on to examine 
Ireland’s experience with local development in detail.
Indigenous approaches to development: national versus local dimension
The years subsequent to Irish independence were marked by an economic war with 
Britain and a wholesale embracing of autarchic policies. In the late 1950s when these 
proved to be an unmitigated disaster in terms of growth, the political class endeavoured 
to steer the economy towards ‘modernisation’ and the competitive trade environment of 
the then EEC. In order to steer and co-ordinate national development, planning was 
introduced within the context of three programmes for economic expansion (1959-63, 
1964-70 and 1969-72). These programmes coincided with general growth conditions in 
the global economy and stable government, both of which provided suitable terrain for 
implementation. In fact, the period from 1958 to 1973 has been called the “Irish miracle” 
(Jacobsen 1994:3). Alongside the new free trade ethos, there was a general increase in 
public expenditure to generate a more efficient social and physical infrastructure for 
modernisation and a fiscal policy for sustained economic growth in the 1960s. Growth in 
the economy, high rates of foreign industrial investment (FDI) and tax increases funded 
the programme (Brunt 1988: 18-19). The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) wras 
reorganised in 1969 to act as an “autonomous state-sponsored body with overall 
responsibility for administration of grants and the promotion and planning of industrial 
development”. It became the de facto  central planner. The 1970s also saw Keynesian 
demand management gain prominence and consequently public spending continued to 
rise in order to provide services comparable to other European states, and to meet 
demands of a growing population. Capital programmes to encourage industrial and 
agricultural performance and the increase in unemployment contributed to the surge in 
expenditure so much so that by 1978, it had risen to the equivalent of a half of GNP. From 
1975 current budget deficits became endemic, as did borrowing on a substantial scale to 
finance current expenditure (Brunt 1988:19). In 1977 the newly elected government 
embraced a highly expansionary programme and created the Department of Economic 
Planning and Development to steer and promote national development. A White Paper, 
National Development, 1977-80 was published in 1978 and along with a ‘give-away 
budget in the same year created boom conditions within Ireland. All of this was at the 
expense of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and foreign and total debt
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burden.-*» Industrial policy centred on the attraction of export-oriented foreign enterprise 
(so-called export-led industrialisation) through a range of financial and fiscal incentives, 
and thus the Export Profit Tax Relief scheme was born. Indigenous entrepreneurs were 
ignored by policy, however.
The first programme was “a bundle of vague, exhortatoiy statistics and succeeded 
through little fault of its own” (Jacobsen 1994:74) but due to favourable international 
circumstances. The second programme featured input-output tables, an iterative 
methodology, and a “first programme afterglow which was a force in itself (Jacobsen 
1994:80). The development strategy has been described by Jacobsen (1994:85) as ‘paying 
and praying’, “that is, paying foreign firms to locate in the Republic while subsidising 
improvement of local firms, and praying for EEC admission which would boost 
agricultural fortunes". The third programme concluded that the second was overly 
concerned with detail and sought to be more selective and modest about goals (Jacobsen
1994:91).
In 1973, the IDA opted to concentrate its energies on the electronics and chemical 
sectors, which had to be virtually completely imported (Lee 1989). It took advantage of 
EEC entry to persuade foreign firms to establish branches in Ireland. The changes in the 
international and national environment in the late 1970s instigated a review of the 
industrial programme, which was undertaken by NESC-u in six major reports published 
between 1981 and 1983. The most important one was that authored by Telesis, an 
American consultancy group (1982), which was highly critical of existing policy, 
submitting that the fiscal and financial incentive package was unnecessarily generous as 
it favoured capital formation rather than employment. Further, it held that indigenous 
enterprise and natural resources were short-changed. Government policy attracted FDI 
and created employment but it failed to address the constraints on the development of 
the manufacturing industry in Ireland. The 1980s economic recession, which reduced the 
amount of international investment, exposed the fragility of a system based on excessive 
dependency on foreign capital to maintain internal growth and challenged policy to 
tackle the constraints on self-sustaining development (Brunt 1988:31). A government 
White Paper on Industrial Policy (1984) followed and made two changes. First, 
maximising net domestic value added which would induce additional employment
4.' From net creditor nation in the early 1970s, the debt rate rose to 21 per cent of GNP in 1979 (Brunt 
1988:20).
o The National Economic and Social Council pnnides a discussion forum of principles relating to the 
development of the national economy and achieving social justice and advise the government through 
the Taoiseach’s department. It is made up of social partners (1BEC, CIF - employers, ICTU - trade 
union and agricultural organisations) and eight government nominees.
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through its multiplier effects rather than employment per se, became the primaiy 
objective of industrial policy. Second, attention switched from the international 
competitiveness of the export industrial sector to the entire industrial sector and thus 
finally recognised the value of indigenous enterprise and the major loss of employment 
and wealth creation through import penetration and the poor linkages of foreign plants 
in Ireland (Brunt 1988:32; Boylan & Cuddy 1984).
In the early 1980s, Ireland was suffering from a growing macroeconomic crisis with a 
balance of payments deficit running at 14.6% of GNP (compared with 5.3% in 1977) and 
inflation at 20.4%. The absence of growth between 1982 and 1986, and growing 
indebtedness (125% of GNP in 1987) showed up the failure of macroeconomic policy. The 
year 1987 marked the beginning of fiscal retrenchment on the heels of political consensus 
on the measures to be taken. The early 1990s witnessed the devaluation of sterling and 
the consequent defence of the Irish pound through high interest rates by Irish authorities 
which stifled domestic demand (Murphy 2000:10-12). The Industrial Policy Review 
Group completed a review of Industrial Policy, otherwise known as the Culliton Report in 
1992 which confirmed the continued existence of the problems outlined in Telesis.
Murphy attributes the turn around in the economy, described in the second Economist 
quote, to the gradual effects of the coalition of globalisation and Europeanisation. In fact, 
the IDA’s wager on chemicals and electronics in the 1970s paid off in the 1990s. Low 
corporate tax rates (o per cent on profits of manufactured exports and later a 10 per cent 
corporate tax rate on manufactured profits and internationally traded services profits) 
also played a significant role. These tax facilities were made possible by virtue of the lack 
of industrialisation in Ireland (Murphy 2000:13). Multinationals have shown a 
preference for English speaking European countries within the Euro zone as opposed to 
those outside (UK). ITS investment tripled between 1991-93. In 1997, Ireland Tanked fifth 
in the world as a destination for US direct investment outflows (OECD quoted in Murphy 
2000:14). The current economic boom is essentially based on (US) multinationals which 
are no longer ‘cathedrals in the desert’ but are tied into the local economy.
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Table 5: Foreign and Domestic Manufacturing Employment 1973-1985
Source 1973 1980 1985 1973-85 1993 1996
Britain 26.932 22.652 14.100 -12.832 -47,6%
USA 14-935 32.563 36.500 21.565 144-4%
Other 17.025 26.753 27-773 10.748 63,1%
Ml foreign 58.892 81.968 78.373 19481 33*1% 88.836 106410
Domestic 158.400 166.300 134.857 -23-543 -14.9% 111.16? 120.224
Total 217.292 248.268 213.230 -4.062 -1.9% 200.003 226.634
Domestic 72,9% 67,0% 63.2% 579.6% 7954% 55,6% 53.0%
Foreign 27,1% 33.0% 36.8% 44.4% 47,0%
Source: Brunt (1988:24); Murphy (2000:28)
Figure 4: Employment Make-up in Ireland 1973-1996
Figures: Economic Growth in Ireland 1975-1999
It
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Table 6: Central Government Expenditure by purpose and economic category' 1965-84
IK£ 1988 p rices
S p en d in g  item 1965-66 1970-71 1 9 7 5 19811 1Q84 T o ta l
iH 'ien ce i4.1uu.ooo 22.400.000 67.IOO.OOO i7U.3OO.OOO 2ti2.W10.000 54  2.500.000
1 ) th e r  c e n t r a l  g o v e rn m e n t
serv ices
23.300.000 37.900.000 i26.30O.OOO 32O.90O.OOO (»O7.8OO.OOO 1.116.200.00(1
e d u c a t io n 39.800.000 81.300.000 222.200.000 553.70O.OOO 980.3OO.OOO I.877.300.OOO
H ea lth 15.000.000 42.700.000 2i3.6OO.OOO 0973oo.ooii I.IO2.4OO.OOO 2 .071.600 .00(1
Social s e c u r i ty  a n d  w e lfa r e 57.600.000 119.100.000 389.bOO.OOO 925.400.000 2. I33.9OO.OOO 3.(125.000.000
H o u s in g 21.900.000 37.000.000 Î39.IOO.OOO 371.300.000 026.000.000 t-195-300 .0 0(1
J l h e r  c o m m u n ity  a n d  socia l 
se rv ices
4.600.000 8.100.000 26.7OO.OOO 71.500.000 142.100.000 253000.00 (I
A g ric u ltu re , fo re s try  a n d  fish in g 60.700.000 107.400.000 I79.4OO.OOO 330.000.000 509.100.000 1.186.600.000
M ining , m a n u fa c tu r in g  a n d  
c o n s tru c tio n
15.700.000 32.000.000 82.9OO.OOO 261.500.000 301.000.000 753-100.000
T ra n s p o r t  a n d  c o m m u n ic a t io n s 25.f100.000 42.400.000 I3I.9OO.OOO 345.900.000 359300.000 905.100.000
O th e r  e c o n o m ic  se rv ic e s 6.900.000 15.900.000 I83.8OO.OOO 168.800.000 302.500.000 077.900.000
I 'u b l ic d e b t 38.000.000 88.600.000 2I7.4OO.OOO 1.082.900.000 2.367.700.000 3.794.600.000
lu ta i  e x p e n d i tu r e 323.800.000 634.8OO.OOO I.98O.OOO.OOO 5.303.500.000 9.754.700.000 17.998.800.000
Source: Brunt (1988) National Income and Expenditure tables
Figure 6: Total Expenditure 1965-84
Total Expenditure 1965-44
P J rtc d e b l
Other economic services 21%
4% ">
Transport and communications
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Defence Othe central goverrment
services 3 % 6%
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A gno li ire. forestry end listing 
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Other community and social 
services•M,
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20%
Thus, Ireland did not have an extensive pre-Cohesion Policy experience of territorial 
development policy. Ostensibly due to the developmental backwardness of the entire 
economy vis-à-vis first the UK and then the EEC, territorially differentiated policies got 
scant attention. The most salient example of the failure or absence of territorial 
development policies is the massive growth o f the East region dominated by Dublin 
which is vastly out of proportion with the size of the countiy (the population of Ireland is 
3.5 million and 1.5 million live in Dublin -  almost a city-state). Dublin’s growth has been 
matched by depopulation in the west region. Yet, some of the principles that Cohesion 
Policy introduced in the 1980s did emerge, albeit on paper: for example, the inclusion of 
relevant actors. These principles were more difficult to guarantee in practice, as it
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happened. This is not because internal territorial policy problems have not been 
recognised. In fact, there would appear to be a significant degree of fit between Irish 
policy ideas at this stage and Cohesion Policy. For instance, in 1964 the Second 
Programme for Economic Expansion had a separate chapter on rural development, 
which underlined the need for an integrated multi-sectoral approach and collaboration 
between statutory and voluntary actors, as did the Third Programme in 1969. Moreover, 
the Inter-Departmental Committee set up in 1961 to deal with agricultural problems in 
the west of Ireland pointed to the dearth of community initiative, a factor crucial to rural 
development. County Development Teams-^ were set up in 1963 in the West and later in 
other parts of the country in response to the Inter-Departmental Committee’s 
recommendations. A  government White Paper in 1971 recommended setting up local 
community councils at a sub-county level for local development. A change in government 
impeded this recommendation from going any further. So “in terms of policy ideas, 
though not so much in the implementation of operational measures, Dublin’s official 
thinking was in many ways as advanced as that now emanating from Brussels" (Commins 
& Keane 1994:104). A further tenuous institutional element of fit can be evinced in the 
drive for regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s when nine planning regions were created 
and given the onerous task of co-ordinating physical planning; and subsequently in 1969 
the Regional Development Organisations were set up without executive authority but 
with co-ordination responsibilities. The advent of EEC membership led to a policy 
retrenchment as any area-based emphasis was scuppered and rural development policy 
was delegated entirely to the CAP. Moreover, regional issues were shelved in favour of a 
centralised administration of Structural Funding.
On the other hand, misfit would appear to obtain in institutional terms as Ireland was 
highly centralised and certainly did not have anything like multi-level governance, and in 
policy terms due to the lack of territorial development policies. Further elements of misfit 
include lack of policy practices such as multi-annual programming of resources, 
monitoring and evaluation that form such an important part of Cohesion Policy. The 
chapter now turns to initial experiences with EU Cohesion Policy in order to ascertain 
whether misfit continues to obtain.
<3 The CDTs were representative of the main public sector agencies and were chaired by the County 
Manager. They were co-ordinated by the Central Development Committee o f the Department of 
Finance. They had no real authority or financial clout even though they were made responsible for 
economic development and its innumerable off-shoots (Comniins & Keane 1994:105).
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EU Membership and Aspects o f Cohesion — the Initial Years
Ireland joined the EU in 1973 and the then government classified the entire country as 
one region for structural fund purposes. This was to be a very significant move in relation 
to the implementation of Cohesion Policy in Ireland as EU authorities effectively dealt 
with one putative ‘regional authority’ which was a national government ministry -  the 
Department of Finance.-*6 In this way Cohesion Policy implementation in Ireland 
followed a very centralised pattern with all applications for and allocations of funding 
being channelled through Finance. Since transfers from the EU have been quite 
substantial -  Ireland has been the biggest net beneficiary in per capita terms, receiving 
monies to the tune o f 3 to 5 per cent o f GDP -  Structural Funding and Cohesion Policy 
have become salient political issues that are jealously guarded by the centre*7 and 
especially Finance. The classification o f the country as one region also betrayed the 
official conception o f regional-»8 policy within Ireland: it was seen as synonymous with 
industrial policy and thus devoid of a territorial basis.*9 In fact, very few policies had any 
area-based approach. It is safe to say that national development has always taken 
precedence over regional development, and alleviating internal differences has been of 
lesser importance than catching up with other EU members.
Ireland’s predominantly agriculturally based economy meant that the allure of a 
generous Common Agricultural Policy greatly influenced its decision to accede to the 
EEC.*0 In fact, Ireland has made the most financial gains from the EU through the 
Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) price support mechanism. This price support 
mechanism proved to be an incentive to postpone the structural reform of Irish 
agriculture, and the CAP became the single most important focus of Irish agricultural 
policy (Brunt 1988:174). In other words, rent-seeking was preferred to structural reform.
* Ministries are also called Departments in Ireland. The Department of Finance hereinafter will bo 
referred to as Finance (with capital letters) and the same applies for other government 
departments/ministries.
The administration of the Structural Funds in Ireland until 2000 iras as follows: overall control as 
well as control of the ERDF rests with Finance, the ESF with Enterprise and Employment and the 
guidance section of the EAGGF with Agriculture.
The term region is defined in a broad sense as a territorial entity for development purposes definal 
as such administratively, unless otherwise specified. Regional policy in a general sense, therefore, 
denotes some form of area-based development policy.
In the first National Development Plan (1989-93), regional development was mentioned only in 
relation to industry but without reference to specific regional measures. The potential contribution of 
other sectors such as agriculture, forestry, transport etc. was not given any explicit consideration 
(Walsh 1995‘56).
r>° This was not the only reason for Irish entry to the EEC. The British decision to enter proved to be a 
resounding motivation as Irish exports were hugely dependent on the British market.
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Furthermore, the CAP’S operation in Ireland has proved to be veiv inequitable"'J: 20 per 
cent of farmers receive 50 per cent of support payable to Ireland. This is because the 
price support mechanism is geared towards output and hence better-off farmers receive 
more support. Thus, the CAP - against its redistributional ethos - has contributed to the 
worsening of development disparities within rural Ireland (O’Donnell & Walsh 1995:14- 
15). Moreover, it has encouraged a dependence on subsidies through distorted incentives 
such as headage payments, which promoted a shift to sheep farming which is 
unproductive and has caused untold environmental damage. The tendency, stimulated by 
policies such as the CAP, is therefore to engage in directly unproductive profit seeking*2 
and resources are directed to political bargaining with Brussels rather than innovative 
policy at a national level. The CAP has also been damaging in other ways. It has been 
linked to the decrease of rural community groups in the 1970s and 1980s for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is geared towards individuals not to organisations that plan strategically. 
Secondly, the sense of co-operation among farmers declined as yields depend on 
directives emanating from an outside agency (OECD 1996:73). These are examples of the 
perverse effects of a policy putatively geared to the development of rural areas: the 
destruction of collective action and social capital in rural areas as well as the promotion 
of rent-seeking for short-term gains instead of instigating structural reform which would 
have long-term benefits. In the wake of EEC entry, Irish rural development policy 
wholeheartedly embraced the ethos of the CAP in that the maintenance of farm incomes 
took precedence over structural reform. Modernisation of farming within the context of 
the CAP exacerbated the inequality within agriculture. As Brunt (1988:22) outlines, “a 
price policy, by supporting output, favoured those enterprises better able to maximise 
production and had less impact on small-scale operations”.*3
Initially the ERDF was used to increase capital resources and constituted a payment to 
the Public Capital Programme. Subsequently, spending on transport infrastructure 
dominated since more funds existed for infrastructural development, and thus receipts 
were maximised. This brings to light an important point in relation to the Irish 
implementation of EU Cohesion Policy, that is, development programmes and plans have 
generally been tailored to match the criteria of Community schemes as opposed to being
5» The CAP's inequitable nature is apparent on a European scale also: “[..] not only does two-thirds of 
the Community's budget not have the aim of redistribution towards the less favoured regions but much 
of it actually distributes resources away from them" (European Parliament, 1991 :iii).
5“ For a discussion of these terms, see Millock & Olson (1992:62-5).
Moreover, the Irish Court of Auditors’ Annual Report (November 1997) found that IR£ig.5 million 
was paid out to 15 large-scale cereal fanners (an average of IR£i-3 million each). The report also 
“appears to suggest that the reform programme has failed to limit overproduction and it has failed to 
redirect more funding towards the smaller farmers’’ (Irish Times. 18 November 1997).
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drawn up on the basis of an analysis of the country’s perceived developmental needs 
(O’Dwyer 1993:19)- The “eclipse o f rural development” from public policy discourse from 
the early 1970s attests to this factor as rural policy was oriented to the CAP because of its 
financial allure (Commins & Keane 1994:111). The main aim is to “draw down” the 
maximum amount of funding from Brussels - and in this Ireland has been very successful 
- and to a certain extent, policy priorities tend to be formulated according to the amount 
of money available for such initiatives. As Laffan (1994:49-51) outlines, “more attention 
is paid to actually managing the politics of grantsmanship than to the economic or 
development process the grants are supposed to assist”.
The First Community' Support Framework
As Chapter 2 illustrated, the 1988 reform introduced programming and partnership and 
also required some institutional innovations such as working groups, monitoring 
committees, advisory groups and review committees in order to prepare and implement 
development plans. In Ireland, regional committees were set up to draft plans for the 
various regions for the National Development Plan under the first round of the Structural 
Funds. However, since membership of these committees has been decided by central 
government, channels for partnership have also been decided by it (Laffan 1989:47) 
which has led to an Irish style of partnership. These institutional innovations have thus 
been described as a “symbolic exercise” (Matthews 1994:49), “ plain window dressing” 
(Laffan 1994:48), “superficiar (Tannam 1993:282) and “largely token” (Holmes & Rees 
1994:12). In the end, the first Community Support Framework, following from the 
National Development Plan, was based on national sectoral programmes as opposed to 
territorially based oness+ and the plans drafted by the regional committees were at best 
disregarded and at worst were not even reads» (interview). Moreover, the Culliton report 
(1992:49) made the following remarks:
“We have also observed a widely-held perception, in both the public and the 
private sectors, that the Structural Funds represent in some way ‘free money 
from Brussels’ the allocation o f which requires to be less rigorously evaluated 
and accounted for than normal”. *5
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^ This was done, according to An Taoiseach C..J. Haughey, on the grounds: “that the requirements of 
efficiency, effectiveness and expediency ail demand that the National Development Plan and its 
Operational Programmes he implemented through the already existing structures with which everyone 
is familiar and that have evolved to meet the particular circumstances and population structures of this 
country" (ICEM 1989).
55 Some of the regional plans had not even been submitted in Dublin when the NDP was submitted in 
Brussels. There were, however, time constraints which made any profound implementation of the 
1988 reform difficult.
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This section discusses the first CSF which ran from 1989 to 1993. Subsequently, some 
new local development structures that emerged in or around this period, some of which 
are more or less EU constructs (IRDPP and LEADER), and some o f which originated 
separately albeit along the lines of European Commission thinking and were 
subsequently integrated into the second CSF (CEBs and ABPs), are reviewed. The first 
one, the Integrated Rural Development Pilot Programme was apparently conceived by 
Irish policy-makers and ran from 1988 to 1990. Later on it was extended for a further two 
years under the Operational Programme for Rural Development (1989-1993). LEADER#, 
also a rural programme is a European initiative but falls outside the mainstream 
Community Support Framework and is one of the Community Initiatives controlled by 
the Commission. Thirdly, the County Enterprise Boards were set up by the Irish 
government and, through their parent department, they were subsequently given 
responsibility for the sub-programme on Local Enterprise in the Operational Programme 
for Local Urban and Rural Development (1994-1999). Fourthly, the Area-based 
Partnerships were also set up by the Irish government and (through their co-ordinating 
body) they too became responsible for a sub-programme in the Operational Programme 
for Local Urban and Rural Development: Integrated Development of Designated 
Disadvantaged and Other Areas. Other partnerships based on the ABPs were set up as a 
result of the Global Grant. But first we turn to the CSF.
The CSF consisted of four specific priorities: (i) Agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism 
and rural development, (ii) Industry and services, (iii) Measures to offset the effects of 
peripherality and (iv) Human resources measures. These priorities were articulated in 12 
sectoral operational programmes. The Peripherality Operational Programme was the 
only one conceived of in spatial terms. However, it concentrated spending on transport 
and infrastructure, belying the assumption that improved access to peripheral areas 
resolves economic problems. Rural development was accorded an Operational 
Programme of its own, but the evaluation concluded that overall rural development 
spending (See Table 7) “has not been very effective in promoting rural development” 
(ESRI 1993:59)-57
s*> LEADER is an acronym for Liaison entre actions de developpcment de leconomie rurale.
“  Only a summary of the evaluation was published. Some quotes conic from the unabridged version 
consulted at the ESRI s offices in Dublin and others from the published summary.
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Table 7: CSF1989-1993 spending on rural development in IR£ million
Policy_______________________________________lR£m
Operational Programme for rural development 125
Programme for the control of farmyard pollution 96
Operational Programme for Forestry 94
Objective 5(a) measures 645
Headage 415
Western Package 65
LEADER 35
PESP»8 (all areas)* 7
Total________________________________________1,067
* National exchequer funded. Source: Kearney et al (1995:14) 
Figure 7: Rural development spending 1989-1993
Rural development spending 1989-1993
Operational Programme for the
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In fact, the evaluators conclude that local development issues were dealt with only in the 
Small and Community Enterprise and Agri-Tourism sub-programmes of the Rural 
Development Operational Programme. The evaluators had the following remarks to 
make.
“The traditional and still dominant model [of local development] has been the 
encouragement of industrial, tourism and physical infrastructure 
development in designated regions. With the possible exception of LEADER, 
most of these measures constitute an approach to development which many 
refer to the ‘top down’ model.
This approach is subject to many limitations. The main limitation derives 
from the dominant industrial policy strategy which has favoured the 
attraction of internationally mobile capital. These firms do not always 
establish strong roots within the regions in which they are located and
The PESP (1990-93) -  Programme for Economic and Social Progress -  was the second national 
agreement between the government and the social partners and encompassed pay, taxation, public 
finance management, EMS parity, social policies and measures to combat long-term unemployment 
etc. It was the second such example o f national partnership aimed at long-term planning after the 
Programme for National Recovery. It was followed by the Programme for Competitiveness and Work 
(1994-97) and Partnership 2000 (1997-2000).
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experience has shown that they are highly susceptible to fluctuations in 
international demand which cause severe adjustment difficulties for the 
regions.
The dominant characterisation of the ‘top down’ model is that the ends, such 
as the numbers of jobs and income, are emphasised at the expense of the 
means. This is clear in the case of industrial policy but it is also the case with 
many other local development initiatives being implemented under the CSF.
In the case of the Small and Community Enterprise sub-programme of the 
OPRD, for instance, the model operates by the prior selection of project 
categories at central administration level and the subsequent administration 
of funds to suitable applicants. The major criticism of this approach is that it 
is not concerned with establishing the seeds of a development process at local 
level. But even on its own terms it has drawbacks. It encourages wasteful rent- 
seeking behaviour, it can cause displacement of already profitable activity and 
it can lead to significant dead-weight costs in the sense that projects might 
have gone ahead without state assistance” (ESRI 1993:208-9).
The Industiy Operational Programme had no “serious regional dimension” as there were
no disaggregated targets for a sub-national level and no discussion of regional
instruments (ESRI 1993:34). In the light o f the sectoral thrust to the CSF, the evaluators
recommended that a properly funded local development programme to reduce the
pressure for dispersed development under the main economic development programmes
and in order to maximise impact, be formulated for the subsequent CSF. In order to do
this, for the rural part it recommended extending the IRDPP under the CSF 1994-99 and
linking rural and local development in a sub-programme. The evaluation went on to
propose that the CEBs or local authorities manage these local development structures
(ESRI 1993:42-5). A critical issue for the evaluators was the simultaneous treatment of
spending and financing issues and the lack o f a systematic cost benefit analysis of public
expenditure programmes. Major weaknesses of CSF procedures were “the introduction of
essentially extraneous financing and procedural issues into expenditure decisions, the
risk of segmented public expenditure decisions as between spending within the CSF and
that outside it, and the ad hoc nature of some of the ex ante and ex post evaluations”
(ESRI 1993:262). Although spending capacity was not a problem, the evaluators still
recommended separating spending from financing decisions in the future in order to
“free the discussion of the relative merits of different projects from pressure from these
essentially redundant and distracting requirements from Brussels” (ESRI 1993:60-1).
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Table 8: Categories of expenditure 1989/93 at 1994 prices in MECU
S tr u c tu ra l F u n d s % to ta l L U  k  N a t io n a l  p u b lic % to ta l
p r o d u c t iv e  s e c t o r l .b y ti 37.0% 2.812 27,1%
in d u s try «13 13.9% 1 .0 0 8 9 .7 *
o f  w h ic h  RTT>
A g ric u ltu re , fo r e s try ,  r u n i l  d e v e lo p m e n t 8 8 2 19.2% 1-555 15.0%-
F is h e rie s in c in  a g r i c u l tu r e w e  in  a g r i c u l tu r e
T o u rism 191 4 .2 % 249 2,4%
ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE 1-027 2 2 ,4 % 3-819 36.8% .
I r a n  s p o i l 8 3 2 18,1% 1.944 18,7%
P o m m u n ir n t io n s 26 0 ,6% 598 5,«%
E n erg y « 0,3% 761 7,3%
IV a le r /e n v i ro n m e n t «55 3.4% 5« 5,0%.
i Ic a lth
HUMAN R E SO U R CE S 1 .809 39,4% 3-(>59 35,2%
in itia l  e d u c a t io n / t r a in in g /Y o u th s  t a r t
C o n tin u in g  t r a in in g  u n e m p lo y e d
C o n tin u in g  t r a in in g  e m p lo y e d
S ocial e x c lu s io n 1.726 37.6% 3-498 33,7»-
S u p p o r t in g  m e a s u re s
;)f w h ic h  c u r r e n t
C a p ita l 83 1,8% K il i ,5%
S ec to ra l O P  ( in d u s t r y  e tc .)
ijucal u rb a n  a n d  ru r a l  d e v e lo p m e n t 11 0 ,2 % 19 0,2%.
OTHER 4 6 1,0% 79 0,8%,
le c h n ic a l  a s s is ta n c e 3 0,1%. 4 0,0%.
P ro -1 9 8 9  p r o je c ts /m is c e l la n e o u s 43 0 ,9 % 75 0,7%,
IO T A I, 4-5«9 1 0 0 ,0% IO .38 8 100,0% ,
S tru c tu ra l F u n d s
K R D F 1-995 43.5% 1-995 43,5%
ESI- 1-731 37.7% 1-7)1 3 7 .7» '
EAGGF 8 6 ; 18,8% 8 6 3 18,8%
F IF G C 0 ,0% O 0,0%
TOTAI. 4-589 100,0 % 4-5»9 100,0%.
Soimv: CSF (1989-93)
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Fig 9: Structural Funds and Public Spending ‘89-93
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Local development thus received scant attention under the first CSF and rural 
development was dealt with unusually. However, during the same period some other 
initiatives were emerging and it is to these that the chapter now turns.
Integrated Rural Development Pilot Programme
One of the first significant Irish innovations in the field of rural development policy was 
the Integrated Rural Development Pilot Programme (IRDPP) which ran from 1988 to 
1990.^ This programme was made available to 12 communities that had a population 
base of between 5,000 and 30,000. TTiese groups’ bottom-up initiatives were facilitated 
and co-ordinated by a planning team which included process and training consultants 
and support staff from the parent department (Agriculture and Food* 60) (6 Cearbhaill 
1992:124). The assumption behind the programme was that successful niral development 
required a reflection of local ideas, locals determining their own priorities and the ways 
in which to implement these, as well as an acceptance o f responsibility for resultant 
actions. In this way, according to 6  Cearbhaill (1992:126), its philosophy “implicitly 
accorded with the principle of subsidiarity’’. A co-ordinator seconded by the Department 
of Agriculture was given the task of establishing and leading each core group which was 
made up of local leaders and took decisions based on their priorities. The co-ordinator 
was to help local communities to consider innovative development, advise them as to 
how to implement their initiatives and interface with development agencies and local 
voluntary organisations (O’Malley 1992). In order to facilitate a shared learning process 
horizontally among the 12 areas, twinning, networking and workshops were promoted. 
The training consultant assisted the 12 full-time co-ordinators who acted as links with
It is not dear that this policy was conceived entirely by Irish policy-makers as the EU ran three IRD 
programmes in Belgium, France and Scotland in 1979 (Brunt 1988:128). Evidence suggests that the 
IRDPP was a copy of the European initiative.
60 The Department of Agriculture and Food subsequently became the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and F<xxl. Hereinafter it is referred to as the Department of Agriculture or simply Agriculture.
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development agencies, technical supports and resource persons by imparting basic 
facilitation and communication skills to facilitate team building and motivation in each 
group (6 Cearbhaill 1992:125-6). Despite the small expenditure involved - IR£i .5 
million61 for technical assistance - it mobilised a large voluntary effort. As is evident from 
the table below, the lions share o f projects had to do with tourism. This is a tendency 
that is replicated in the other local development programmes discussed below.
The programme aimed to promote development, not by providing direct financial 
assistance but by making effective use o f existing financial resources, services and 
expertise. In fact, a television documentary' suggested that it could prove more favourable 
to development were local groups not distracted by monetary considerations. While the 
evaluation was not made public, a copy was sent to the Commission for consideration in 
formulating European rural policy (6  Cearbhaill 1992:126-7). The fact that the evaluation 
was not made public however, makes it difficult to report its impact in economic terms. 
In sum, the IRDPP “arguably demonstrated the benefits of co-ordination on the local 
level, the potential utility of a local development agency in marshalling dispersed 
resources and the ability of local groups to find imaginative responses to local problems 
when given sufficient room to manoeuvre” (OECD 1996:44). The IRDPP, in its original 
format remained a pilot programme, although LEADER to a certain extent, represents 
the European version of the programme.62 In 1991 (the programme ended in 1990), it 
was decided to extend the IRDPP for two more years under the Operational Programme 
for Rural Development and 25 rural development co-ordinators were to operate. 
However, its essential format changed: extensive planning was no longer carried out by 
planning teams; training and workshops were terminated; finance was only available for 
small and community enterprise under one of the five sub-programmes of the same 
name as well as rural infrastmcture and farm diversification. In the west, this sub- 
programme was administered by the CDTs and SFADCo6^ , and in the east by the County 
Development Officers which are attached to Local Authorities (Shortall 1994:242)
1,1 The EU contributed to costs.
b- That some Irish officials are convinced of the Irish bias in LEADER may bo due to the fact that the 
Commission availed o f a copy of the evaluation report of the IRDPP and. MaeSharry was 
Commissioner for Agriculture at the time. Furthermore, LEADER is apparently more suitable to an 
Irish context than other European contexts (interview). See however footnote on provenance of 
IRDPP.
SFADCo. the Shannon Development Company was established in 1959 and was originally concerned 
with Shannon Airport development. Since then it has expanded its tasks and is responsible for 
industrial development, tourism and regional development in the mid-west of Ireland (counties Clare, 
Limerick and parts of Tipperary, Offaly and Kerry)- It is a government agency with an appointed Board 
of Directors. See Coyle & Sinnott (1992); Brunt (1988:129-30).
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Table 9: Projects undertaken in IRDPP______________________
No. of projects % of projects
Primary agriculture 25 6-3
Alternative farm enterprises 38 9-6
Tourism i l l 28.0
Heritage 24 6.0
Social/cultural 33 8.3
Community development 36 9.1
Small scale manufacturing 17 4*3
Processing 9 2.3
Service 8 2.0
Aquaculture/mariculture 29 7-3
Other 43 10.8
Infrastructure 24 6.0
TOTAL 397 100.0
Source: McGuinness, (1991) in 0  Cearbhaill (1992:127)
LEAD ER
LEADER is a Community Initiative which falls outside the mainstream Structural Funds, 
hence its organisational requirements are different. It aims to mobilise local actors in 
rural areas to develop their locality using innovative strategies. LEADER I (the first 
programme which ran from 1992 to 1994) was a pilot programme and was made 
available to 16 groups (covering 61 per cent of territory and 30 per cent of the population) 
in Ireland. Like the IRDPP, it was a short programme. Its successor LEADER II is a 5 
year programme (1994 to 1999) and has been extended to the whole country (34 groups). 
Under LEADER I6-*, groups were chosen by consultants on the basis of a Business Plan 
they submitted to the administering department, Agriculture. They then entered into a 
contract with Agriculture which set out the terms and conditions under which they would 
operate as well as the funding timetable, terms for payment, reporting arrangements and 
general operational and administrative conditions appropriate to the implementation of 
the Business Plan. The administration of LEADER takes place on three levels: the EU 
sets out the broad objectives and makes funding available; Agriculture allocates funding, 
monitors and controls the group and acts as an intermediary between the groups and the 
EU; the groups administer the programme on the ground, choosing projects and 
strategies etc. LEADER received considerably more funding than the IRDPP. Under 
LEADER I Ireland was allocated IR£20.8o3 million from the EU and IR£i3.896 was 
made available from the exchequer. Private sector funding was expected to match public 
expenditure which altogether would have amounted to IR£70 million. On average 
IR£i3,ooo was allocated to each project and IR£20,000 came from the private sector.
tJ1 The part on LEADER I is based largely on Kearney et a i (1995) who undertook the evaluation 
commissioned by the government.
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2,800 projects were financed: 15 per cent were natural resources projects, 44 per cent 
were rural tourism projects and 18 per cent were small enterprise projects. Thus 
LEADER was a high spending and a high profile initiative that had considerable success 
in mobilising local actors to come together and administer the programme in their area.6-'* 
Spending for the 16 groups was allocated as follows:
Transnational In ftitution ftuihiin* for Local Dêi 'tiopment 7 f# Case nf European Union Cohesion PoUij in irvhnri utui Sardinia
Table 10: LEADER spending__________________________________
Target____________________________Amount spent in percentages
Technical support and vocational training
Natural resources
Rural tourism
Administration
Small enterprise
Other__________________________________________________
Source: Kearney et al (1995)
10
14
41
12
18
5
Despite considerable pressure to spend funds within the specified time limit, at the end 
of December 1993, funds had been committed to over 2,350 projects but the average 
group had not yet paid funds to 59 per cent of its projects. Slightly more than 30 per cent 
of committed expenditure had been paid. Thus the deadlines set for decisions to be 
complete and funds to be paid had to be extended by six months. In fact, Agriculture 
spent much time recuperating unspent money (interview). Time limits also proved to be 
a constraint for getting groups off the ground. Some of the groups pre-dated LEADER 
but six of them were formed to administer LEADER and were forced to become 
operational very rapidly, without any prior experience, in order to meet the spending 
time limits. In some cases, projects were launched directly and were not integrated into a 
long-term development strategy'. It must be said, however, that a two-year pilot 
programme promises little in the way of long-term strategies.
No allowance was made for the different stages o f development of the various LEADER 
groups. As aforementioned, six of the groups were formed especially to administer 
LEADER and had no previous experience. In these cases, very little by way of training or 
capacity building was undertaken. In other words, no pre-development stage was 
envisaged. In fact, spending on animation and capacity building was informal and 
sometimes almost accidental - that is, it was not planned (interview).
Most of the groups found the guidelines excessively restrictive. Initially, however, these 
guidelines were sparse and vague but were developed over time in a reactionary knee-
The Commission insisted that each group receive no less than IR£i million and that the groups have 
a high profile (interview).
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jerk fashion. They were then communicated to the groups via circulars from Agriculture 
but in some instances, guidelines were issued prohibiting projects that had already been 
embarked upon. Other problems included the unavailability of loan finance and the 
difficulty of implementing training measures due to the fact that they were only part- 
financed.
The evaluation itself encountered some problems. Firstly, the general dearth of 
economic, social and demographic data meant that changes were difficult to measure and 
presumably, strategies for development must have been difficult to formulate. Secondly, 
LEADER groups did not generally keep data collection systems which hindered the 
monitoring of progress. Thirdly, the evaluation was done too soon. The final report was 
undertaken and presented in 1994. According to a report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General’s office, “a full economic impact evaluation might best be undertaken in early 
1996 when all projects have been in operation for some time and their impacts may be 
more realistically assessed”. Furthermore, the objectives of LEADER may overlap with 
other area-based programmes thus the development impacts of all area-based 
programmes should be assessed at the same time. The report also lamented the absence 
of clear targets at a national and group level as well as the lack of data collection systems 
for ongoing monitoring and ex-post evaluation (Government of Ireland 1995)«
The evaluators concluded, “local partnerships are capable of creating structures which 
facilitate the achievement of subsidiarity in a way that provides for devolution of 
decision-making and also provides for accountability” (Kearney et al. 1995:126). Thus, 
LEADER seems to have made some progress where the customary model has failed. 
Furthermore, LEADER II seems to have taken most of the evaluation’s criticism into 
account. For example, more resources are allocated to capacity building and animation. 
Training is 100 per cent funded. The different stages of development are taken into 
account so pre-development work can be undertaken. LEADER II has the same amount 
of binding as LEADER I despite the fact that it encompasses 34 groups. Most of the 
actors involved in LEADER 1 stressed that it was a learning process and experience 
gained can now be put into practice with LEADER II. That it is a five year programme 
should lend itself more easily to long-term strategies and less haste to spend money. 
However, the application process under LEADER II has become a “highly technical 
exercise that has created work for a growing squad of consultants” (Varley k  Ruddy 
1996 :?5).
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Area Based Partnerships
The Area-Based Partnerships (ABPs) were launched as a two and a half year (until the 
end of 1993) pilot programme under the Programme for Economic and Social Progress 
(PESP) “to implement a community response, in particular local areas, to long-term 
unemployment and the danger of long-term unemployment” (PESP 199U75).66 Twelve 
areas, four rural and eight urban, were selected in 1991 by the government on the 
recommendation of the Central Review Committee (CRC)6?. Disadvantaged areas were 
selected on the following basis: the extent of unemployment, in particular, long-term 
unemployment, achieving a wide geographical spread as well as a rural-urban balance 
and “the existence of structures and activities already in the areas on which the area- 
based response could build” (Guidelines for Partnerships 1991:2). This area-based 
approach was designed to recreate the partnership method operating on a national level 
since national accords of this nature began in 1987 (until 1990) with the Programme for 
National Recovery. The partnership was deemed to be a co-operative working 
arrangement among the local community, the social partners68 and the state agencies 
each of which have equal representation on the Partnership boards. The average board 
was made up of eighteen - six from each of the sectors - and met on a monthly or two- 
monthly basis. The ABPs were to work with the long-term unemployed at a local level in 
areas such as training and confidence building. They were to assist the development of 
local enterprises and job creation and help change attitudes about people who are long­
term unemployed.
Each of the Partnerships had to produce an Area Action Plan which had to be area- 
specific, that is, based on the needs and resources of the area as defined by the ABPs in 
consultation with the local community. The Partnerships were to act as “a focus for local 
development of new initiatives and innovation” (Guidelines for Partnerships 1991:5). 
Their legal status is that of companies limited by guarantee. Like the LEADER groups, 
the ABPs entered into a contract with the National Co-ordinating Team (NCT)6<> winch
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G,i NESC (1990) first raised the notion of an area-based approach to long-term unemployment. Its 
recommendations wvw adopted during the negotiations between the government and the social 
partners on the PESP (Craig 1994:16).
The CRC is made up representatives of government departments and the social partners as well as 
state agencies such as FAS, and more recently, the Combat Poverty Agency, the Irish Resource 
Development Trust and the Trust for Community Initiatives. It is also responsible for monitoring 
national agreements, the reason for which it was established.
Social partners generally refer to trade unions, employers and farmers.
^ The NCT is made up of staff seconded from the Federation of Irish Employers - Confederation of 
Irish Industry - which later became Irish Business Employers Confederation, the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions, FAS and the Departments of Education, Social Welfare and the Taoiseach. In 1993 a 
full-time community development worker and an ciiterpri.se support worker (from IBEC) were added 
to the NCT (Craig 1994:94).
80
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ SnCYlU X II -  ChJtrtfTz) inlind.' Praçmaîù Adôblntron to Poky
detailed their responsibilities, staff considerations and a work programme. The NCT was 
appointed by the CRC which is responsible for monitoring and co-ordinating the ABPs 
and programme implementation and organisation, in order to facilitate and support 
Partnership establishment and development as well as to monitor and co-ordinate.
A considerable amount of funding came from the Global Grant which was provided to 
support the development of indigenous potential at local level, enterprise creation and 
development, training and education and capacity building of local organisations. These 
objectives broadly coincide with those of the PESP Partnerships, hence half of the Grant 
went to the twelve ABPs. An independent intermediary body, Area Development 
Management Ltd. (ADM Ltd.}?0 was set up to administer the Grant in October 1992 and 
support integrated local, economic and social development. ADM Ltd. also funded 28 
other groups outside the PESP Partnerships. It was subsequently made responsible for 
the management of the sub-programme on Integrated Development of Designated 
Disadvantaged and other Areas in the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development in the second CSF. Although ADM Ltd. is under-staffed for the range of 
functions it has to perform, its functions include appraising and evaluation local 
development plans from eligible communities, allocating funds according to the results of 
the evaluation and monitoring expenditure and performance. Informal support through 
its liaison staff provides the most valuable information exchange (interview; see also 
OECD 1996:87-89). It also provides technical assistance, disseminates information, 
encourages the dissemination of models of good practice and provides a ‘‘mentoring” 
service which includes financial control and performance indicator systems (ADM Ltd. 
1995*5)- It is represented on the Inter-Departmental Committee on Local Development71 
w'hich will be discussed in more detail below. The following table shows the budget of 
direct subventions of the Partnerships. The bulk of binding came from the Global Grant.
■ ’ ADM Ltd.’s board is made up of the social partners, the Enterprise Trust, the Taoiseach's 
department, local authorities, the Business Innovation Centre in Dublin, Macra na Feinnc, community 
groups and representatives o f the PESP partnerships. In 1993, the NCT took over the executive of 
ADM (Craig 1994 :95)-
"* The Inter-Departmental Committee on Local Development is made up of senior level representatives 
from Agriculture, Education, Social Welfare, Taoiseach, Enterprise and Employment, Environment, 
Finance, -Justice, Tanaistc. the Combat Poverty Agency and ADM.
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Category 1991““ ........1992 ____ 1993 Total
Global Grants - 1.200 1.96 3*160
Matching Global Grant Funds“) - 0.300 0.815 1.115
Taoiseach: Administration 0.438 0.875 1,412 2.275
Other - - 1.039 1.039
Total 0.438 M CO Cn 5-226 8.039
Average Budget per company 0.0365 O.I988 0.4368 0.670
Average Administrative Budget 0.0365 0 .0953" 0.0953"6 -
Source: Craig (1994:37).
The CRC commissioned an evaluation of the PESP ABPs which highlighted a number of 
difficulties (Craig 1994). Firstly, in relation to developing an area-based focus to long­
term unemployment, it proved difficult as this factor is not necessarily spatially 
concentrated.77 Secondly, cultural differences between centralised decision-making and 
local development were difficult to reconcile. Although the NCT was a useful link 
between local experience and central decision-making, it tended to have a controlling 
influence at a local level and was not strong enough to ensure that policy issues at a 
Partnership level be followed up at a national level, nor to secure the commitment of 
state agencies. Furthermore, the NCT did not provide adequate support or training for 
the Partnerships as there was a lack of guidance and detailed guidelines. The role of the 
Taoiseach's department, the parent department, proved crucial in ensuring that the 
initiative was cross-functional and that no one agency dominated. It also ensured that the 
programme received prominence. However, subsequent to the change in government, 
responsibility was shifted to Enterprise and Employment (January 1993) for eight 
months which meant that the prominence o f the initiative wras squandered. It also meant 
that the ABPs were unsure of their status78 and were thus distracted as they spent time
“- Covers the period from June to December 1991.
~* The Global Grant figures are estimates hased on assumption that 1 ECU=IR£o.8o.
Includes IR£i20,ooo from the Enterprise Trust in 3992 and IR£453.ooo in 1993. In response to the 
PESP initiative, employers set up the Enterprise Trust in June 1992 to manage funding for the 
enterprise parts of the Area Action Plans. Originally, it was thought that its contribution would amount 
to matching funds for the Global Grant (25 per cent) but the level of funding it provided was less than 
expected (see above table) with an average of IR£48,ooo per partnership which amounts to half of a 
partnership’s administrative budget for a year (Craig 1994:37).
“  The administration budgets from the Department o f the Taoiseach in 1993 were hased on 14 months 
in recognition that Partnership companies were under-funded in 1992. Thus, the average 
administration budget is calculated over the two years 1992 and 1993.
See previous note.
~ NESC (1994:91-3) however, contends that four issues need to be distinguished and evaluated: the 
degree to which long-term unemployment and poverty are spatially concentrated or dispersed; 
distinguish clearly between the idea of an area-based approach and a selective one; freed of its 
incidental link to selectivity, consider the merits of an area-based approach to long-term 
unemployment and disadvantage; the existing area-based approach must be kept in perspective as one 
part of a public policy which affects the unemployed. Haring considered these, it holds that a strong 
case exists for the continuation or even extension o f ABPs. Similarly, the evaluation of the Global 
Grant (Haase et a i  1996) holds that concentration o f unemployment does, in fact, exist.
"* This was due to the fact that Enterprise and Employment in October 1992 had announced the 
establishment of the County Enterprise Partnership Boards which had a similar rein it to the AEPs.
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negotiating with the Taoiseach’s department about their potential relationship with the 
CEPBs. Another distraction was the Global Grant made available by the European 
Commission. This was because in January 1992, in anticipation of the Grant, 
partnerships were asked to draw up the Area Action Plans on the basis of a budget of 
IR£i million. Subsequently, the grant was reduced by a quarter but in the end the 
Partnerships got even less (IR£35o,ooo). This also distracted them from the real sources 
of funding for local development - the budgets of state agencies - so they do not have any 
decision-making role in relation to the spending of resources in their area. Although the 
Global Grant lent the Partnerships some leverage in jointly funding projects with state 
agencies, essentially it has meant that the ABPs have assumed a delivery (which displaces 
or duplicates other structures) rather than a brokerage (co-ordinating existing services) 
role, and state agency spending has remained unchanged by them^: “In the longer term 
however, the partnerships’ ability to act as catalysts for change will be dependent on their 
moving from a position of grant-aiding activity at the local level to one of negotiating 
with statutory agencies about their expenditure” (Craig 1994:38).
The positive outcomes o f the initiative include the partnership approach which brought 
three sectors together to address problems in a multi-dimensional way, and the raising of 
awareness of the needs of the long-term unemployed. Partnerships that assumed a 
brokerage role did better as did those that kept a small board of directors. Their real 
impact is difficult to measure due to the lack of data available on each area. One of the 
recommendations that the evaluation made related to time: more time was needed to 
establish partnership and to design plans. However, a two and a half year pilot 
programme cannot provide that kind of time. The initiative was extended to 1996 and 
beyond with the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development.
The Global Grant
The Global Grant**0 provided binding to community bodies on the basis of action plans 
drafted in consultation with local actors, state agencies and local social partners. Priority 
was given to groups outside of the PESP and LEADER areas. Its objectives were to 
contribute to economic and employment development in local communities, to bring
This was supposed to be the means to expand the ABPs nation-wide (Craig 1994:151). The CEPBs were 
piloted for a short period and in May 1993 became the County Enterprise Boards (discussed below) 
which had significantly reduced responsibilities.
^ State agency expenditure in PESP Partnership areas increased by 39 per cent in relation to 1992 
spending- However, it is unclear whether this is part of a general increase or more specifically to do 
with the ABPs (Craig 1994:41).
A Global Grant involves combining ERDF and ESF funding to support an integrated package of 
measures for social and economic development.
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about a redistribution of job opportunities towards the unemployed and “to support the 
main forces of local development by contributing to capacity building of local 
organisations with the view' to enabling them to participate as primary movers in local 
development programmes” (Article 4 of the Agreement between ADM Ltd. and EU 
Commission 1993). These objectives were to be reached through a local development 
model based on four principles: partnership, participation, planning and
multidimensionality (Haase et a i  1996). 28 groups and the 12 PESP Partnerships 
received funding and it was later brought tinder sub-programme 2 of the Operational 
Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development in the second CSF. The Grant 
provided IR£8 million to the PESP Partnerships (IR£4million) and the 28 groups 
(IR£3.2million). The table below details the expenditure. It is evident that more was 
spent on Measure 2 than had been envisaged. According to the evaluation commissioned 
by ADM Ltd. (Haase ef a i  1996), this is because there was some difficulty in 
understanding the classification of spending,81
Table 12: Proposed and Actual Expenditure in percentages of the IR£8million Global 
Grant
Transmtional Institution fttaldir^ for Lvcat Development The Case afEttroptan i  rnion Cohesion Policy in Inhnd and Sardinia
Measure Proposed Actual
1: enterprise creation and development 62 43
2: training and education, infrastructure, environment, 30 48
capacity building
3: technical assistance 18 ____ 25.
Source: Haase etal. (1996)
The PESP ABPs fared best according to the evaluation and like the Craig evaluation 
(1994), it holds that the groups that assumed a brokerage role - that is, set lip a 
partnership structure to influence state and private spending in their locality - do better 
in the long run. Groups were generally unable to influence the spending decision of state 
agencies. As in the other initiatives discussed above, it was found that not enough time 
was granted to draft plans (2.5 months) and some groups had to produce plans before 
they had finished constituting themselves which meant that many of the area action 
plans were subsequently disregarded when it came to implementing a development 
process. It was also found that the new groups missed out on learning from the PESP 
Partnerships as their “good practice” wras not documented nor made available to them. 
Furthermore, since LEADER II was slow to get off the ground, some Partnerships were
s* The evaluation contends that much expenditure under Measure 1.2 which cin e«  training/education 
in enterprise and business skills, is subsumed under Measure 2.1 which instead deals with 
trainmg/education relevant to enterprise creation, business development and employability. The 
nuance was therefore only apparent to 'those in the know*.
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uncertain about conflicting responsibilities etc. (Haase ef ai. 1996). However, the report 
did endorse the Global Grant model of local development and praised ADM Ltd. on its 
targeting of the programme even though this targeting was based entirely on the 
applications it received - if disadvantaged areas did not submit an application, they 
automatically disqualified themselves. One of the recommendations of the report was the 
separation of the roles of consultation and facilitation in getting groups off the ground.
County Enterprise Boards
Unlike the other initiatives discussed above, the County Enterprise Boards (CEBs) were 
not launched as a pilot programme in their current format82 but were set up in each 
county and urban area in 1993 under the Fianna Fail-Labour coalition government in 
order
“to fill a gap which has become apparent in the support services for local 
enterprise initiatives. They will bring a variety of interests together to set up 
objectives for promoting enterprise in their area, prepare a strategic plan and 
provide assistance to small enterprise projects which can yield a cost effective 
return in terms of job creation” (Minister for Enterprise and Employment,
Press Release, 27 September 1993).
The CEBs are based on the sub-programme on Small and Community Enterprise (SCE) 
in the Operational Programme on Rural Development (1989-93) which targeted support 
to small and local enterprises that fell outside the competence of the main development 
agencies. They directly descended from the aborted initiative to set up the CEPBs which, 
w'ere they to have become operational, would have been an upper tier above the ABPs 
and LEADER companies (interview). Their final form however, was “untrammelled by a 
social agenda” (interview). A more striking resemblance to the so-called County 
Development Teams (CDTs) is evident. The CDTs differed from the CEBs in the following 
ways. Firstly, they were operational in the west of Ireland originally (although 
subsequently spread to the rest of the country) and were funded from a Western 
Development Fund, control of which lay with Finance.^ Secondly, they were only 
responsible for grant-giving and thus did not provide business support services or the 
like, and funding was allocated on a “first come first serve” basis (interview). Thirdly, the 
CEBs have a very specific function within very specific guidelines and rules of procedure, 
whereas the CDTs were left more flexibility (interview). However, the CDTs were
The CEPBs were conceived differently to the CEBs.
Control of the CDTs resided momentarily in the Department of Economic Planning, the Department 
with the shoitest lifespan in the history of the state. It was created for the principal economic advisor 
to the Taoiseach on his first day in the Dail in 1 9 7 7 .  It was abolished in the face of utter failure in 1981 
and its responsibilities and personnel were dhided by the Taoiseach’s department and Finance which, 
under the Central Development Committee, took over the CDTs (Lee 1989:487-503),
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subsumed into the CEBs and many hitherto County Development Officers now go under 
the name of County Enterprise Officers.8-*
The CEBs’ objectives are to develop enterprise action plans covering all sectors in their 
county; to create local enterprise awareness and develop an enterprise culture to ensure 
community based enterprise; to provide grant support (not exceeding IR£so,ooo) to 
individuals and local community groups; to assist commercially viable small enterprise 
activities; and to influence the allocation o f resources for small enterprises from EC, 
private and public funding sources. Each board is composed o f 13 members and a 
chairman and is supposed to reflect “a balance of interests embracing four elected 
representatives, and representation from the main public sector agencies, business, 
farming, trade union and community interests” (Enterprise and Employment 1993). 
Initially !R£i2 million was allocated under the County Enterprise Fund to grant aid the 
establishment of small-scale economic projects that generate sustainable jobs and 
economic infrastructure at a local level. According to a Government Press Statement at 
the time of their establishment, the CEBs are to provide a framework for local initiative 
and complement the regional and county level services of state agencies such as FAS, 
Teagasc, Forbairt etc. They are monitored and co-ordinated by Enterprise and 
Employment. Each of the CEBs must draft an integrated, three year County Enterprise 
Action Plan in consultation with interested parties such as state agencies, the social 
partners, business interests and community groups. Action Plans are reviewed annually. 84
84 According to one interviewee, the CDTs were never legislated out of existence but rather faded into 
the background and thus if e ve r the CEBs are abolished, his particular CDT intends to become 
operational once again (interview).
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Table 13: The Operation of the CEBs
Minister for Enterprise and 
Employment
overall responsibility and 
discretion ov er all CEBs
nominates CEB members and doles 
out the Countv Enterprise Fund
County Enterprise Co­
ordinating Committee
within the Department of 
Enterprise and Employment
advises the Minister on the basis of 
CEO recommendations
Count}' Enterprise Officer 
(chief executive)
of each CEB reports back to the Minister
Count}' Enterprise Boards 
(36 in number)
Chairperson (elected the by 
members)
13 members:
4 elected representatives,
representatives from the main
public sector agencies,
business,
farming.
trade unions
and community interests
-formulate 3 year Count}' Enterprise 
Action Plans after consultation with 
interested parties, state 
development agencies, social 
partners, business interests and 
community groups;
-achieve consensus among 
responsible implementing agents 
and oversee and co-ordinate 
implementation
-report regularly to the Minister on 
progress in implementing plans.
Evaluation Committees 
(for each board)
made up of persons with banking 
and accounting expertise and 
experience in assessing the 
quality, local relevance and cost- 
effectiveness of project proposals
-make recommendations on 
appropriate level and form of 
assistance for all projects
Source: Fitzpatrick Associates (1997)
According to NESC (1994:96-9), there is a conflict between the two functions of the 
CEBs: development planning and grant giving. It contends that difficulties experienced in 
the former may lead them to prioritise the latter in which case deadweight (whether an 
activity would have taken place anyway) and displacement (whether grant-aided business 
displace existing businesses) must be of concern. Furthermore, NESC asserts that filling 
a gap in local economic development differs from filling a grant-giving gap“'*1 and doubts 
“whether the CEBs have the structure, resources and capability to formulate and execute 
enterprise development strategies for local development”. In fact, only about 10 per cent 
o f expenditure goes to promoting an enterprise culture which prompted one official to 
assert that the least amount of money goes to the greatest challenge of all (interview). 
Since there is a definite need for the provision of support services for local enterprise 
initiatives at a county level (the report of the Task Force on Small Business demonstrated 
that most small businesses preferred the county level for the provision of services), NESC 
would see the future role of the CEBs as “one-stop-shops” for information regarding 
loans, grants and other information.
Their remit and funding were extended somewhat under the Operational Programme for 
Local Urban and Rural Development as they - through Enterprise and Employment -
s- previously micro-enterprises (with less than 10 employees) were left outside of state agency support 
which is one of the reasons for the setting up the CEBs (Cullen 1994).
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have responsibility for the implementation of the sub-programme on Local Enterprise. In 
contrast to the other initiatives discussed above, the CEBs’ geographical coverage is 
country-wide and each unit is based on established local authority boundaries (Cullen 
1996). Furthermore, the presence of elected representatives distinguishes the CEBs from 
LEADER and the ABPs. Finally, the CEBs do not embrace a multi-dimensional approach 
to development but are specifically concerned with job creation and commercially viable 
enterprises.
The excluded partner: local government
Local Authorities86 are conspicuous by their absence from the development domain 
described above. This is due to a number of reasons emanating both from the nature of 
local government itself and from the local development strategy pursued in Ireland. Local 
development partnerships explicitly exclude Local Authorities. Instead, they include 
single function state agencies, central government, the social partners, the private sector 
and in latter years, the community and voluntary sector. In relation to the nature of local 
government, the abolition of domestic rates in 1977 removed the only autonomous source 
of finance held by Local Authorities. Subsequently, they became dependent on central 
government grants for finance. This means that their participation in EU programmes 
depends on matching funds from the government (Coyle 19968:7) and since most local 
development programmes are EU funded, Local Authorities are somewhat constrained in 
terms of the initiatives they can take.8? Local Authorities had representation on the sub­
regional committees that were set up to monitor the NDP. Local government was 
assigned a developmental role under two different acts: the Local Government Act 1941 
accorded Local Authorities the right to help local groups in community development and 
the Local Government Planning A ct 1963 designated Local Authorities as development 
agencies. In relation to the former, no links developed between community groups and 
local authorities and the role of animator has been forfeited to the private sector (Coyle 
19963:9-13). Furthermore, Local Authorities lacked the technical and financial 
wherewithal to perform the latter. Thus their developmental role was limited mainly to
w Local government is made up of 114 directly elected authorities in five legal classes: 29 County 
Councils; 5 County Borough Corporations; 5 Borough Corporations; 49 Urban District Councils and 26 
Town Commissioners- In all, there are 1.627 elected Local Authority members (Devolution 
Commission 1996). Elections are held about every 5 years by proportional representation and the 
number o f members o f each authority varies according to residents. Until recently central government 
decided on when elections were to be held and often postponed them for political reasons: they were 
postponed in 1965,1972,1984, and 1990 with no public protest (Hussey 1995:101).
8" In 1991, local government expenditure accounted for under 5 per cent of GDP and 11.3 per cent of 
overall public expenditure (Barrington Report 1991:11).
88
SECTIOS ¡1 - C h jfitrr} Ifflim t Pntwatj.' Adaptaiio* to Poh<-y
providing infrastructural support for industry.88 In fact, most services provided by 
European Local Authorities are provided by single function executive agencies working 
on a national level in Ireland. Moreover, policy entrepreneurship in local development 
was long stifled by the ultra vires clause which prevented Local Authorities from 
undertaking activities that were not explicitly included in their legislative competence, 
and its removal in 1991 did little to alter the sterile nature of local government. Moreover, 
not only did local authorities receive their powers through legislation, failure to carry out 
one of their tasks could lead to abolishment by the Minister of the Environment and 
Local Government.8^  Contact with central government is done exclusively through the 
Department of the Environment, the parent department and elected members are akin to 
mere petitioners, seeking privilege for individual constituents in matters like the 
provision of public authority housing. Hence local government is considerably less 
significant in Ireland than in other European countries in relation to the role it plays, or 
does not play, in local development.^0
In the scenario presented in this chapter, local development is therefore distinct from 
local representative democracy. There are few elected representatives for instance on the 
LEADER boards?1 and none on the boards of the ABPs as they are not compelled to 
include elected Local Authority members. Non-elected members (Local Authority 
Managers?2) chair 23 of the 35 CEBs and the board of ADM Ltd. contains a member of
s® Their remit covers housing, roads and traffic (which accounted for half of overall spending totalling 
IR£ 1 billion in 1992), water supply and sewerage, development plans, environmental protection, 
recreation and amenity, and education (Hussey 1995:102).
^  The power and functions of elected members cover the adoption of annual expenditure estimates, 
fixing of annual rate on commercial properties, amount to be borrowed, local by-laws, house building 
programmes, making of development plans (Hussey 1995:102).
9° They also constitute the majority of the electorate for the Seanad (the upper house of parliament) 
which is one of the reasons why local elections are highly politicised, that Is, they provide Seanad votes, 
hut they are also a trial run for national elections and a means of talent scouting. In practice much of 
the more publicised activity of local councillors has been in the area of planning wherein they have the 
possibility to overturn managerial decisions, a possibility' wide open to corruption, dubious rezoning 
and general planning travesties (see Hussey 1993:103-4).
ltl Some Local Authorities applied for funding under LEADER I but Agriculture felt that LEADER 
projects headed by state agencies (which is how local government is perceived) went contrary to the 
ethos of the initiative which was to empower local groups (Kearney et a i 1995).
<y2 A management system was put in place in the 1930s based on the example of US city management. 
This system entails the separation of reserved functions (major policy issues for example finance, 
legislation, nomination o f elected representatives to public bodies etc.), which arc the preserve of 
elected councillors, and executive functions (covering anything that is not reserved) which fall within 
the competence of the Local Authority Manager. The latter is a career official appointed by the 
independent Local Appointments Commission. “In practice, however, as permanent, professional, 
salaried officials, the manager and his staff are in a strong position vis-a-vis the unpaid, part-time, 
perhaps transient elected councillors and play a key role in initiating policy and in advising the 
council" (Coy le 1993:5). The Local Authority Manager ranks second (after government ministers) in 
terms of influence wielded in a region (Coyle & Sinnott 1993:92). Contrast this position with that of 
local elected councillors, in twelfth place (after the catholic clergy, the press and agricultural 
organisations) out of fifteen in terms of power wielded in a region.
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the City and County Managers’ Association. The CEBs follow existing administrative 
boundaries and include four elected members of the Local Authority as well as the Local 
Authority Manager. This constitutes a somewhat limited presence in the new local 
development structures and the protagonists of local development are not elected 
representatives but emanate almost exclusively from the private sector. The Irish 
development panorama is thus somewhat o f an anomaly. This issue is dealt with in 
Chapter 5.
Conclusion
In this chapter the first CSF, IRDPP, LEADER, ABPs, Global Grant and CEBs have been 
presented and discussed. Local development structures, that is the ABPs, the CEBs and 
LEADER, which form the nucleus o f local and rural development policy in Ireland and 
were subsumed into the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development in the second CSF (1994-99), are evidence of EU thinking penetrating Irish 
policy-making. Chapters deals with this CSF and institutional change in detail.
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Table 14: Classification of elements o f  misfit 1234
1. Leealistic/Centre-local issues
- High degree of centralisation
- No regional authorities
- Inept and ineffectual local government
- No local development structures
2. Bureaucratic
- State has sought to maintain close control of everything issuing restrictive guidelines
3. Programmatic
- No socio-economic data due to the arbitrary nature of boundaries for development
- No data collection systems essential for monitoring
- No spatial development but a sectoral bias
- Lack of co-ordination
- Drive to meet spending targets takes precedence over all other considerations
- Evaluation, monitoring and transfer of good practice
4. Political
5- Partnership 
- State dictated partnership
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This chapter now turns to the elements of misfit between Cohesion Policy and native 
approaches. The incongruous elements are listed in Table 14. First, legalistic problems 
generally relate to centre-local type issues. Ireland was a veiy highly centralised state 
with no regional authorities and an inept and ineffectual local government structure that 
did not sit well with European Commission policy-making notions. Second and in a 
related manner, the State has sought to keep tight control of the local situation, imposing 
strict guidelines where possible and establishing companies limited by guarantee rather 
than devolving to representative institutions. Third, programmatic elements of misfit 
include the absence of socio-economic data due to the arbitrary nature of boundary fixing 
for development and other administrative purposes. This has led to the impossibility of 
data collection systems essential for monitoring. Co-ordination problems are also rife but 
this is less critical in an experimental stage. Other programmatic elements of misfit relate 
to the absence of a spatial or area-based policy and a tendency for sectoral policies to take 
precedence. The drive to meet spending targets imposed by the Structural Funds has 
tended to rank as a higher priority than formulating development policies suitable to the 
problems at hand. Vis-à-vis monitoring, evaluation and transfer of good practice, there 
are some lacunae but this can be attributed to the pilot, experimental nature of the 
structures. In relation to partnership lastly, the state has tended to take an imposing role 
vis-à-vis ‘lesser’ sub-national partners and prescribe partners with which to dialogue.
Adaptational pressure was high therefore for Ireland and even during the period of the 
first CSF, 1989-93, European Commission-inspired organisational structures began to 
emerge. The IRDPP pre-dated LEADER but it seems clear that it is a carbon copy of the 
European version and has European Commission-inspired overtones as does its 
successor, LEADER. ABPs also bear a European Commission imprint, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
More than institutional change at this stage, the Irish situation is characterised by 
experimentation with new kinds of local development structures. Local government is 
deliberately excluded so no actual formal change is necessary. The ad hoc administrative 
nature of the structures is an Irish invention. More changes were made with the second 
CSF 1994-99 and will be attended to in Chapter 5.
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Table 15: Formal institutional changes
- Parallel experimenting with new structures for local development
- Ad hoc administrative status for local development structures
92
J
Chapter 4
Sardinia: Basic Policy M isunderstanding
Introduction
Sardinia is one of the five special statute regions within the regional ised Italian state and 
thus, at least in theoiy, enjoys more autonomy than other ordinary regions.^ In terms of 
EU Cohesion Policy it is an Objective One region. A significant policy/institutional misfit 
has been posited in order to better understand Sardinia’s poor performance in the 
context of Cohesion Policy, and the European Commission’s relative lack of success with 
institution building. Thus this chapter seeks to establish misfit between Cohesion Policy 
and domestic development policies. It does so by outlining Sardinian experience with 
development policies prior to Cohesion Policy and then setting out initial experience with 
the ERDF. It concludes with a discussion of the elements of misfit. Chapter 6 goes on to 
examine Sardinia’s experience with local development in detail.
Indigenous approaches to development: national versus regional
After the war, big business and the central state dominated the national debate on 
economic development and as a result, development in the south was seen almost 
exclusively in terms of industrialisation to be brought about by locating big complexes in 
the south (Trigilia 1989:169). Nevertheless, developing the south was formulated as an 
explicit aim of economic policy and planning due to the fragility of economic structures 
in the Mezzogiomo as well as serious political and social tensions. The idea was to
'*■  ‘Special’ regions were set up in the post-war period while ‘ordinary' regions were established in the 
1970s, even though they had been previously provided for in the post-war constitution. Although 
article 116 of the constitution provides special regions with “particular forms and conditions of 
autonomy”, the main difference between them is the earlier establishment of the funner (Mine 
1993:263). Regional competencies are laid out in the table below. Primary competencies mean that the 
region can make its own laws, shared means that it has to legislate within the framework laid down by 
national law and minimal means that it can make only minor adaptations to national law (Bottazzi &
Primary Shared Minimal
Agriculture and 
forests
Regional public works 
Artisans
Tourism and hotels
Industry
Commerce
Mining
Education
Labour
Social security
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integrate the south into overall national development (Trigilia 1992:12). However, as 
Hine (1993:264) outlines
“The planning of economic activity and territorial development, including the 
allocation of resources between sectors and across the national territory, 
became the major concern. In reality, rather little of Italy's post war 
development has been ‘planned’, but this did not stop much lip-service being 
paid to the principle, right across the political spectrum.”
The Cassa per il M ezzogiom o (fund for the south, hereinafter cassa), established in 1950
and abolished in 1986, was the primary instalment for national policy (intervento
straordinario) and subsequently for European funding in the south. It is commonplace
throughout the literature to characterise this large-scale public policy as assistenziale,
unproductive and essentially a failure insofar as it never managed to bring about an
autonomous, self-propelling growth for the south (Graziani 1978; Trigilia 1992). This is
notwithstanding the fact that the objective of the cassa was to raise the level of
development in the south to match northern standards - it did not have any other
practical objectives. Government intervention in the south was organised into three
phases: 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The first phase involved the provision of basic
infrastructure and overhead capital formation; and the second phase advocated the
intervention of publicly owned companies and the attraction of branch plants of private
corporations through generous financial incentives. The third phase saw attempts to
create the conditions ripe for the blossoming of diffused forms of industrialisation based
on small firms (Leonard! 1993:494). One of the most interesting conclusions drawn from
this policy experience is that not only were policies unsuccessful in relation to the
objectives of top down development, they ended up impeding the possibility of bottom up
development (Trigilia 1992:32-34). The policy problem was conceived of in economic
terms and thus public spending raised incomes in the south but without a corresponding
increase in production capacity. Furthermore, the areas which benefited most from
public intervention are now stagnating and in crisis. In sum, public spending under the
aegis of this territorial development policy, supported income and not productive
structures. Trigilia (1992:71-72) uses this particular example to demonstrate the
‘perverse* effects of public policy and concludes that the Italian experience casts shadows
on the productivity o f economic and social spending.
In relation to home-grown development policy, Sardinia was one of the first regions 
involved in attempts to plan economic policy to alter regional productive structures in the 
1950s. Its economy was primarily agricultural and characterised by massive outward
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m igrations These and other factors led the region to seek the extraordinary programme 
of intervention provided for by article 13 of its special statute (sfaftifo spéciale, the 
region’s constitution). This article provided for an integrated plan to be drawn up by the 
state with the agreement o f the region to promote the economic and social revival of the 
is la n d s  A debate began on what kind of plan to adopt which was to have far reaching 
consequences. One commentator (Bagella 1993:34) asserts that the tone of the debate 
was far from a precise philosophy of development or the bones of a plan compatible with 
existing institutional conditions. Notwithstanding, the debate on the Revival Plan was 
one of the most animated during the history of the regional councils (consiglio 
régionale).
The governing party of the regional executive {giunta) wanted a gradual transformation 
through new investments in agriculture, industry' and transport. The general programme 
was supposed to take into account all ordinary' and extraordinary interventions through 
which all public resources available for the development of the island were to be 
channelled. Fourteen years later, law 588/1963 launched the so-called Extraordinary 
Plan to promote the economic and social revival of Sardinia (piano straordinario per 
favorire la rinascita economica e sociale della Sardegna, hereinafter Revival Plan) for 
the social and economic regeneration of the island which was to be the central axis of 
Sardinian development. The first Revival Plan, which ran from 1963 to 1975, was to 
provide 400 billion lire and was to be implemented by the region through annual or 
multi-annual programmes. The Regional Centre for Programme Planning (Centro 
régionale per la programmazione) was set up in 1962 to formulate the plan and 
programmes.
Bottazzi and Loy (1997:303) hold that, even by todays standards, the objectives of the 
first Revival Plan are quite modern and include contemporary aspects of the discussion 
on the perspectives of development. For instance, utilising local resources was a central 
part of the plan as were modernising agriculture and livestock rearing and developing a 
network of SMEs. They even add that the Revival Plan "anticipated the idea of 
endogenous development and was not limited to a consideration of macro-economic *
‘’-■ Gross Regional Product from agriculture in 1951 was 36.1 percent. From i960 to 1964. more than 
100,000 people left Sardinia. This is a considerable amount for an island with a population of 1.4 
million.
*0 Article 13 of the Region’s statute asserted that “the State, with the help of the Region, will prepare an 
integrated plan to facilitate the economic and social re-hirth of the island”.
'■’'•This was largely because of the political situation of the time characterised by tensions between 
government and opposition (DC and PCI respectively) at national level which was mirrored at regional 
level.
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aggregates but took into account the social realities of Sardinia’'9? (1997:304). Other 
innovative aspects of law 588, which in many respects foreshadow EÜ principles 
introduced with the 1988 reform, include the requirement of additionality o f funds and 
the integrated as well as extraordinary nature of the intervention. In relation to 
additionality, the 400 billion lire was not supposed to substitute but be ‘extraordinair’ 
and additional to ordinary and cassa interventions. It was supposed to be integrated in 
the sense that it was to move away from sectoral and fragmented interventions to co­
ordinated plans. Furthermore, the plan was supposed to co-ordinate all other 
interventions in Sardinia and to this effect, the law stipulated that the government, public 
agencies as well as the cassa had to inform the region of their intentions before 
proceeding with plans (Brigaglia 1982:84). Law 588 also provided for the involvement or 
participation of the local population and social partners. A subsequent law went one step 
further and provided for the establishment of committees of trade unions and local 
authorities, which were to give ex ante consultation on decisions and implementation.
What happened to these procedures in practice? Firstly, the consultation referred to was 
never activated beyond a limited conception of ex post opinions on already completed 
drafts of plans in which decisions had already been taken. This led to the exclusion of 
local communities and authorities from this planning process (Brigaglia 1982:85). 
Secondly, in relation to the co-ordination aspect of the plan, apart from the cassa, no 
other actor informed the region of their intentions on the island, rendering any attempts 
at co-ordination futile. Thirdly, additionality7 was not respected as for example, the level 
of state public works in Sardinia decreased (from 4.2 per cent in i960 to 3.5 in 1968). 
Brigaglia (1982:85) attributes this to the lack of political will and institutional jealousy. 
Its failure is generally attributed to the incongruence between instruments and objectives 
(Bagella 1993:57). Bottazzi and Loy (1997) provide the most extensive study of the 
Revival Plan and they attribute its failure to two factors that resurface frequently in 
Sardinian territorial development policy. Firstly, the region’s administrative structure 
was ill-prepared to efficiently manage the proposed interventions and there were delays 
in the preparation of initiatives to spend funds. Secondly, the philosophy of the Revival 
Plan w7as usurped with the arrival of the then dominant model of development, that is 
large industry organised around a development pole.
Over the period of the Revival Plan which coincided with the advent of the petrochemical 
‘mono-culture’, regional income increased by 128 to 140 per cent98 (the national average
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',sFrom 311 billion in 1962 to 710-750 billion in 1974.
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was 80 per cent) and 140,000 new jobs were created (75,000 in industry, 60,000 in the 
tertiary sector and 10,000 in construction) (Bagella 1993:35-40). Measures to restructure 
the agricultural sectors as well as funds to industry were inadequate for the potential of 
the sector.100 However, the petrochemical sector attracted most funds between 1962 and 
1968 (319 out of 448 billion which is 71 per cent). The main credit institution in Sardinia, 
the CIS (crcdito industriale sardo) spent 74 per cent of its total investments on chemical 
industries between i960 and 1974, during the first Revival Plan (Moro 1978:5).101 This is 
curious if one considers that the CIS was created to favour SMEs and home-grown 
entrepreneurship and yet, it financed external industries unconnected to the local 
economy and local resources. The CIS, in fact, made the concrete choices in relation to 
the development plan pursued. Thus the only practical possibility considered for 
industrial development in Sardinia was large chemical industry', and this seemed to bear 
fruit initially, at least in terms of income which grew at an average of 5.9 per cent from 
1963 to 1974 (more than the Italian average or that for the M ezzogiom o). Not so positive 
however, were the changes wrought in employment structure. 53,000 jobs were lost in 
agriculture, 5,000 jobs were created in industry and 3,600 in the service sector (Bagella 
i 9 9 3 :44-49)' Clearly, industry did not provide an outlet for the loss of jobs in the country 
and in the agricultural sector as was the case elsewhere. In fact, the economy was based 
on low cost labour and energy which made the 1970s international oil crisis all the more 
gargantuan for the island. In sum, the increase in energy costs stymied the 
developmental model based on the propelling role of petrochemicals and the ensuing 
crisis signalled the end of a conception of regional economic development based on the 
growth pole logic (Moro 1978:7-10).
In essence, regional planning fell largely in line with national planning and Sardinia 
‘endured’ rather than promoted the logic of development of chemical industries (Moro 
1978:5). Its experience is indicative of the term ‘cathedrals in the desert’ (cattedrali nel 
deserto) or white elephants (Saba 1974). This was the case generally for southern Italian 
regions as “the planning vogue implied their subordination to a grand national design" 
(Hine 1993:264). The development policy pursued in Sardinia did not contribute to the 
development of local entrepreneurship because of the distance of the local scene from the
_____  SJZCllOX ¡1 -  Chaffer 4 Sardinia: Bap; Poha AUsuntimUn.in*
9«Agriculture received funds to the tune of 500 billion in these twelve years. 100 of which came from 
the cass«, 80 billion from the region, 70 from the private sector, 100 from the Agricultural Ministry 
and 150 billion from law 588. This amount appears to have been insufficient to deal with the 
modernisation required (Bagella 1993:40)
«"’An interesting and. as we shall see, recurring feature of this experience emerges at this point, that is, 
the inability to spend funds. In 1970, for example after eight years of implementation, only 40 per cent 
of funds had been committed (Bagella 1993).
'° in  1961 it spent 53 percent of its financing on the chemical sector and 77 per cent in 1962.
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locus of decision-making and because state incentives were formulated on the basis of a 
more modern entrepreneur in the centre-north. Thus, the relationship between banks 
and local entrepreneurship was suffocated, as was the case for the CIS (Satta 1978:13-15).
So the first Revival Plan must be seen against the backdrop o f the oil crisis. In its wake 
however, the productivity of investments made was not evaluated. In fact, the region had 
no coherent set of instruments for intervention let alone control or monitoring o f 
implementation (Bagella 1993:53). Boscolo et a l explain what they call fictitious 
development (sviluppo fittizio) asserting that the aim of development policies is the 
elimination of backwardness through the activation of a process of endogenous 
accumulation, rather than the reduction of backwardness through an increase in 
consumption, which was the nature of what happened in Sardinia. Agricultural reforms 
were sacrificed at the altar of industrial development and the agri-food sector declined as 
a consequence. However, at the beginning of the 1950s, development in the south had 
been geared towards reinforcing the agricultural sector. Article 1 of the law establishing 
the cassa does not contain any references to industrial development programmes. At the 
end of the 1950s changes came about with the demands of big industrial groups for 
different economic policy choices. At the same time, it became clear that the intervention 
policy being pursued (agriculture and infrastructure) was not sufficient to guarantee 
development (Colonna 1979:135-177). Land reform was one o f the most important 
agricultural reforms but its implementation was partial and limited, which accentuated 
the dualism of the agricultural structure (small farms with little hope of survival and 
medium and large farms located on the best land) (Cosentino et al. 1979:179-232). 
Industrialisation in Sardinia was dominated by a strategy o f large national and 
multinational companies. Growth was dependent on intervention and the expansion of 
public administration. Furthermore, funds tended to be distributed rather than invested. 
As Colonna (1979) holds, evaluating the development policy of the south is tantamount to 
surveying the influx o f external resources.
Subsequent to the first Revival Plan, six more followed from 1976 to 1990. The amount 
allocated in the programmes was about 45 per cent more than that which was actually 
paid out to the programmes, and the amount committed was 6.5 per cent more than the 
amount paid.10- Furthermore, it is important to point out that this was not the initial 
budget as the budget for each programme (ranging from 154.25 billion lire in 1979 to 
1,196.6 billion in 1988-90) wras changed numerous times and in some cases, long after
7 rammSiunal Imtiiutinn Bui fling, far La.\jl Derelvpmnt. The Oise «ƒ' fjuwptan V/uon Cohesion Po/fy in Inland and Sardinia
“’-3.283.78 billion lire was allocated, 2,834.2 billion lire «as committed and the amount paid out was 
2,268.8 billion lire (situation in 1993).
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the programme’s deadline. This practice gives a specific character to these programmes, 
which received other allocations, distributed directly to specific measures without 
altering the overall programme through annual financial laws. For example, as late as 
1993, allocations were made to the 1985,1986-7 and the 1988-90 programmes. What 
emerges from the account of the Revival Plan is a patchw'ork kind of programming, 
characterised by minor and major ad hoc changes as well as financial shifts from one 
measure to another without any significant overhaul. In short, there is much slippage 
from the initial programme during implementation. Thus, the programme is not an 
integrated one in the sense that all measures combine to make up a cohesive whole, but a 
patchwork of provisional, independent single measures. Another aspect that emerges and 
exacerbates the tendencies described above is the absence of temporal constraints. Time 
is money in the opposite sense here: even though beyond their deadlines, the 
programmes continue to receive more funds. This is a significant factor in explaining the 
difficulties Sardinia appears to have with EU programmes as no such ad hocery is 
permitted. Hence, while in theory Revival Plans constituted development planning and 
might have prepared Sardinian authorities for EU Cohesion policy, the regional 
administration was in fact, accustomed to a different form of planning. The role of the 
Italian state is also problematic in the sense that it failed to respect its commitments 
made under law 588 as it did not co-operate fully with the region (their plans worked 
separately) and thus the global and integrated nature of the programme was undermined 
(Ribichesit 1982:77). A fourth point which complicates matters further is the fact that 
often the overall amount of financial payments to Revival Plan programmes does not 
correspond to the sum o f allocations per spending item, because further allocations made 
by financial laws are directly transferred to specific items (La Programmazione in 
Sardegna 1993:150). This made monitoring and evaluation (as well as accounting) 
redundant. Since this practice is practically institutionalised as a norm, it is a small 
wonder that working with EU Cohesion policy, which stipulates monitoring and 
evaluation, has not taken a smooth course. In fact, it makes for significant misfit between 
Cohesion Policy and native approaches. Before going on to develop this point further, we 
take a closer look at the individual programmes in terms of spending.
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As is evident from the above tables 16 to 18, there is much deducting and changing of 
programmes during their implementation. What is striking is that in 1993, some 3 billion 
lire had still to be paid out in the agricultural sector and the 1986-87 programme still had 
478 billion lire to commit. Furthermore, the practice of multi-annual programmes 
founders as a result of the inability to respect temporal deadlines: for example, the 1985 
programme was integrated into the 1982-84 programme; CIPE (comitato 
interministeriale per la programmazione economica, Inter-ministerial committee for 
economic planning) was still approving changes in 1993 of the 1988-90 programme). As 
is evident from Table 19, agricultural spending as a percentage of each year’s allocation 
decreased steadily (from 65.67 per cent in 1976-78 to 28.53 per cent in 1986-87), with a 
slight increase in 1988-90 (to 31.42 per cent). Industrial allocations on the other hand, 
more than doubled (from 20.47 per cent to 42.9 per cent) from 1976-78 to 1979, but then 
more than halved in 1982-84 (to 18.58 per cent), and remained at about 19 per cent for 
the other three programmes. The so-called Tourism-Social-Territory’ spending item was 
halved from the 1976-78 to the 1979 programme (from 12.39 to 6.02 per cent), but 
increased six-fold in the 1982-84 programme, increasing to a zenith of 46.59 per cent in 
1986-7 and fell off to 37.14 per cent thereafter. It takes the lion’s share of spending when 
all the programmes are taken together (37.07 per cent). Taking tourism separately, its 
increase in expenditure is congruent with the massive emphasis on coastal tourism 
during this period.
Spending capacity or ‘absorption’ is highest in agriculture mainly because spending in 
this sector means that implementation authorities receive the sums allocated. The 
spending capacity of the latter is not known (La Programmazione in Sardegna 1993 
14/15). Agricultural spending is divided into two parts, title I and II. The disaggregated 
spending for agriculture is as follows: 56 per cent for the reform of the agri-pastoral 
sector, 35 per cent to forestry and 21 per cent was spent buying land to order to provide 
pasture lands as well as improving and transforming municipal and private lands. 
Spending on territory is also quite high (24.84 per cent) in terms of allocations over the 
six programmes. Measures in this sector include residential building, roads, and 
infrastructure for internal areas and urbanisation of Sassari and Cagliari. The social 
sector received the least amount of funds (3.5 per cent) and appeared only in the 1988-90 
program me.10* 1
11’T h is  is surprising given the fact that the Rerival Plan is for the promotion of the economic and scx'ial 
revival of the island. Spending in this category was on schools (building and equipment) and 
encouraging sclnxil attendance.
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Bottazzi and Loy (1997:306) outline three sets of limits to the Revival Plans. Firstly, 
interventions are neither sufficiently territorial nor sectoral. Furthermore, the economic 
and social heterogeneity of the island is not taken into account in the plan. This lack of 
selectivity leads to ‘rain-drop interventions’ (interventi a pioggia) which denotes a 
situation where public grants and aid are distributed rather than invested, among the 
largest number o f recipients in a small quantity. Moreover, the economic efficiency of 
measures are not estimated nor calculated; and results are not evaluated. Secondly, in 
spite of the fact that the plans were to be economic and social, the latter part was 
neglected. This meant that sectors such as education and training - traditionally sub­
standard in Sardegna - were not considered, probably due to the dearth of proposals for 
projects. That said, the social dimension did exist inadvertently in the agricultural sector, 
as some spending that could not be justified on economic grounds was geared to 
improving living conditions. However, the mix between economic and social objectives 
produced weak results in both spheres. Thirdly, taking all sectors into account, 
approximately a third of allocations (29.52 per cent considering years and 69.7 per cent 
when considering sectors) was not spent. The two authors attribute this absorption or 
spending capacity problem to the bloated bureaucracy of the regional apparatus on the 
one hand, and on the other, a general incapability of the regional administration to 
formulate projects, stimulate and aid programmes, monitor results and evaluate effects 
(Bottazzi & Loy 1997:306-7).
Taking a closer look at absorption problems which can be both of a commitment (as a 
proportion of allocations) or a spending (as a proportion of commitments) nature. The 
sector with the best record on commitments is agriculture10-*, and more specifically the 
agri-pastoral reform10^  (98.61 per cent). Industry has the best record on spending mainly 
because half of the resources were transferred directly to regional public bodies, 20 per 
cent was grant aid and 27 per cent was spent on industrial infrastructure. A meagre 7 per 
cent was spent on services to enterprises. The worst record on commitments is held by 
the ‘territory’ spending item, in which 76.88 per cent was committed. The social sector 
scores lowest (32.38 per cent) on payments, even though 94.5 per cent of its resources 1
Transnational Institution Building for Local Development. The Cast ofEj/mptan Union Cohesion Polly in In Lind and Sardinia
1"-1 Agricultural projects were mainly of the following type: water development for inter-sectoral use, 
development and promotion of wine, fruit, milk and cheese sectors, public agricultural works, land 
improvement for livestock rearing, fruit and vegetable development, indoor plan development, 
interventions to reduce the deficit in the regional agri-food budget, co-ordination programme for the 
development of sheep farming, fisheries and acquaculture, irrigation, iniproring agricultural 
structures and the development of youth entrepreneurship.
'<•3 The other agricultural sector was mainly concerned with agri-pastoral reform, buying land for 
pasture use, improving grazing and forestry (which accounts for 63.24 per cent of the total allocation 
to the agri-pastoral reform).
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had been committed.1«1 The worst programme on commitments is the last one (1988-90) 
which committed 75.8 per cent of resources and scored 55.95 per cent on payments.10? 
This is because it was probably still in the process of being implemented when the study 
was undertaken in 1997.
W here did the funds come from? As is evident from table 20, the state made the lion’s 
share of contributions (2,268.8 billion lire, 46 per cent) and the region contributed 27 
per cent About 12 per cent came from interest obtained as well as recovered and 
reimbursed funds. The remainder came from article 28 of law268/i974loS (8 per cent), 
budget laws (Finarmaria.) (7 per cent) and the so-called reserve fund (Fondo di riserva). 
The state did not make any contribution to the 1985 and the 1988-90 programmes.
As is evident from Table 20, there are several funding bodies for the Revival Plans. Once 
again, such a mix is reminiscent of EU Cohesion Policy in that it too is made up of a 
myriad of hinds. Although it is a little more complicated, one would expect a certain 
policy fit, that is, Sardinia would have been well able to administer the policy due to its 
prior experience. However, this has not been the case as shall be seen further on.
S IS C I I O S  I ]  -  C h j f ’ i n  4 S a rd in ia : ffogr P c fay  U s t tn f is r it jru i ir r *
Tourism, social and territory measures included urban improvements, residential building, 
camping zones, youth hostels, tourism infrastructure, integrated complexes in thermal zones, hygiene 
works in municipalities, birring, completing and restructuring of cultural works in provincial capitals 
for seivices, tourism development, youth entrepreneurship in tourism sector, building and school 
equipment, major roads, environment and the development of thin! level airports.
,0"These figures are for October 1993.
108Article 28 of law 268/1974 reads with the law that approves the state budget in each of the 
financial years from 1975 to 1984, there will be a further sum to be attributed in addition to t h a t ,  
provided for by this law for objectives title I and II o f that law
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To recap briefly, Sardinia has had an extensive pre-EU Cohesion Policy experience of 
territorial development policy. Moreover, it also encountered some of the principles that 
that policy introduced in the 1980s. These principles did not get beyond the written stage 
in the sense that they were not implemented. The novel approach to local development 
espousing notions such as inclusion of social partners, participation o f local populations 
and utilising local resources that appeared as early as the 1950s in Sardinian 
development documents, was scuppered in favour of an industrial policy based on the 
petrochemical mono-culture.
There would appear to be several elements of fit between Cohesion Policy and Sardinian 
development policy. First, multi-level governance has characterised development policy 
with the involvement of several layers (central state, region, cassa). Second, the use of 
multiple funds is a commonality. Hine advances a ‘congruence’ between the style of 
politics and public policy-making to which Italians have become used to over forty years 
and the style of Community institutions and decision-making procedures. He also likens 
the Community political system to the Italian one as they are both “multi-tiered and 
pluralistic”; “there is no strong executive and a clear-cut majority-minority divide” hence 
“majorities in favour of given policies are in both systems fragile and pliable, so that 
decisions need to be taken on the basis of a very broad consensus”; “neither the Italian 
government nor the Commission-Council tandem can count on pushing legislation 
through in a form which resembles that in which it was introduced, or to a predictable 
timetable”; “both systems are heavily juridicised and based upon marked elements of 
inter-institutional and territorial bargaining”; and “both display a great deal of ambiguity 
about the status of decisions and the point at which decisions have actually been taken” 
(Hine 1993:286).
On the other hand, misfit would appear to centre on the following elements. First, a 
bizarre kind of programming characterised by periodic ad hoc changes to the detriment 
of any kind of integrated or integrated momentum. Second, a general disparity' between 
instruments and objectives and thus significant slippage from initial aims in the 
implementation phase. Third, an inability to meet temporal constraints compounded by 
the above-mentioned ad hoc periodic changes. Fourth, ‘absorption’ or spending problems 
with funds going unused or being merely distributed. Fifth and as a consequence of the 
first three, inability to monitor programmes and hence to undertake any meaningful 
evaluation, either ex ante or ex post. Hence, where fit may be posited at a ‘descriptive’ 
institutional level, the practical perspective highlights the predominance of misfit. The
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chapter now turns to initial experiences with EU Cohesion Policy in order to examine 
whether this misfit holds.
Transnational Institution Building for Toca! D  eve k>p went The Ca.it ot Htsmpran i  'titan Cohesion Polity in In'Lmd and Sardinia
EU Membership and Aspects of Cohesion -  the Initial Years
“Italy's original membership o f the Community’ was more a political act of faith than a
reflection of the country’s real economic strength” (Hine 1993:284). In joining the EEC
Italy accepted the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in order to acquire
a market for its industrial exports. This meant that agricultural regions largely lost out as
industrial interests were more powerful and
“the indifference of the Community toward Italian agricultural problems was 
matched by the lack of any constructive attitude on the part of the Italian 
authorities .. [as they] were unable to present an acceptable allocation 
programme for those hinds that the Community put at the disposal of Italian 
agriculture” (Roccas 1980:110-111).
The entire south of Italy was eligible for funding from the inception of the ERDF, but the 
cassa was assigned the responsibility' for applications. This move reduced the role o f 
regions, hitherto responsible for regional development (Merloni 1985). Clearly, these two 
factors affected Sardinia somewhat. Firstly, it was an agricultural region, which had to 
subscribe to a CAP geared in favour o f northern European countries. Secondly, the 
leading role the region could have played in its own development was curtailed as a result 
of the cassa's protagonism in the field.
In general, although efficiency has characterised drawing down funds in Italy, absorption 
or spending capacity problems emerge thereafter, thus delays in implementation were 
rife (See Mele 1990:704-706; Desideri 1994:13). For example, from 1975 to 1985, Italy 
failed to spend up to 6,000 billion lire and paid out only 50 per cent of its allocations 
(Songini 1988). This is generally thought to be due to inter alia  the novel character of 
programme planning (although as we have seen this is not the case for Sardinia). One 
DG-XVI functionary lays the blame for the inefficiency of Structural funds spending in 
Italy with the viscosity of the Italian politico-administrative system, particularly at the 
regional level, which is not compatible with the management of the funds (Ciardelli 
1992:190), even though regional administrations had little or no involvement to begin 
with as the cassa was responsible for the ERDF.
108
S l.’JT]' f\H  > 4 j tr in i *v»". /VA, ,\f. .**<&*:fJK.lPT
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
As we have seen in chapter three, the IMPs ushered in the 1988 reform, which altered the 
procedures of Cohesion Policy. As expected, considerable adaptations) pressure resulted 
in Italy and Sardinia. Bianchi (1993*56) undertook an evaluation of the first IMPs and 
concluded that most Italian IMPs are “like causal sets of actions, that is, mere sources of 
financing” as opposed to programmes as such.100 Two of his other main findings are of 
concern here. First,
“[..] despite their marked multisectorality, IMPs are hardly recognisable as a 
genuine manifestation of ‘integrated development'. Ironically, the multi­
sectoral approach operates, given the limited amount of resources and the 
pronounced sectoral fragmentation, to reduce the potential impact of the 
IMP” (1992:56).
Second, monitoring procedures were little other than book-keeping methods. In relation 
to the first, he advances that
“[t]he integrated approach, as such, cannot be made responsible for the 
failure of the programmes, the shortcomings and the contradictions which 
have appeared in some specific instances. It is quite obvious that despite the 
attempts to experiment with pilot projects and other preparatory' measures 
the IMPs were designed and put into practice without any serious 
consideration of the local institutional and societal context" (Bianchi 
1993:64).
Moreover, Desideri (1994:13) asserts that the very nature of the IMPs encountered 
difficulties in Italy such as, the lack of properly trained staff, political interference in 
administrative questions, and some regions assigned the task of drawing up IMPs to 
external consultants which led to the absence of regional officials at formulation stage, 
and consequent confusion at the implementation stage. Bianchi (1993) does, however, 
point to some positive outcomes in relation to institutional and social partnership in Italy 
generally. Although IMPs were introduced in 1985, due to some initial hurdles and 
delays, the Sardinian IMP was initiated after the 1988 reform and was thus incorporated 
into the first Community Support Framework. It is to this first real experience with 
Cohesion Policy that the chapter now turns.“0
In June 1986 Sardinia sent its IMP proposal, which was drafted by the Regional Centre 
for Programme Planning to the Italian government. The idea behind the plan was to seek 
to resolve the basis of misfit that had obtained vis-à-vis Cohesion Policy* until then. Thus 
the IMP was conceived as an overall and complete programme design and was not
“^This is unlike French IMPs -  “components of broader, yet unknown, plans", and some Greek IMPs - 
territorial plans.
l,r,Thc following account of the introduction of the IMPs in Italy and Sardinia is based on Songini 
(1988; 1991) and Piga (1986a; 1986b) as well as interviews.
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limited to co-ordinating the IMP regulation111 resources. It was to integrate all funds and 
instruments in order to reduce fragmentation among programmes. In fact, it was similar 
to the Revival Plan in the sense that it sought to introduce one document to cover and co­
ordinate, even simplify the plethora of regional, national and EU initiatives in the region. 
Funding to the tune of 3,500 billion lire (of which 1,500 billion from the EU) was 
requested.
In December 1986, the CIPE reduced all Italian regions' requests from 17,800 billion to 
8,250 billion, which came closer to the amount available for Italy (between 5,000-6,000 
billion lire). Sardinia’s IMP was chopped by four fifths (to 700 billion lire) without any 
alterations to the programme details and objectives.
In February 1987, the IMPs were sent to Brussels where it emerged that the request for 
funding was still far too high. Hence, the Commission requested Italian regions to 
identify priority measures in which planning had preferably already commenced. 
However, Sardinian authorities stuck to the principle that the IMP was an overall design 
directed to all EU funds and not just the IMP funds. Subsequently, the Commission gave 
the Sardinian regional authorities a draft overall orientation of the IMP in which it 
proposed concentrating intervention on some development axes within the five sectors o f 
the original programme (agriculture, tourism and the environment, SMEs, artisans and 
training). Thus a new programme was drafted with four sub-programmes, each of which 
contained some training measures (agriculture and fisheries, artisans and SMEs, tourism 
and the environment and implementation and monitoring).112
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1,1 Regulation 2088/1985.
“'Under the first sub-programme of the IMP - agriculture and fisheries - the following measures were 
included: a study of the market for sheep cheese and meat products; a market study of quality w ines; 
genetic and health improvement of sheep; a study on aromatic and medicinal plants; two measures on 
the cork oak tree; training and employment of multi-purpose agricultural experts; rural infrastructure 
(roads and electricity); a fish market in Porto Tones; research on fish and acquaculture; professional 
training in agriculture, fisheries and acquaculture; and centres of professional training. The second 
sub-programme - SMEs and artisans - comprised measures sucli as share financing; leasing; services 
to enterprises (BIC); applied research and technological offices/hclp desks; construction of pilot 
centres for artisans; a diffusion of quality brand name for artisan products; commercialisation and 
market research; training; and incentives to artisans. The following measures vveiv* a part of the third 
sub-programme - tourism and the environment: training for tourist operators; a computer system for 
tourism; management and care o f the environment; tourism promotion; Corsica-Sardinia 
interventions: parks, forestry; infrastructure, hotels and itineraries; env ironmental forestry; ecological 
train journeys; thermalism; and a hotel school in Pula. Finally, the fourth sub-programme dealt with 
the implementation and monitoring of the programme and had such measures as monitoring and 
evaluation; studies and project making; advertising; information; training; informative material and 
telecommunications.
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Brussels approved the final plan on 22 July 1988 and the programme contract was 
signed. The final financing approved was 295 billion lire“3 (45 per cent from the EU, 51 
per cent from the region and 4 per cent from the private sector). Because o f the 
significant delay in agreeing on the plan - it took two years - the time scale was reduced 
and the IMP was to run from 1988 to 1992 (divided into two periods of three and two 
years). The Commission failed to rectify the built-in bias towards the poorer regions, 
which were supposed to receive more funds as Tuscany received about 18 per cent (350 
billion) more than Sardinia.“ -»
In the wake of such a laborious beginning, Sardinia’s IMP did not find a smooth course. 
The split in the time period mentioned above ensured a ‘check-up’ after the first three 
years on the basis of which funds were added or deducted for the subsequent two years. 
The check-up was enacted on 31 December 1990 and Italian regions were classified into 
four groups.1 li; Sardinia was put into the third group as its payments stood at 19.6 per 
cent. The EU and the state scheduled technical meetings with regions in view of - what 
they called - the ‘IMP emergency’. The problems that emerged from these meetings and 
encountered by all regions arose from a general misfit between the IMP and local 
institutional structures. First, there were legal setbacks consisting of delays in approving 
regional laws for the implementation of the IMP. In Sardinia’s case, the EU approved its 
IMP in 1988 but the regional financial regulation necessary for implementation came 
into being in June 1989. Second, regions had some difficulties with control organs such 
as the Corte dei conti.ll6 Third, the administrative committees“ ? were established late. 
Fourth, there was insufficient co-ordination among Community, national and regional 
regulations in relation to new procedures. Fifth, difficulty was encountered in activating 
decision-making procedures and administration due to elections or political crises. Sixth, 
not enough projects were formulated apparently due to the insufficient amount of
u T h e final financing was one tenth of the original Sardinian request and a quarter of the government 
request.
”•» Interestingly, CIPE is supposed to ensure that two-thirds of resources are allocated to the 
Mczzogiomu (Grotc 1996:265). However, in the first place CIPE sent a Tuscan request for 813 billion 
to the European Commission -  16 percent more than the Sardinian request.
"'The first group (Tuscany. Emilia-Romagna and Molise) which had more than about 63 per cent of 
their funds paid Avert* deemed to have satisfactory performance: the second group (Abruzzo, Basilicata 
and Umbria) had paid between 30 to 36 per cent of their funds; the third group (Sardinia, Lazio and 
Marche) scored about 18 per cent on payments; and finally the last group had paid an insignificant 
amount of funds (in Campania’s case, nothing was spent) (Songini 1991).
1,f' The Corte dei conti delayed some decrees for spending emitted from regional departments because 
the region was slow in setting up the administrative committee stipulated in the IMP. The presidential 
(executive) decrees of 11 .July 1990 countered this somewhat as it set up one administrative committee 
for all EU programmes (Songini 1991:17).
" T o  co-ordinate EU funds and programmes at a regional level, a presidential decree of the executive 
provided for one administrative committee for all Community Support Framework programmes 
chaired by the President of the executive or a nominee and also includes EU representatives, the state 
and the region (Songini 1991).
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Operational Programme (357.16 billion lire) (Programma operativo plurifondo). The 
National Programme of Community Interest concentrated on the priority sectors of 
tourism, the environment, artisans and SMEs. The Operational Programme 
encompassed the strategy of creating an environment favourable for economic 
development through infrastructural interventions which were neglected in the IMP and 
the National Programme of Community Interest. The IMP (342.22 billion lire) had the 
objective of favouring the development o f the island through the potential o f promising 
activities and the modernisation o f economic structures, and it and the Operational 
Programme laid emphasis on human resources through a series of training measures 
linked horizontally to the productive sectors o f intervention.
National Programme o f Community Interest
The biggest of the Community Support Framework programmes, the National 
Programme of Community Interest was entirely ERDF funded and articulated in three 
sub-programmes, that is, tourism, the environment and artisans and SMEs. These 
sectors have long been developmental priorities in Sardinia. It was supposed to 
emphasise the “endogenous potential” of the region (National Programme of Community' 
Interest). To a certain extent, the environment and tourism measures continue from the 
first and second annual plan for the implementation of extraordinary intervention 
(primo e secondo Piano annuale d i attuazione dell’intervento straordinario). To follow 
and evaluate the National Programme of Community Interest, a management committee 
comprising regional, national (Minister for extraordinary intervention in the 
Mezzogiorno) and the European Commission (DG-XVI) was set up.
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Table 22: National Programme o f Community Interest 1989-1993 by sector in million lire
Sector Allocations Commitments Payments P/C% P/A% C/A %
Artisans and 
SMEs
315,392 315,392 245,000 77-68% 77.68% 100.00%
Tourism 195,000 195,000 114,434 58.68% 58.68% 100.00%
Environment 176,100 176,100 64,496 36.62% 36.62% 100.00%
Infrastructure 59,ooo 59 ,ooo 40,219 68.17% 68.17% 100.00%
Total 745,492 745,492 464,149 62.26% 62.26% 100.00%
While the IMP centred on developing some particularly promising activities and 
modernising the economic structures o f the island, the National Programme of 
Community7 Interest emphasised the potential of some priority sectors of the region that 
have been the subject of the planning commitment of regional authorities. There were no 
agricultural or training measures. It applied to the whole island on the basis of the
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justification that economic backwardness characterises all of Sardinia. Funding came 
from the EU and the region on a fifty-fifty basis.
Operational Programme 1989-1993
The Operational Programme122 was made up of four ERDF sub-programmes 
(communications, tourism, support infrastructure and programme implementation), one 
ESF sub-programme (training) and five FEOGA sub-programmes (rural infrastructure, 
development of local agricultural products, modernisation of livestock sector, 
development of rural world and natural resources).
Table 23: Operational Programme 1989-1993 by sector in million lire
Sector Allocations Commitments Payments P/C % C/A % P/A %
Agriculture 
and Fisheries
77 ,760 65,311 36,126 55-31% 83-99% 46.46%
Artisans and 
SMEs
112,489 90,006 68,177 75-75% 80.01% 60.61%
Tourism 26,062 21,237 13,140 61.87% 81.49% 50.42%
Environment 29,030 29,030 n ,374 39.18% 100.00% 39*18%
Infrastructure 144,065 134,393 66,448 49-44% 93-29% 46.12%
Total 389406 339.977 195,265 57.43% 87*31% 50.14%
The sub-programme on developing the rural world was to implement the actions 
provided for by the Community Support Framework “enhancing agricultural resources 
and rural development”. The idea behind it wras to favour a more rational use of resources 
and access to alternative outlets for local products. Within this, measures for agricultural 
tourism and some environmental measures were adopted but subsequently abandoned 
because of the lack o f a regional regulation and the absence of implementing authorities 
respectively. In any event the following measures were adopted:
- the establishment of a regional agricultural meteorological service with an 
information service, a regional centre and seven peripheral offices in order 
to provide information on the weather to farmers;
- alternative livestock rearing and the development of equine sector through 
the establishment of a genetic centre of equine species in Sardinia, 
protection of the Giara pony and the production of the “Giarab” pony;
- land protection and study of hydrographic basins;
l-2 The 1988 reform had largely been anticipated by the IMPs. Operational Programme/Coniniunity 
Support Framework and IMP implementation follow the same lines. The regional administration 
drafts the programme and submits it to the Minister for the Co-ordination of Community Policies. 
Subsequently, the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Co-ordination of EU Structural Funds which 
includes a regional representative, gives an opinion and sends it off to Cl PE. Evaluation and control 
units and the Ministry for Co-ordination of Community Policies make a final evaluation and 
modifications in accordance with national economic policy. Cl PE then sends it off to the Commission 
and a contract is sought with the state and the region for programme implementation (Grate 
1996:265-266).
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- system of protected areas in Sardinia (Operational Programme 194).
Most of these measures were funded under the FEOGA fund and managed by the 
Department of Agriculture (assessorato alVagricultura). Under the ESF, training for 
agricultural workers was provided.
The overall Community Support Framework
As outlined previously, the CSF was composed of the IMP, the National Programme of 
Community Interest and the Operational Programme.
Figure 11: CSF 1989-1993
IMP (ERDF. L551)
FEOGA)
-KCO/
‘iPC l (ERDF) 
51%
The difficulty encountered in particular with regard to the ERDF, in implementation as 
well as the tardiness of the region, led to the introduction of changes. The original 
programme is below.
Table 24*^: CSF 1988-1993 in million lire by programme in 1996
Programmes Allocations Commitments Payments C/A (?6) P/A
(%)
P/C
(%)
IMP 342,223 328.233 158,156 95.91% 46.21% 48.18%
NPC1 745,492 745492 464449 100.00% 62.26% 62.26%
OP 357461 3 4 b870 182,267 95.72% 51.03% 53-31%
Total 1,444,876 1,415.595 804,572 97.97% 55*68% 56.84%
Source: élaboration of data from Régional documents and Bottazzi & Loy (1997:309)
The official evaluation on the Community Support Framework, completed in September 1994. holds 
that 59% of IMP allocations were spent (46% of committed funds), 71% {62% of committed funds) of 
National Programme of Community Interest allocations and 65% (53% of committed funds) of 
Operational Programme allocations were spent.
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In December 1992, the Sardinian Department of programme planning submitted a 
proposal to the EU for revising the Community Support Framework which included the 
enlargement of some measures to avoid the loss of funding as a result of failure to meet 
the minimum objectives stipulated for spending. In January 1993, DG-XVI agreed to 
some changes but reserved its opinion on others pending more details. The idea behind 
the changes was to accelerate spending and better qualify priorities. In June 1993,85 per 
cent of sums had been committed and 51 per cent (of committed sums) paid. Within the 
IMP (88 per cent committed and 44 per cent paid), 13 billion was subtracted from the 
ERDF part (tourism, green train circuit and thermalism) and 16.16 billion lire from the 
L551 part Ceasing, pilot artisan centres, wine studies etc.) and added to incentives to 
artisans. Within the National Programme of Community Interest (98 percent committed 
and 66 percent paid), 14 billion was taken from an environmental measure (Molentargiu 
pond) and plans for productive establishments and added to incentives to artisans. 
Another 86 billion was taken from the ERDF part of the National Programme of 
Community Interest (incentives to tourist enterprises, cultural itineraries, controlled 
waste, purifying apparatus, nature walks etc.). The Commission reduced the ERDF 
commitment to the Operational Programme (59 per cent committed and 30 per cent 
paid) by 10 million ECUs because of the risk of not spending money. EU funding for the 
environment increased from 60 to 65 per cent and other ERDF measures from 50 to 60 
per cent (La Programmazione in Sardegna 1993:136-7). Thus much funding was 
transferred to the artisan sector which was justified on the basis that funds are more 
easily absorbed (ibid. 13). Whether this could be justified from a developmental point of 
view is another matter not alluded to herein. It brings to light the effects of pressures to 
spend money, that is, that sectors that absorb hinds easily are targeted with programmes 
without necessarily a developmental reason. The ERDF and L551 have higher 
commitment levels (94 and 93 per cent respectively) than FEOGA (65 per cent) and the 
ESF124 (57 per cent). ERDF payments are also the highest (55 per cent): higher than the 
ESF (47 per cent), L551 (45 per cent) and FEOGA (39 per cent).
‘-J This is continuous with the difficulties encountered with social spending in the Revival Plans.
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Table 25: Fund performance per programmed
Programmes C/A % P/A % P/C%
IMPERDF 90.01% 25-53% 28.36%
IMP 551 92.58% 44 .53% 48.10%
IMP EAGGF 83.69% 54-71% 65.37%
IMP ES F 86.24% 86.24% 100.00%
IMP Total 8 8 .25% 44-2 3 % 50.12%
NPCI ERDF 97-91% 65.65% 67.06%
Total
OP ERDF 77-32% 23.20% 30.01%
OP EAGGF 46.52% 22.60% 48.58%
OPESF 51-37% 39 .85% 77*57%
OP Total 5 8 .84% 29.9 6 % 50 -91%
All Total _ 84,91% 50 .91% 59 .96%
ERDF Total 9 4 .05% 54-57% 58.02%
551 Total 9 2 .58% 4 4 .53% 4 8 .10%
EAGGF Total 65.11?0 38.66% 59-38%
ESF Total 57-01% 47-35% 83-05%
Source: La Programmazione in Sardegna
In the Community Support Framework* 126, programmes were approved at different stages 
and the region provided for investment in numerous sectors often without overall co­
ordination and without taking account o f the long time frames needed for their 
implementation. Thus many infrastructural projects were abandoned in favour o f 
artisans “which constitutes the only sector that can absorb a part of sums. Thanks to this 
decision, the region did not lose the ERDF contribution [...]” (Community Support 
Framework 1994-1999:195-6). It is obvious that financial incentives are easier to ‘dole 
out’ than other more complex types of intervention.
The evaluation o f the Community Support Framework was compiled by the regional 
administration and emphasised the “organisational dysfunctionalism" that characterised 
the implementation of Community programmes (Community Support Framework 
evaluation 1994:10). The report attributed delays in implementation to several factors. 
First, administrative procedures are chronically slow. Second, the involvement of 
numerous actors led to an excessive fragmentation of interventions on the regional 
territory. Third, no co-ordinating structure existed to enable a constant control of 
programme implementation until July 1990. Fourth, local authorities were incapable of 
making proposals and consequently, the project portfolio of responsible departments was 
inconsistent. Fifth, numerous permits were required to access financing (Community 
Support Framework evaluation 1994:10). It also pointed to the dearth of a culture o f
Situation in 1993.
126 The Community Support Framework also included INTERREG I and the global grant.
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monitoring and accounting in Sardinia as public administrators have tended to 
concentrate on operational aspects rather than monitoring implementation. Finally, EU 
funds were considered ‘residual’ when compared to the financial resources provided by 
the extraordinary intervention of the Mezzogiorno (law 64/1986). In order to counter 
these aspects, in the wake of the first Community Support Framework, working groups 
were set up in each department to survey the implementation of Community 
programmes.
Conclusion
This chapter establishes misfit between Cohesion Policy and domestic development 
policies in Sardinia. Discordant elements are listed and classified in table 10. First, there 
have been conundrums of a legal nature such as those relating to legislation. The time- 
frames involved in approving regional laws as well as the inability to activate national 
laws go against the ebb of Cohesion Policy implementation which operates according to 
fairly rigid time-frames. This situation is compounded by the legal ‘nit-picking of 
administrative organs such as the Corte dei Conti which may delay legislation even more. 
The fact that Italy is a stato di diritto in the sense that “strictly speaking, there can be no 
action of public administration within the Italian framework which is not directly 
mandated by a law or by a quasi-legal norm” means that “[public administration] 
concentrates on formal rules and rule-making to the neglect of what actually happens” 
(Furlong 1994:79-80). This also means that the establishment of fairly standard 
‘administrative committees’ requires legislation to be passed and thus may take quite a 
while. Moreover, issuing authorisations and permits takes a relatively long period of 
time. Second, bureaucratic type hiccups relate to the general slow-moving nature of the 
administration, in relation to the issuing of authorisations for example, which gives rise 
to severe delays. The Italian administration in general tends to be characterised by a lack 
o f capacity or competence in relation to the tasks assigned to it, is noted for its 
sluggishness and it concentrates on procedures as opposed to actual performance. AH of 
these characteristics make for a significant mismatch with Cohesion Policy. Third, 
programmatic hurdles include basic incomprehension of EU programmes, for example in 
the case of the IMP in which the Sardinian regional authority interpreted the IMP in an 
entirely novel but inappropriate way. This interpretation can be attributed to the real 
need for a 'co-ordination programme’ to somehow weave all the different national, 
regional and EU programmes together. However, the IMP was not the appropriate 
instrument. Other programmatic snags include the inadequate number of projects and 
the excessive number of measures and consequent fragmentation. Both monitoring and
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evaluation requirements have also given rise to some stumbling blocks due to technical 
difficulties in the case of the former, and in the latter case, evaluation has not been 
entrusted to third (independent) parties. Thus there is a tendency to lay the blame for 
inadequate implementation at the door of putative ‘weak actors’. Fourth, political 
complications have added to the hotchpotch of elements of misfit. Regional authorities 
have been slow to attribute salience to EU Cohesion Policy simply because other more 
readily accessible sources of funding existed. This situation has been petering out for 
some time now however, and thus interest has been on the increase. The Italian 
notoriousness for frequent elections and political crises also bears out in relation to 
Cohesion Policy difficulties. Finally, partnership hitches relate to the involvement of 
actors with no previous experience, the involvement of too many actors and the absence 
of private actors.12?
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«'■  On 30 September 1994, no private payments had occurred for the 1988-1993 Community Support 
Framework apart from the 8,656 million iire under the FEOGA part of the Operational Programme.
120
SEC I I OS i l  O nteer -f Sanhnta: Has,'.- Pok.i A h<utt4rr.'Uin,Ln„
Table 26: Classification of elements of misfit
1. Legal istk
- Delays in approving regional laws
- Failure to activate national laws
- Legal ‘nit-picking’ by central state organs
- Establishment o f administrative committees
- Authorisations and permits
2. Bureaucratic
- Sluggishness giving rise to delays
- Lack of capacity or competence
- Authorisations and permits
- Administrative concentration on procedures as opposed to actual performance
3. Programmatic
- Not enough projects
- Fragmentation -  too many measures
- Technical difficulties with monitoring
- Incomprehension of purpose of IM P
- Self-evaluation drawing some ‘interesting’ conclusions
- No co-ordination
4 - Political
- Elections and political crises
- Lack of interest due to low salience due to the amount of funding involved (when 
compared with overall ‘cohesion* budget)
5. Partnership
- Involvement of weak actors
- Too many actors
- No private actors
What emerges from the above five elements is that in Sardinia, development 
programmes from the Revival Plans to the first CSF have been designed and 
implemented without any serious regard for the local institutional and social context. 
This gives rise to a serious case of misfit between policy and context. Misfit has led to 
serious ‘absorption’ or ‘spending capacity’ problems resulting in a shoddy 
implementation of development policy in general. In order to rectify this situation, some 
changes were introduced (see Table 27). First, one administrative committee for all EU 
programmes will counter some o f the legalistic and bureaucratic problems described 
above. Second, a procedure whereby budget changes do not require legislation is 
certainly a positive innovation in such a languishing system. Third, the establishment of 
working groups in each department to survey implementation is also a procedural 
improvement. Fourth, the Italian state attempted to overhaul southern policy’s 
institutional arrangements with law 64 in 1986 which granted more responsibility to
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regions in planning and development. Moreover, a Department for the South was 
established at central level to co-ordinate development policies and it was to rely on an 
Agency to carry out the former functions of the cossa. The implementation of Cohesion 
Policy in the first programming period however, served to assist botching this reform as 
it showed up the policy incapacity of regions and failed to make inroads into traditional 
southern policy (Bull & Baudner 1993). Inter-institutional feuding in relation to 
competencies also served to flummox the reform.
Table 27: Formal institutional changes
- One administrative committee for all EU programmes
- Introduction of procedure whereby budget changes do not require laws
- Working groups set up in each department to survey implementation
To conclude, the Sardinian context of development policy and initial experience with EU 
programmes has been outlined here. Significant misfit has been established. Chapter 6 
goes on to deal with local development more specifically, adaptation strategies and 
European Commission institution building in Sardinia.
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Introduction
Institutional change in Ireland can be conceived as a gradual process of learning through 
experimentation, emulation and permeability. Chapter 3 demonstrated that adaptational 
pressure was high and the internal conditions for change were ripe. That is to say, a 
persistent condition of underdevelopment vis-à-vis other EU states and continuing 
differential internal development underscored the failure of development policies, and 
excessive centralisation and the absence of a regional dimension to development policy 
constituted flagrant policy misfit. Certain external factors contributed to weld decision­
makers' perception of the need for change. For example, Cohesion Policy and its 
generous benefits for Objective One regions acted as an incentive to follow certain policy 
courses emanating from the European Commission. Chapter 2 illustrates how European 
Commission policy documents had long concentrated on and advocated a certain kind of 
regional development based on decentralisation, partnership etc as the preferred policy 
paradigm (Hall 1993). Despite much lip-service, this paradigm was never really heeded 
and was, indeed, skilfully dodged by Irish decision-makers who preferred sectoral 
approaches to development. In fact, the regional level in Ireland was characterised by 
arbitrary and constantly changing boundaries, and the institutions that operated at this 
level were mono-functional state-sponsored bodies as opposed to territorially-based 
entities. The subsequent shift in emphasis to local development was more conducive to 
the Irish situation where counties rather than regions had underpinning in terms of 
identity, institutionally and geographically.
Forming part of a kind o f ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993) alongside 
the European Commission, were some domestic actors such as the ESRI -  successive 
governments’ most authoritative source of thought and evaluation -  wrhich
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recommended a local development Operational Programme in its review of the first CSF. 
Initial successes from the LEADER experience provided further material for this 
advocacy coalition to promote their paradigm. The Taoiseach’s department, acting as a 
norm entrepreneur or change agent supported the advocacy coalition and wholeheartedly 
embraced the local development paradigm. Its position as a front runner at central state 
level in a highly centralised system o f governance, facilitated its ease of action. Other 
assets held by the Taoiseach’s department such as access to European Commission 
thinking at the highest levels, a fairly straightforward uncomplicated legal system in 
which to experiment new structures, centralised clout and consensual partnership 
relations nationally, all combined to enable it to successfully negotiate and enact change. 
The puzzling part of policy, that is, what to do (Heclo 1974) had already been catered for 
by the presence of numerous policy documents pioneering local development, not only 
from the European Commission, but also from the OECD. Thus, the structures that 
emerged locally constituted an adapted emulation, albeit somewhat sui generis due to 
the exclusion of local government, of what was advanced in these documents. Linking 
these structures to Cohesion Policy facilitated a pilot, transitional, almost ‘trial and error’ 
experimental period in which much institutional overlap, duplication, confusion and 
uncertainty was tolerated. It also made powering, that is, how to get changes through 
(Heclo 1974)» easier by borrowing the legitimacy of Cohesion Policy to eschew objections. 
Anchoring experiments however was a different matter. During the transitional, pilot 
period, many experiments were made to correct the institutional problems listed above 
and thus attempts were made to formally reform local government, enhancing its clout 
and capacity while exposing it to interaction with these bodies in an interim period in 
order to equip it to eventually merge with local development structures. The dynamism 
of local development bodies as well as their fundamentally participatory nature was 
allowed to permeate local government. Taking Hall’s (1993) different orders of change, 
the period under the first CSF was characterised by minor changes akin to a first order 
change in policy instrument settings -  the involvement of CEBs and IRDPP. The 
incorporation of the latter however, served ultimately to dilute its innovative aspects and 
avoid change. The second CSF was characterised by a second order change as 
modifications were made to policy instruments through the Operational Programme for 
Local Urban and Rural Development. Attempts to anchor these changes in mainstream 
programmes and spending by tying local development structures to a renewed, 
reinvigorated local development structure on paper constitutes a potential third order 
change, because a new local institutional level based on a wide participatory and 
representative structure is acquiring roots in the Irish institutional configuration. 
Moreover, the very definition of the policy problem has changed. That is to say,
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development problems are no longer considered solely in terms of Ireland vis-à-vis the 
rest of the EU. Internal differential growth and development problems have been 
recognised and therefore, combating internal disparities now goes hand-in-hand with 
mainstream development. It has to be said that new-found economic growth and 
prosperity enabled this enlightened vision which took expression in the third and latest 
NDP from 2000 to 2006 in the form of a systematic spatial element to all policies. In 
other words, having made ground on other EU countries in terms of development, 
decision-makers can now ‘afford’ to look at domestic disparities.
The likely conditions for movement from one paradigm to another are the accumulation 
of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy and policy failures that cause a 
shift in the locus of authority over policy and a wider contest between competing 
paradigms. In Ireland, that these conditions obtain becomes evident as this chapter 
unfolds. The process is gradual and indirect. Notwithstanding, this policy change and 
institutional learning and change have been obfuscated by the irreverent, late and 
spurious acquiescence of Irish decision-makers to the regional development paradigm: 
the ‘creation’ of two new regions, regional assemblies to administer them and two 
operational regional programmes in the NDP 2000-2006. This move was motivated by 
the threat of losing out on Structural Funding due to economic prosperity. As a whole 
Ireland surpassed the EU average and if it had remained as one region for the purposes 
of structural funding, it would have only been eligible for Objective One in Transition 
status. A crafty plan to mitigate the effects of dwindling Structural Funds proposed 
dividing the country into two regions, one which would continue to qualify for Objective 
One status and one eligible for Objective One in Transition status. However, this move 
wras toned down by EUROSTAT, w'hich let decision-makers teeter while it took time to 
decide, and although it finally accepted the division, it switched two counties from the 
‘poor’ region to the ‘not-so-poor’ region. What this and other episodes recounted below 
reveal, is that changes are influenced by the European Commission and more especially 
Cohesion Policy. This chapter deals with institutional change. In order to do so the 
second CSF, in particular the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development is explored with a view to exposing the degree o f importance of local 
development. It then comparatively examines local development structures and identifies 
the institutional difficulties characteristic of this experimental period. It concludes by 
identifying the main elements that make up institutional change in Ireland. This analysis 
is taken up again in Chapter 7 which examines the mechanisms explaining the differing 
degrees of institutional change found in Ireland and Sardinia.
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Regionalism and Localism: Competing Paradigms?
As an attempt to redress problems of co-ordination and centralisation and to absorb 
adaptational pressure arising from Cohesion Policy, eight Regional Authorities128 were 
set up and came to life on 1 January 1994 with the primary role o f co-ordinating public 
services regionally and the function o f monitoring and advising on the regional 
implementation o f the Structural Funds. Previous (sometimes seven or nine) ad hoc 
regional development organisations were disembodied in the 1980s and the first CSF had 
made recourse to ‘sub-regional review committees’. Although in theory the new Regional 
Authorities were to act as “a framework to optimise national development in the years 
ahead [and to represent] an important progression in the democratic life of the nation” 
(Environment, Press Statement 29 December 1993), they wfere not given a clear or 
distinct role in practice,120 and were bereft o f  executive functions (vis-d-vis inter alia the 
CSF) and legislative powers with which to co-ordinate. Probably as a result, but further 
compounding the problem, the CSF 1994-99 had no regional dimension and was 
designed, structured and implemented on a national basis through national 
programmes.«0 Moreover, the individual Operational Programmes specified little 
regarding regional aspects and no delivery agency followed the Regional Authority 
boundaries exactly, since the sub-national dimension of Operational Programme delivery 
generally relies on the Department which delivers it. In fact, on the heels of the ESRI 
recommendations, the NDP for the second round of Structural Funds was especially 
interested in local rather than regional development. This was subsequently articulated 
in the Operational Programme on Local, Urban and Rural Development, the 
implementation o f which was the responsibility of the Department of the Taoiseach«1. 
Apparently,
“The Government recognises the importance of a local dimension to 
enterprise and employment creation and the importance o f developing the 
capabilities o f local communities to contribute to tackling unemployment and 
pursuing local development The experiences already gained from the Pilot
'-8 Membership came from and were nominated by the elected ranks of constituent local authorities. 
To earn' out its functions, a Regional Authorin' is flanked by two Operational Committees, an ’EU 
Operational Gmimittee’ which assists in CSF review functions and a general Operational Committee to 
support its wider local government functions.
"-9 For example, one of the Regional Authorities, the West Regional Authority accumulated a 
IR£8o,ooo shortfall after just two meetings and was reported to be “confused about its exact role” 
(Irish Times 22 April 1994).
"The CSF document contains a modest explicit regional dimension, its primary goals, strategy and 
mechanisms being defined at national level. The CSF docs not contain regional objectives, either 
overall or by region; it contains no quantified regional targets and no projected expenditure by region. 
[...] There are, therefore, no integrated regional strategies, plans or programmes (i.c. ranging across all 
the OPs) within the CSF. Instead, the CSF is designed, structured and implemented on a national basis 
through national programmes -a  fact central to any evaluation of the operation and impact of the CSF 
at regional level within Ireland.” (Fitzpatrick Associates I997:iv)
More specifically, the Junior Minister for Load development and European Affairs at the 
Taoiseach’s department.
126
S E C 110\  W  - Charters Inland: Tonards Transformation?
Area Programme in Integrated Rural Development 1988-1990, the current 
LEADER programme, the area-based initiatives under the Programme for 
Economic and Social Progress, the Third EC Poverty Programme and the EC 
Global Grant for Local Development all suggest that considerable potential 
exists at local level and that, in order to release it, carefully structured 
interventions are required” (NDP 1993:69).
Thus after a brief flirtation with regionalism in the interlude between the first and the 
second CSF, localism prevailed in the latter CSF. It prevailed first because the shift from 
regional to local had previously occurred at European level (see McAleavey & De Rynck 
1997) and second, because it bettered suited the Irish system in which the local county 
level has been more historically preferable to the regional one. Direct influence from the 
European Commission is evident in a heated polemic over spending on training. The 
Director General of DG-XVI, Eneko Landaburu, questioned social spending in the Irish 
NDP during question time in the European Parliament, as apparently, the link between 
job creation and training wras not that clear‘d  {Irish Times 18 February 1994). This 
criticism was not appreciated by senior ministers at the time.133 However, one of the 
elements of the NDP (the other three became sub-programmes in the Operational 
Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development) called “expanded Community 
Employment Development Programme (CEDP) and a countrywide Social Employment 
Scheme (SES) which will complement the first two measures [CEBs and ABPs] and be 
particularly relevant to the objectives of the area-based sub-programme" (NDP 1993:69- 
70), did not appear in the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development.134 Instead a technical assistance sub-programme was introduced. Had the 
original version been maintained, the rest o f the Operational Programme (that is without 
the CEDP/SES schemes) would have accounted for 2 per cent of Structural Funds 
spending (all o f it was to constitute 7.2 per cent of Structural Funds spending) (CWC 
1993:23). In other words, the intervention of the European Commission meant that local 
development measures went beyond employment schemes and became more important 
as a proportion of the rest of the CSF. Its spending power benefited from the changes 
wrought by the Commission in the CSF. The Irish government proposed spending 1.2 per 
cent (170 MECUS) of Irish Structural expenditure on local development, while the CSF 
agreed to 2.1 per cent (311 MECUS). When compared to the figures in the 1989-93 CSF - 
11 MECUS which equals 0.2 per cent - it appears that there is a notable increase in 
commitment - spurred on by Brussels (the jump of 141 MECUS) - to local development.
It was not dear to the Community Workers Cooperative (1993:26) either.
1:; > The reason for spending on training could be due to the increased availability of funds that did not 
have to be match«! under the ESF, rather than the sudden realisation that unemployment was due to 
poor skills in the workforce - this was not the case.
v* i A somewhat different version called, Community Employment was included in the Human 
Resources Operational Programme.
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Another contention came to the fore in relation to inflated figures as the NDP had been 
submitted before Structural Fund allocation to Ireland was known, and although the 
Commissioner for Regional Policy (DG-XVI), Millan had promised no more than IR£y.2 
billion for the plan, decision-makers drafted the plan on the basis of Structural Funding 
to the tune of IR£8 billion which was apparently promised in private by Commission 
President Delors. The outcome was a plan based on IR£8 billion in Structural Funds and 
matching funds calculated consequently. Once the figure became publicly known, instead 
of eliminating projects in the plan as originally expected, projects were scaled down 
across departments.1^  The rest o f the money was expected to be made up in the mid­
term review (Irish Times 4 March 1994). Apparently, Ireland fell “victim to its own 
success” {Irish Times 25 February 1994) as years of maximum draw-downs were halted. 
Structural Funds have become so politically salient in Ireland that the consequences of 
the fall-out were to be found in pages and pages of newspaper articles and editorials. 
Figure 12 compares the NDP with the CSF. The increased importance of local 
development is obvious. Figure 13 shows the difference in local development spending as 
laid out in the NDP and the CSF in proportionate terms. *2
>35 According to the Minister for Finance, “it would he very foolish if we were to knock out projects 
from the National Plan before wc know what programmes the Commission might favour {Irish Times
2 March 1994).
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Figure 12: NDP and CSF 1994-99 compared (in MECUS1994 prices)
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The new local development drive found expression in the Operational Programme for 
Local Urban and Rural Development, which was made up of four sub-programmes (see 
Table 29).
Table 29: Implemented of the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural
Development
sub-program m e cen tral
resp o n sib ility
local re sp o n sib ility  area size
1: Local enterprise Enterprise and 
Employment
County Enterprise County 
Boards
2: Integrated Development 
of Designated 
Disadvantaged and Other 
Areas
Taoiseach 
ADM Ltd.
Area-Based Sub-county 
Partnerships
3: Urban and Village 
Renewal
Environment Local authorities Town, village
4: Technical Assistance Taoiseach -
The objectives of the local enterprise sub-programme were for County Enterprise Boards 
(CEBs) to improve the financing of SMEs, to foster networking and for CEBs to become a 
one-stop-shop locally for information, advice and guidance to firms. EU aid of C77 
million was made available through the mechanism of the CEBs to provide a range of 
support services for local enterprise initiatives. The main objective of sub-programme 2 
was to counter disadvantage through support for communities (support for local 
enterprise, improving potential of unemployed, advice for career planning, training, 
countering risk of early-school leaving and under-achievement, enhancing capacity of 
local communities, improving physical environment). The Sub-Programme on Integrated 
Development of Designated Disadvantaged and Other Areas, accounted for EU aid of C8i 
million and provided support primarily to disadvantaged communities. It allocated 
IR£8o million to 38 partnerships (ABPs) over the 1994-99 period and each partnership 
received a budget for the whole period of between IR£i million and IR£4 million (an 
average of JR£6oo,ooo per annum) to cover staff, administration and the revenue costs 
of selected projects and services. Funding was provided on the basis of a strategic plan 
formulated in consultation among local residents and groups, and taking into 
consideration how existing resources could be used to best effect. Due to time 
constraints, until about 1997, the original 12 PESP partnerships had undertaken almost 
all activity (OECD 2000). The urban and village renewal sub-programme supported a 
range of initiatives designed to promote sustainable physical, social and economic 
revitalisation of urban centres throughout the country. It was allocated €78 million of EU 
aid. Under this sub-programme Hinding was provided to finance a range of measures
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designed to rejuvenate the social and economic life of towns and villages, rehabilitate the 
built environment and restore and conserve important elements of Irish architecture and 
heritage (NDP 2000-2006:283-5). Actions under the technical assistance sub- 
programme included feasibility studies, programme studies related to performance, 
information technology, publicity, external evaluation and research unit.
Transnational Institution building for Lo<al Development: The Cast oftamptan Union Cohesion Poiuy in IrtLwd and Sardinia
The mid-term evaluation (E SR I1997) drew positive conclusions and crowned the CSF “a 
notable success story**. It judged that
“funds have been deployed effectively to support and enhance what has been a 
remarkable economic recovery. Under the CSF process, medium-term 
planning of public expenditure has come more to the fore, allowing a more 
systematic and effective programming in many areas. Capacity and capability 
has been increased in the productive sectors; there has been a quantum-leap 
in the provision of public infrastructure; education and training attainment 
forges ahead; and experimental institutional arrangements have galvanised 
local initiatives”.
So it seems that the CSF was a success in terms of meeting spending targets and coupled 
with a period of economic growth, rosy economic and social benefits were had. In the end 
the Local, Urban and Rural Development Operational Programme accounted for €382 
million o f co-financed public expenditure (€269 million of EU aid) over the 
programming period (almost 5 per cent o f total EU aid) (NDP 2000-2006).
The Chapter now attempts to better grasp these “experimental institutional 
arrangements” by comparatively examining them in order to ascertain what local actors 
participate and the extent of local clout. It then explores them tris-d-vis policy issues such 
as integrated development, monitoring and best practice transfer.
Local development bodies
Local development in Ireland is unusual in that it is divorced from local government and 
is pursued by “experimental institutional arrangements”. Furthermore, its impetus is 
top-down as its path is defined by EU (LEADER) or national guidelines (CEBs and 
ABPs). As we have already seen, EU guidelines in relation to consultation with sub­
national actors (which after the abolition of RDOs in 1987 are difficult to identify), 
created pressures to devolve power to either local level or regional level for development 
purposes. These “experimental institutional arrangements” emerged as the Irish 
response and they are the County Enterprise Boards, Area Based Partnerships and the 
LEADER groups. Chapter 3 detailed their formal make-up and briefs. This section 
examines them from a more informal perspective.
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Local actors
Who are the local actors involved? Most of the structures are compelled to include local 
actors, that is, members of the local community. The LEADER guidelines1#  made 
reference to including leading figures of the local economy and society. However, 
according to one evaluator, this implies retaining the status quo to a certain extent, 
which runs contrary to encouraging innovation in local development (Kearney et a l  
!995 :99)* Furthermore, this may lead to an over-dependence on a single personality'.137 
Secondly, leading figures (those who have power and influence) tend to want to maintain 
the status quo and frustrate change: they have a vested interest in maintaining the 
prevailing power structures within the community which, in a development strategy may 
need to be altered. Kearney ef al. (1995:1x9) in their evaluation encountered LEADER 
companies that assumed a local top-down structure dominated by a strong personality, 
which impeded the emergence of a genuine partnership. Where a sense of local 
ownership was instilled and partnerships were accountable to the local population 
through public meetings etc., a voluntary contribution on the part of the local population 
resulted, according to evaluations. However, a quarter of LEADER companies were not 
community based and generally LEADER companies tended to exclude the unemployed, 
trade unions and environmental interests (Kearney et al. 1995). LEADER companies also 
tend to perceive the local business community as representative of the local population -  
which is not always the case. For instance, some board members (local actors) promoted 
projects of their own or projects of close connections. This evidently leads to conflict of 
interests (Government of Ireland 1994). It is not enough to allow boards to be 
determined locally as they may end up reflecting the needs of the local political comity 
more than operational considerations (OECD 1996:46). The novel actors on the 
development scene come from the community and voluntary sectors. They were given 
explicit recognition in the composition of the Boards of the ABPs (six from the 
community and voluntary sector) and on the board of ADM Ltd. However, initially there 
were no mechanisms to ensure that they actually represented their constituency. 
Moreover, they use public funding but are not elected nor mandated by public 
representatives. The OECD report (1996:36) concluded that “the ABPs naturally become 
at least a complement to and perhaps a partial substitute for local government; yet they 
are not obliged to account for themselves to the latter”.
*36 European Commission 91C 73/14.
'3' Kearney et al. (1995:24) Rive the example of a clergyman in a small country town who sought to 
promote development but failed to adequately involve the local community and neglected to establish 
a successor which meant that the initiative’s success was dependent on him.
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An enhanced role for ‘communities’ was developed in the anti-poverty strategy where 
community involvement was based on notions of empowerment and social inclusion 
pioneered by the work of the Combat Poverty Agency since the 1980s in the context of the 
EU Poverty Programmes (Walsh 1999). Due to the policy vacuum in Ireland vis-à-vis 
Poverty programmes, the CPA was very successful in influencing the policy process. 
Community involvement covers consultation on needs or participation in decision­
making through a board member. Six (minimum out of eighteen) community directors 
are necessary in the ABPs which are largely responsible for formalising the community 
and voluntaiy sector role. However, some obstacles to genuine community participation 
persisted. First, “the management ethos drawn from the worlds of business and public 
administration” which is “particularly unsuited to the experience of community activists 
and may in part explain the high turnover in community representatives as they struggle 
to come to grips with an alien management format” (Walsh 1999). Second, initially the 
procedures for selecting representatives were ad hoc and informal so much so that some 
community groups held a monopoly. Now selection takes place in community fora  
containing geographical and sectoral groups and also ensuring feedback. Community 
involvement locally has resulted in the involvement of the community sector nationally -  
through the National Economic and Social Forum‘3® -  and inclusion as a social partner in 
national social partnership agreements.
Local clout
Do local development structures have discretion or clout? LEADER groups appear to 
have significant ‘power of the purse’ but they are compelled to spend within increasingly 
restrictive guidelines, characterised by increasingly bureaucratic procedures. 
Furthermore, they are required to provide matching private funds and they have to spend 
funds within a pre-established deadline. Although the IRDPP involved less spending 
power, local actors could determine developmental priorities and implement them. 
Guidelines were also less restrictive until it came under the Operational Programme for 
Rural Development in the first CSF. Thus the more money involved, the less discretion 
the groups have. EU programmes are generally better funded, therefore they reduce the 
degree of discretion central government is willing to cede. As Shortall (1994:242) asserts, 
in both cases projects are locally based but “focused by systematic central guidance”. 
Therefore, the state continues to be the organ through which local and rural development
‘  ^The National Economic and Social Forum was set up in 1993 by the government to contribute to the 
formation of a wider national consensus on economic and social policy issues, especially 
unemployment. It is composed of government and opposition parties, the social partners and, in 
contrast to the NESC, the unemployed, women, the disadvantaged, environmental interests and the 
elderly etc.
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is pursued. Similarly to LEADER, the ABPs were tightly controlled by the NCT and 
subsequently by ADM Ltd. The availability o f funding under the Global Grant meant that 
they concentrated on spending power rather than establishing a position of strength vis- 
à-vis state agencies. The extent of their discretion is illustrated by their frail position 
since their continued existence initially depended on the policy' leadership of the 
Taoiseach’s department, which in turn depended on the composition of government. For 
several months they fell under the responsibility of Enterprise and Employment which 
desired a more enterprise orientated role for the Partnerships. The CEBs too are also 
highly constrained by Enterprise and Employment and have to conform to a cumbersome 
bureaucratic process. They are composed of public officials (career civil servants) that 
have tended to limit their development thrust to grant-giving within established 
guidelines, thus no real empowerment is involved. Moreover, the expiry date hanging 
over most of the development structures means that they are constrained by time: the 
IRDPP ran for two years, paused, and then resumed for almost another two years; 
LEADER I ran for two years; the ABPs were also piloted for a short period and had to 
conform to the deadlines imposed by the Global Grant; the CEBs too had to conform to 
the deadlines of the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development. 
These time constraints reduce the level of real empowerment by militating against the 
development of a long-term strategy. Time constraints are further compounded by 
dependence on funding from Brussels for survival as all of the structures looked to 1999, 
but not beyond. This uncertainty considerably reduced clout and discretion.
Empowering local development structures would involve the state (central government) 
relinquishing some power (zero-sum game) or sharing it with the new' structures in a 
form of partnership (non-zero-sum game). Thus, empowering local actors in local 
development either means less power for central government (devolution) in this field or 
shared, concurrent power (partnership). However, devolving responsibility to local actors 
may entail a *de-responsibilisation’ o f the centre without a genuine ‘responsibilisation’ of 
local structures. For example, giving ABPs responsibility for combating long-term 
unemployment - a problem that has dogged successive governments for years - means 
that failure in terms of jobs not created or an increase in the numbers of long-term 
unemployed will be attributable to the ABPs and not central government. This is normal 
if  responsibility is matched by clout, that is to say, if the ABPs and other local 
development structures are given adequate powers to be able to pursue a self-defined 
strategy, then failure can be attributed to them (hence, the case for real devolution can be 
rejected out of hand), yet success can be claimed by the centre given that the structures 
and strategy are its brainchildren. Local development partnerships can be seen as a
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strategy of fence-sitting for the centre: it passes the buck where failure is concerned and 
takes the credit in the case o f success.^ in this scenario, the centre is the dominant 
partner in the partnership, giving the impression of power-sharing, but in reality gaining 
maximum benefit in terms of retaining power and shirking responsibility. Is this the case 
in relation to Irish local development structures? Firstly, the state dominates the 
partnerships through its executive agencies without letting partnerships influence them 
unduly. In fact, most of the evaluations demonstrate that local development structures 
have been unable to influence their strategies and spending. As Commins & Keane (3994: 
162) point out, “it is dear from the detailed description of this area-based response that 
the statutory  ^agencies were to have the main responsibility for the programmes, and not 
least in deciding controls and expenditure”. Yet, wherever possible government 
statements refer to local communities as the “prime movers” (PESP 1991). The aborted 
attempt to create the CEPBs as a structure above the ABPs and LEADER is indicative as 
the CEBs are not representative of the local community. Finally, it is not clear that the 
responsibility accorded to local development structures in terms of expectations,* is 
matched by clout or discretion which could lead to their discrediting in the long-run.
The legitimacy and accountability of the new local development structures is based on 
partnership. Partnership attempts to bring sectoral, state and local community interests 
together to work for the benefit of the community. At central level, partnerships are a 
means of reaching agreement among the main sectoral interests (employers, farmers and 
trade unions) to formulate economic and social development proposals along consensual 
lines (Commins & Keane 1994:162). Generally, partnership proved positive as it brought 
different sectors together to address local development. It “provides a procedural and 
institutional framework for turning the interaction of community, market and state in a 
constructive direction” (NESC 1994:144). The partnership structure of the ABPs was 
clearly prescribed from the outset (equal representation of the local community, the 
social partners and the state agencies) as was that of the CEBs. LEADER groups were not 
required to establish a partnership but most of them did (between state agencies, the 
private sector and the social partners). However, in local development partnerships in 
general, equality of status for partners was not a requirement and partnerships tended to 
take shape according to the dominant partner. Furthermore, partnership ended up 
referring to structure and not process, yet “a local partnership structure, though 
necessary, is not sufficient for effective rural or local development” [emphasis in original] 
(NESC 1994:144). Much of this is attributable to the fact that administering departments
Transnational Institution Budding for lasca} Detvlopment: The Case ofEnrtpean Union Cohesion Polity in Ire Lind and Sardinia
^“One community group member - Kathleen O’Neill from KLEAR in Kilbarmck felt that the state was 
attempting to shift the blame for unemployment to the ABPs (Irish Times 28 February 1994).
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expected partnership to “come naturally”. In fact, the LEADER evaluation held that some 
LEADER groups ended up resembling state agencies rather than embedding state 
agencies within a partnership. LEADER groups were also criticised for the uneven nature 
o f community representation and the exclusion of the unemployed and environmental 
interests (Kearney et a l  1995)- In relation to LEADER therefore, it appears to be only 
(financially) accountable to Agriculture and ultimately to the EU and not to the local 
community. Its legitimacy as a bottom-up local initiative is undermined because of this 
and because of the uneven representation of local communities. In fact, LEADER 
“partnerships” appear to be dominated by the local business sector as opposed to the 
local community. Thus, establishing a partnership structure does not guarantee 
legitimacy or accountability. Their continued existence depends on public support and 
thus they need to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and not just vis-d- 
vis the main paymasters (national exchequer and the EU). Furthermore, partnerships are 
intended to enhance the effectiveness of mainstream measures yet some state agencies 
failed to deliver within these structures (Craig 1994). Thus the degree to which local 
actors are empowered by operating through partnerships is questionable since state 
agencies embarked upon new activities - courtesy of supplementary funding from the EU 
and the national exchequer - rather than subjecting their regular activities to the 
partnership. It can be concluded therefore that partnerships were empowered only 
insofar as new funds became available. Regular state agency budgets - the real funds 
according to Craig (1994) - remained untouched. Moreover, state agency representatives 
on the partnerships tend to lack strong organisational backing and so “much depends on 
the personal commitment, capabilities and seniority of the individuals concerned [and 
while] some people engage actively in the partnership and devote considerable energy to 
securing departmental support, [...] others are more passive and non-committal” (OECD 
2000). Partnership in this context can be defined as a non-zero-sum game for the centre 
as it gains new decision-making powers in relation to extra funding, yet its regular work 
remains untouched by the partnerships. For the local community, partnership is also a 
non-zero-sum game as it too gains in relation to decision-making powers. However, the 
stability of this situation is insecure as the partnerships depend on financial transfers 
from Brussels for their existence. *
Monitoring and best practice
Learning about best practice as well as training is crucial to embryonic local development 
structures. The IRDPP made provisions for advising local actors as to innovative 
development practices and their implementation. It also (initially, before it was 
subsumed into the Operational Programme for Rural Development) put in motion a
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horizontal learning process through networking etc. Although LEADER made provision 
for networking among groups, it gave less consideration to training or guidance. Instead, 
from an early position of vague guidelines issued by the EU, specific and prohibitive 
guidelines emerged piecemeal from Agriculture, for which LEADER proved to be a 
learning experience. This meant that since some groups were constituted precisely for 
LEADER and had little prior experience of rural development, a huge emphasis on rural 
tourism and in particular, golf courses and Bed & Breakfast accommodation resulted. 
Although capacity building and animation were key objectives, no meaning was 
attributed to these concepts nor were groups advised as to how these could be embarked 
upon. The administering department’s role was limited to a controlling one. Neither did 
the NCT provide adequate training for the ABPs. ADM Ltd. has an enhanced role in this 
respect but failed to disseminate good practice in the ABPs to the post PESP 
partnerships. Furthermore, the fact that some of the ABPs adopted a delivery role, thus 
duplicating the work of existing agencies, bears evidence to the fact that they were guided 
very little. The CEBs were provided with very little guidance in relation to promoting an 
enterprise culture and thus tended to limit themselves to allocating grants. Most of the 
structures had to develop action plans yet they were not given any training for this which 
meant that they all employed consultants to draft plans. Some o f these plans lost out on 
area-specificity as some consultants had little knowledge o f the area hence this had 
detrimental effects on the development strategy pursued. Furthermore, the evaluation of 
the PESP ABPs demonstrated that many activities undertaken by the ABPs were not 
included in their Area Action Plans (Craig 1994:19). In sum, while local development 
structures appear to have many mechanisms constraining them, guidance is less evident.
As aforementioned, the IRDPP can in a way be seen as the precursor to LEADER. Hence 
some continuity could be expected, that is to say, best practice under the IRDPP could 
have been disseminated widely under LEADER I. However, since the evaluation of the 
IRDPP was not published, very little information was made available to LEADER 
companies. Furthermore, IRDPP co-ordinators were not retained for LEADER. This 
meant that “the whole process of training and familiarisation will have to begin all over 
again, particularly for those [LEADER] groups which have already been in the IRDPP” (6 
Cearbhaill 1992:130). It also meant that a potentially beneficial learning experience was 
squandered. The CEBs essentially took over from the CDTs in areas where they existed 
but no evaluation o f the CDTs was undertaken to ensure that the CEBs could learn from 
them. Similarly, the non-PESP partnerships learned precious little from their 
forerunners. In sum, although a “pilot” programme denotes an experimental element, the 
lessons from the experiment are rarely built upon or taken into consideration when
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moving beyond the pilot stage. In fact, the pilot schemes are rarely genuinely 
mainstreamed and one has the impression that these structures remain experiments. 
Thus where continuity is desirable, it cannot be ensured and where it is undesirable, it is 
difficult to break from. In order for this to be rectified, monitoring and ex post 
evaluations are cnicial.
Sabel (1996:16,91) holds that some of the partnerships have been successful and others 
have not but because central government does not seem “to be systematically monitoring 
the results”, it is difficult for them to distinguish the two and learn from the exemplary 
cases. “The (potential) paradox, of course, is that to be an effective national advocate for 
its ideas, a local partnership must spend much of its time advocating those ideas 
nationally, not testing them locally”. Although ex post evaluations are undertaken, 
ongoing monitoring leaves much to be desired. Both ex post evaluations and monitoring 
are central elements of policy learning but care is needed in undertaking both. The 
LEADER (Kearney et al. 1995) and PESP ABP evaluation (Craig 1994) came up against a 
lacuna of data - economic, social and demographic - which obviously makes evaluation 
very difficult indeed. The CSGs have been allocated the task of coming up with data for 
their constituencies. However, since the ABPs and LEADER groups follow no pre- 
established boundaries and criss-cross between counties and even regions (as most 
recently delineated), and do not keep data collection systems (Government of Ireland 
1995)* producing data would appear to be an impossible task. Furthermore, in relation to 
LEADER, the evaluation was undertaken when very little in terms of economic/social 
impact could be measured. Other evaluation problems include measuring the not so 
easily quantifiable aspects of development such as empowerment and capacity building. 
Since the LEADER I evaluation felt it necessary “to preserve Group anonymity” (Kearney 
et at. 1995:54) - without mentioning the reason for this necessity - little can be learned 
from individual groups. The ABP evaluation however, makes reference to specific groups. 
M ost of the evaluations focus on overall impact rather than individual examples. Sahel's 
OECD (1996) report takes two rural and four urban ABPs (there are respectively four and 
eight in total) and makes generalisations from them.
Integrated development
Integrated development was reintroduced into the local development policy discourse by 
the EU with the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988-89. Is Irish local development 
characterised by an integrated approach? An integrated approach is “a means of linking 
functional and territorial approaches to rural development” (Commins & Keane 
1994:160), thus a development strategy should be multi-sectoral, touching all aspects of a
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region/Iocality - the opposite of the sectoral approaches adopted heretofore - and co­
ordinated. An integrated approach is supposed to achieve “synergy between the different 
measures and ensure the organised convergence of the efforts of different partners with 
different backgrounds and different responsibilities” (Matthews 1994:22). As Commins & 
Keane (1994:20) illustrate, “an ideal rural strategy would be one where local level actions 
and national or inter-regional objectives share a common ground in being integrated and 
mutually supporting”. Furthermore, “if integrated rural development is to have an real 
meaning it must involve both co-ordinated policy-making and sensitivity to the different 
circumstances in regions and sub-regions” (Commins & Keane 1994:134). The IRDPP in 
its original format, that is under the guidance of the Irish government, was multi-sectoral 
in its approach to rural development and no restriction was imposed in relation to 
development models, however (and somewhat paradoxically given that the integrated 
approach of latter years was advanced by the EU in the first place), once it was 
incorporated into the Operational Programme for Rural Development, it became less 
area-based and trundled along with sectoral measures, chiefly small enterprise (Shortall 
1994:242). It is rather ironic that the first CSF after the reform of the Structural Funds 
included a programme which had adopted an integrated approach previously, but under 
the CSF, which was supposed to embody an integrated approach, became a mere mêlée of 
sectoral measures. LEADER in Ireland, and EU-wide, is supposed to adopt an integrated 
approach to rural development. However, rural tourism now replaces agriculture as the 
dominant sector. Over-concentration on this sector undermines the multi-sectoral nature 
of the programme. Moreover, in most o f the local rural development structures, the lion’s 
share of funding went to rural tourism. Rural tourism is different from agri-tourism and 
implies a collective provision o f services rather than individual or corporate provision 
and it is a recognised part of rural development (Commins & Keane 1994:129-130). 
However, in for example the LEADER programme, of the proportion spent on rural 
tourism, 33 per cent was on accommodation, especially Bed & Breakfasts. This led to a 
highly inequitable situation in which Bord Fâilte (the tourist board) specified houses with 
three bedrooms and a separate dining room which obviously benefited the better-off who 
have bigger houses (Shortall 1994:251). Furthermore, many o f the tourism projects were 
more suited to the sub-programme for tourism than rural development (Kearney et. al. 
1995:61). Finally, the growth that came about as a result of concentration on tourism was 
that of the consultancy sector (“Ireland’s biggest growth industry"1^ ) which carried out 
the required feasibility studies for tourism projects. Moreover, in the LEADER 
programme “rural development has been equated with rural enterprise” (CVVC i993;45)-
Transnational Institution Building for Loral Dertfapment The Case nftLurvptan Union Cohésion Policy in Ireland and Sardinia
1J,‘ Brian Sheerin, Manager of Arigna LEADER in Leitrim (Irish Times 8 November 1994).
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For example NESF wrote in that regard: “It is understood that the LEADER Programme 
is under consideration at present as the vehicle for the Partnership approach in rural 
areas; this is a matter of serious concern to the Forum as the current LEADER 
Programme is too-narrowly focused on enterprise development and would need to be 
radically recasted to provide a much broader and a more integrated and multi­
dimensional strategy to promote environmentally and socially sustainable local 
development and capacity building in rural disadvantaged areas” (NESF 1993:20). 
Similarly, Commins & Keane (1994:171) point to “the narrow connotation of development 
implicit in the requirement that groups submit ‘business plans’ in their original 
submissions to participate in the programme”. NESF (1993) and CWC (1993) also 
criticise the CEBs for being too enterprise oriented to the detriment of community 
development. Furthermore, Commins & Keane (1994:176) assert that the CEBs are uni­
dimensional in their approach. Thus the ABPs have to emphasise development that goes 
beyond private enterprise while LEADER and the CEBs remain “untrammelled by a 
social agenda” (interview). Even combined however, the structures do not adopt an 
integrated approach: the entire symphony of local development structures, ABPs, CEBs, 
LEADER, etc. appears to militate against an integrated approach to rural development by 
virtue of their number, separate operation and duplication (Shortall 1994:249). Neither 
are the divisions among various government departments in the sphere of local 
development conducive to an integrated approach. Commins and Keane (1994) hold that 
sectoral programmes predominate because the Irish state only responds to sectoral, 
functional interests such as the social partners1-»1. Thus, Irish local development policy is 
more sectoral than integrated due to a lack of co-ordination at sub-national and national 
level, no mainstreaming of policies as well as over-concentration on some aspects of 
development. The farming community continues to wield disproportionate power which 
reinforces the prevalence of a sectoral approach (Shortall 1994:255). In fact, rural 
development still seems to be still equated with agriculture as is evident in the PESP 
(1991) in which it is found under agriculture and along with disease eradication, 
horticulture etcM2 In its successor, the PCW (1994), it is found above animal health.
The extent to which local development structures take account o f different stages of 
development is also questionable. A  uniform approach is adopted for all areas. Yet, the 
IRDPP evaluation and that of LEADER “noted that the prior stage or starting base of 
local mobilisation was an important variable in explaining the greater degrees of progress
•i' This is also the reason for the absence of an area-hased approach up to now. NESC (1994:123) 
however, disagrees witli this view and suggests instead that the clientelistic nature of Irish politics has 
ensured a geographical distribution of resources.
»-»* This point is highlighted by Commins and Keane (1994:117).
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;in the more successful areas” (Commins & Keane 1994:171). This means that differentia! 
development approaches are necessary. A  pre-development stage would require much 
training, animation of local groups and capacity building. In sum, it requires 
building/helping to build social capital and capacity for development. Many central 
policies have destroyed social capital in rural areas, for example the CAP.
Grouping rural and urban development together gives rise to a policy which has to be 
general enough to address both, thus risking meeting the needs of neither: “although the 
local development sub-programme has the potential to be multi-dimensional in 
character, its focus on areas with high concentrations of unemployment and 
environmental deprivation carries a bias in favour of urban centres” (Commins & Keane 
1994:118). Urban centres have different developmental problems such as unemployment, 
while rural areas are characterised by under-employment and depopulation. This 
consideration is not really built into these policies.
Integrated local development is not a new concept in Ireland. Chiefly due to European 
programmes it has been implemented on the ground. The above section has examined 
the Irish model of local development. W hat emerges is a wide participatory partnership 
approach encompassing the community and voluntary sector, state agencies and social 
partners. The involvement of the community and voluntary sector and fora has animated 
and activated local actors to participate in development and demonstrated the resources 
present locally that went untapped heretofore. Moreover, as a result these resources have 
been galvanised in national policy-making. A more area-based local-specific approach to 
policy has developed and the agenda o f local development has been broadened to include 
a wide range of economic and social concerns. However, partnerships have little political 
clout because of their estrangement from local government and their direct control over 
only limited resources. The lack of mechanisms to mainstream them further compounds 
this scenario. Specific institutional issues are the focus of the next part of the chapter.
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Institutional issues
Central configuration
Taken together, the new local development structures seem to demonstrate a large 
political commitment on the part of the Irish government to local, urban and rural 
development. As aforementioned, this apparent commitment was consolidated in the 
Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development. The table below
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illustrates central government’s apparent penchant for local and rural development.1-»:»
Table 30: Central institutional configuration for local development until 1997
Section/Unit Department Responsibility’
Rural Development Agriculture LEADER
Rural Renewal And 
The West
Taoiseach development of the western region 
development of the islands
Local Development 
And European 
Affairs14-»
Taoiseach overall responsibility for the Operational 
Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development 
ADM Ltd
It is difficult to identify logic to explain why there are three junior ministries, two of 
which are in the Taoiseach’s department, that are concerned with rural and local 
development1-»"*. In fact, as is evident from the table, the division of labour among 
government departments seems to be fairly arbitrary and operates according to a logic o f 
inter-ministerial competition and rivalry’ (interviews]. For example, one civil servant 
questioned the wisdom of according responsibility for LEADER to Agriculture as its 
expertise is in agriculture and not necessarily rural development (interview). NESC 
(1994) poses the same question. Similarly, 6  Cearbhaill (1992:28) writes about the 
“unisectoral tradition and structure of the Department of Agriculture and Food where 
Rural Development has been seen as a mere subset and given a low priority” and 
expresses some unease in relation to it becoming LEADER’S administering body. In fact, 
the evaluation demonstrated that it was ill-equipped for LEADER I. What this 
configuration means in practice, is that other rural development initiatives operate in 
isolation from LEADER and co-ordination among them is difficult. The Minister for 
Rural Renewal and The West is a relatively new arrival on the rural development scene 
and is a response to a report published by bishops in the western region which 
emphasised the need for inter alia a Minister for the West to offset imminent disaster 
due to depopulation and decline in the west. There however, appears to be little 
justification for having a Minister for Rural Development and Rural Renewal, unless 
these two phenomena are considered distinct. They are not considered distinct but rather
m3 The Minister of Local Development and European Affairs illustrated his intentions in this regard: 
"It is my stated objective over time to make Local Development as well known to job creation and 
tackling disadvantage as the Credit Union is to providing finances - in other words it will have a 
specific niche”. Presented to a conference on Community Business in Ireland - The Role o f Local 
Development May 1996 Davenport Hotel. The same minister asserted that the first step in rural 
development was to lower the price of funerals.
M4 This section subsequently became the European and International Affairs section when local 
development passed to the Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation in 1997. 
ms How ever, Ministers of State (Junior Ministers) with cross-Departmcntal briefs constitute a method 
of co-ordination (Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Systems, 
August 1998:31).
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some justification was needed for nominating a territorial based junior Minister for the 
West in a sectoral institutional configuration. Another interesting feature is the absence 
of the only territorial ministry -  Environment -  from the local development model which 
mirrors the exclusion locally of local government. Sabel reckons that political 
commitment to local development has been reinforced by the appointment of a Minister 
for Local Development who also has responsibility for European Affairs thus ensuring 
that “Ireland's European policy is informed by the lessons of the local development 
approach at home” (OECD 1996:49). A less sanguine view of this would be that local 
development initiatives are essentially born of European financial coaxing, thus the two 
are inextricably linked. In fact, the local development structures that implement the 
Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development were not guaranteed 
survival after 1999 when the current round of Structural Funds ran out - further evidence 
of the link between “European Affairs” and Local Development.1*' So it seems that local 
development is dependent on the whims of EU Structural Funds, has little central 
institutional rationality let alone stability, and constitutes a crowded and muddled policy 
arena. According to NESC (1994:148), overlap and confusion characterise the rural 
development policy arena and “co-ordination is required not only at local level, but also 
across departments and between functional agencies at national level”. The Inter­
departmental Policy Committee on Local Development (IPCLD) was set up in 1994 to 
address problems of co-ordination and is chaired by the Taoiseach’s department. Its 
remit covers co-ordination, the proper management of local development schemes and 
monitoring the operation of local development policies and structures (Government of 
Ireland 1995:24). More recently a Policy Review Committee (PRC) was set up to deal with 
co-ordination among government departments in the sphere o f rural development as laid 
out in the White Paper on Rural Development, Ensuring the Future (1998)« Its task is to 
produce a broad policy statement or a “vision”. Within this framework, government 
departments are required to detail their activities in rural development. According to one 
member of the PRC, they are discovering that nothing can be done that is not being done 
already but problems arise because most departments are oblivious to the initiatives 
taken by other departments (interview). A “rural proofing” of policies is to be introduced 
to take account of the implications and effects of all policies for rural areas (interviews).
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l*c All o f the local development structures were unsure as to their future post-1999. The increase in 
Ireland’s GDP meant that it no longer qualified as Objective One which sent decision-makers into a 
Hum- o f consternation and considerable secrecy surrounded the strategy to be adopted in this regard. 
Five possible scenarios emerged: lass of Objective One status with a “re-designation” such as transition 
Objective One; attempts to redefine thresholds with reduced funds; the entire country except the five 
counties around Dublin city classified as an Objective One region; Objective status to lx? decided on an 
issue-by-issue basis; the sub-division of the countiy into a number of large regions (the preferred 
option of the EU) (Western Development Partnership Board 1996).
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Although the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development goes 
some way in bringing the local development structures together under one programme, 
co-ordination with LEADER is still left up to the individual companies at a local level.
Subsequent to a government change in June 1997, some central institutional 
rationalisation occurred mainly around the Taoiseach’s office. First, the erstwhile 
Department of Tourism and Trade was renamed Tourism, Sport and Recreation and took 
over inter alia local development and the co-ordination o f the Operational Programme 
for Local Urban and Rural Development from the Taoiseach’s office. In this department, 
a Local Development Unit was activated to co-ordinate departmental input into inter alia 
Partnership 2000, NESF, and the National monitoring committee on the Social 
Economy. It also provides the secretariat to the Interdepartmental Policy Committee on 
Local Development147. A Policy Development and Evaluation Unit was established to 
contribute to the formulation of Operational Programmes o f interest to the Department, 
and to the implementation of the Report of the Task Force on the Integration of the Local 
Government and Local Development systems148. Finally a Local development -  EU Co­
funding Unit monitors and drives as the lead department, the implementation of three 
Operational Programmes, Tourism, Local Urban and Rural Development and Urban1«. 
Even though excluded from the Department’s name, local development has certainly 
become more a stable section of its own rather than an ephemeral adjunct to be switched 
around at will.
The second rationalisation measure was the delegation of the Devolution Commission to 
the newly named Department of the Environment and Local Government (hitherto the 
Department of the Environment). Third, western development was transferred to the 
erstwhile Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, which as provided for in the 
White Paper on Rural Development, Ensuring the Future (1998) was subsequently (in 
2000) renamed Agriculture, Food and Rural Development “in order to reflect its position 
as the lead department for rural policy matters” (IPA 2001).
1 http://ww.goY.ie/tourisiii-sport/wiiahvedo/localdev/vvwd Id localdevunit.htm 
11$ httn://WAv.gov.ic/tourism-snort/whatwcdo/locrtldev/vvivd Id noldcv.htm 
httn: /Avmv.gny.ie/tourism-snortAvhatwedo/Ifxalilev/wwd Id euco.litm
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Table 31: Central institutional configuration for local development after 1997
Sectien/U nit D e p a rtm e n t R e sp o n sib ility
Rural Development Agriculture, Food 
and Rural 
Development
LEADER
Western Development
Local Government Environment and 
Local Government
Devolution Commission
Local Development Tourism, Sport and 
Recreation
overall responsibility for the Operational 
Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development 
ADM Ltd
Local Development Task force 
Interdepartmental Policy Committee on 
local development
Regional and local solutions
The simultaneous emergence of a plethora of new structures make duplication and lack 
of co-ordination rife. As already mentioned the Regional Authorities were originally 
supposed to undertake to co-ordinate development at a regional level. However, this 
scenario did not materialise. Instead the Operational Programme for Local Urban and 
Rural Development (Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development 
1995:109) opted for county level co-ordination and called for the “differentiation of target 
groups” among local development structures. However, Roitrke (1994) illustrates the 
problems associated with the different objectives of ADM Ltd. and LEADER: ADM Ltd. 
has a broad socio-economic definition o f development, whereas LEADER companies 
focus on economic development. “Therefore, some local development groups, located in 
LEADER areas, with a strong social/community focus might not be considered eligible 
for funding from either LEADER (because their priority is socio-economic rather than 
merely enterprise-economic) or ADM (because they are located in a LEADER area)“ 
(quoted in NESC 1994:95).
The Regional Authorities that were set up to review the implementation of the CSF, 
hampered by a lack of power, identity, continuity of members, unwieldy structures, were 
so unsuccessful that the mid-term review (Fitzpatrick Associates 1 9 9 7 :1 0 7 )  concluded 
that the regional review' process “is not working well”. There was doubt as to what 
‘review’ actually meant in practice and in some cases it became ‘retrospective 
consultation’. A dearth of data and resources to measure impacts combined with a lacuna 
of guidelines to blunt the review process.
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In November 1998 a government decision on ‘régionalisation' was announced and in .July 
1999 two new group regional authorities1^ 0 were put in place on foot of the application 
made to EUROSTAT to divide the country into two regions. They are based on the 
existing regional authority structure, one covering the current regional authority areas of 
the Border, Midlands and West (to include counties Clare and Kerry) called Border, 
Midlands and Western Group Regional Authority, and the other covering the regional 
authority areas of Dublin, the Mid-East, the Mid-West (excluding Clare), South-West 
(which with the exclusion of Kerry will be known as the Cork Region) and the South-East 
called Southern and Eastern Group Regional Authority. Their responsibilities relate to 
promoting co-ordination of the provision of public services, advising the Government on 
the regional dimension of the National Development Plan, monitoring the general impact 
of all EU programmes of assistance under the Community Support Framework in their 
areas, and managing regional programmes in the next CSF. So for the veiy first time two 
regional operational programmes were provided for in the NDP and regional authorities 
are charged with their management. Membership of the new group regional authorities is 
drawn from elected representatives from the eight existing regional authorities which 
remain in existence and will retain their existing functions at sub- regional or NUTS III 
level. The National Development Platvs» was submitted to the European Commission in 
November 1999 with two regional operational programmes. For the first time, as the 
OECD report (2000) asserted, “it is rather surprising that the National Development 
Plan does not acknowledge an explicit role for local partnerships, especially bearing in 
mind their prominence in the previous plan”. The role of co-ordination of services is to be 
played by the County Development Boards. The new national agreement (Programme 
fo r  Prosperity and Fairness) and rural white paper all refer to CDBs and regions.
Subsequent to the 1994 change o f government, a Devolution Commission was established 
to advise on the implementation of the decision to make local government the focus for 
working through local partnerships. The model broached was an integrated framework 
made up o f regional authorities, local government and partnerships that would simplify 
the existing plethora and entail the operation of all bodies on the basis of an integrated
’5<J The group regional authorities were established by order made by the Minister for the Environment 
and Local Government under the Local Government Act 1991.
^  Apait from the two regional operational programmes, there are also three other operational 
programmes dealing with economic and social infrastructure, employment and human resources 
development and the productive sector. The N D P  proposes an investment of public and private funds 
o f almost IR£4i billion (1999 prices), the bulk o f which will come from the Irish exchequer. The EU 
Structural Funds will contribute just over IR£3 billion. The objectives o f the NDP arc continuing 
sustainable national economic and employment growth, consolidating and improving Ireland's 
international competitiveness, fostering balanced regional development and promoting social 
inclusion
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multi-purpose development plan coinciding with EU and national programmes. Local 
partnerships would be obliged to include elected councillors in their boards, and vice 
versa local government would include representatives of local partnership bodies in their 
operational committees (Walsh 1999:14). Almost simultaneously, the Department of the 
Environment published a White Paper entitled, Better Local Government, A Programme 
for Change (1996) containing its proposals to integrate local partnership and local 
government more formally. Due to another government change and considerable 
opposition, only one element o f the proposed reform was retained, Strategic Policy 
Committees, and a Task Force was set up to examine how local government and local 
development could be integrated. The White Paper on Rural Development, Ensuring the 
Future (Department of Agriculture and Food 1998:29) emphasised balanced regional 
development and once again voices the commitment to harmonising the boundaries of 
state sponsored bodies and agencies. Co-ordination is to be undertaken by Regional 
Authorities which act as a consultative forum to Regional Assemblies. But state agencies 
continue to draft their own regional development plans that “will be integrated with the 
plans and strategies drawn up by the Regional Assembly, the Regional Authority and the 
County Development Boards to encourage and facilitate economic and social 
development”.
Thus, much experimentation with myriad structures and change gave rise to disorder, 
uncertainty and creativity. For learning to occur, creativity' is important (Ferrera & 
Gualmini 1999:122). That some sort o f rationalisation was necessary was widely accepted 
but what to do was not so clear or so backed by consensus. Preferences were for local 
government to be drawn into the local development process without dissipating the 
latter’s drive, innovation and dynamism. Moreover, a rationalisation of structures at 
regional level was deemed necessary'. Thus, the experimental period was prolonged while 
some investigation and research into what to do was undertaken.
Local government and development
According to Sabel’s OECD report (1996:47), “the CEBs are an attempt to attach the 
motor power of co-ordinated local initiatives to the machinery of both local government 
and national administration, while meshing each of the latter more tightly to the former”. 
However, the CEBs are just one part of the local development process, the enterprise 
orientated part. Their role as we saw above is twro-fold (grant-giving and promoting an 
enterprise culture) and problematic and is certainly not co-ordinated. The extent to 
which they can be defined as a local initiative given that they were set up by central
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government, or can be said to work well with other structures is also questionable.1"12 
Furthermore, the CEBs lacked any significant funding until the Operational Programme 
for Local Urban and Rural Development was introduced. Irrespective of their merit, they 
are the only local development structure that has real or required links with elected 
representatives.
The OECD (1996:50) report illustrated that the Operational Programme for Local Urban 
and Rural Development “has heightened perplexity. In placing local development 
partnerships at the centre of a broad EU-funded strategy’, the Operational Programme 
has drawn attention to the exclusion or limited involvement of local authorities in 
programmes that once seemed a hodgepodge of temporary measures”. Whether to marry 
local government and local development however, has been a moot point among analysts. 
While FitzGerald and Keegan in their evaluation of the first CSF (ESRI 1993:63) 
recommended using the Local Authority structure for the Operational Programme for 
Local Urban and Rural Development,1^  and Kearney et ah (1995:106) found in their 
evaluation of LEADER I that exclusion of Local Authorities “contributed to 
misunderstandings and reduced the overall effectiveness” of groups, Sabel (OECD 
1996:96) held that
“efforts to normalise the partnerships by subordinating them to the national 
agencies or incorporating them in local or county governments risks 
debilitating the former without strengthening the latter. The agencies of the 
national government are too fragmented and centralised to provide effective 
local co-ordination of current programmes, let alone to devise new ones. Local 
government is too limited in its scope, constrained in its capacities, and 
characterised by traditional approaches to oversee within its jurisdiction the 
effective redeployment of resources provided by the centre”. >34
NESC (1994:134) shared this view’, asserting that “the existing structures, procedures and
role of Irish local government are such that its involvement is unlikely to enhance current
initiatives for rural and local development [..] even reformed local government structures
are unlikely, in combination with central government, to constitute an adequate
institutional arrangement for the design and conduct of rural and local development
policy". Thus the structural weaknesses of local government combined with the fact that
local government is not considered important by the Irish electorate (witness low
electoral turnout at local elections and the lack of protest when rates were removed in
•.'»a in one locality studied, the CEB consistently clashes with non state-sponsored load initiatives as 
well as LEADER and the ABP.
i : I n  their report on the Structural Funds, FitzGerald and Keegan focus on avoiding corruption so they 
emphasise officials over ad hoc community groups (NESC 1994:133).
>5-i That its scope Is limited is questionable, as its competencies have increased. It has had 
responsibility for development since 1963 and has been charged w ith helping community groups since 
1941. Its capacity is without a doubt however, limited.
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19771")), make local government unsuitable to undertake development policy. The
Devolution Commission (1996:18) recommended an “integrated local government/Iocal
development system* with effect from 1 January 2000. However NESC (1994:137)
asserted that “reliance on local and central government as the chief structure through
which rural development policy would be pursued confronts, first, some general
limitations of representative democracy and, second, some particular limitations of the
state as the main organ through which to pursue rural and local development".
Notwithstanding O ’Sullivan’s (1994) rather drastic assumption that concerns about
empowerment and community, local or regional democracy and good governance are out
of step with trends of local neo-corporatist regulation, issues relating to legitimacy and
devolved authority and responsibility inevitably came to the fore as “the exclusion of local
government representatives from the partnerships is a bizarre feature in the political-
administrative structure of a republican democratic country” (Pflaumer 1996:107). Calls
for devolution have been made for several years from within the country and outside.
Nonetheless as the Barrington report concluded (1991:58),
“the case for devolution o f functions from the centre, to a new reorganised 
and revitalised local government system is ultimately a political one 
depending largely on assumptions about the sort of society we want in the 
21st century, the proper balance between the centre and the local level, the 
desirability of giving local communities greater control over their lives etc."
The creation o f Regional Authorities as well as the harmonisation of the regional
boundaries used by functional agencies in 1994 seemed to be a first step, at least judging
from the intentions of press statements at the time. Other measures followed. First, the
Local Government Act 1994 commissioned an independent statutory body to carry out a
review of sub-county government (Reorganisation Commission, April 1996). Second, in
July 1995 the Devolution Commission was set up to make recommendations in relation
to devolving “significant additional functions” to local government, involving Local
Authorities “with policy and administration regarding functions which are not directly
devolved to them", “Local Authorities become the focus for working through local
partnerships involving local community-based groupings, voluntary bodies, the private
sector and public agencies* as well as the co-ordination of the efforts of Local Authorities,
CEBs, LEADER, and ADM Ltd. partnerships (Devolution Commission 1996:13). The
latter Commission began working and submitted an interim report before the other had
completed so they operated in isolation. However, when the interim report was
published, the government was reported to have been “very disappointed” as the
Devolution Commission “adopted a root-and-branch approach to local democracy” which
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•s» See Coyle & Sinnotfs (1993:92) survey which places local elected representatives in twelfth place 
(after the catholic clergy, the press and agricultural organisations) out o f fifteen in terms of power 
wielded in a region.
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was certainly not the intention (Irish Times 19 August 1996). The difficulty with the 
report was that the decentralisation^6 * of public services pursued since 1987 was 
threatened. Therefore, a conflict emerged between decentralisation (the physical moving 
of offices to provincial towns) and devolution (which refers to power and discretion).1^
Local government reform
In parallel to the operation of local development structures, and as we have seen, much 
debate about relations with local government, local government was at the receiving end 
of some changes aimed at capacity building and enhancing efficiency as well as 
eliminating unnecessary central control over spending and staff resources. First in 
December 1996 a White Paper entitled, Better Local Government: A  Programme fo r  
Change, set out a programme to make optimum use of resources through increased 
emphasis on corporate planning. Second the 1997 Local Government (Financial 
Provisions) Act widened the role of local government auditors to examine economy and 
efficiency in the use of resources as well as the adequacy o f management systems in place 
in local authorities. It also provided for the development of the policy-making role of 
local councillors through Strategic Policy Committees1"»8 which prepare the groundwork 
for policies to be decided on by county/city councils and for their role in CDBs. Third, the 
Local Government A ct 1998 introduced a new funding system with effect from 1 January' 
1999 entitled A New Deal fo r Local Government, involving the setting up of an 
independent Local Government Fund amounting to approximately IR£590 million in 
1999,*r>9 giving local government an extra IR£i25 million for “discretionary» day-to-day 
expenditure” (website). Fourth, the Constitution was amended and a new Article 28A 
gave specific recognition to local government and a fixed five-year cycle for local 
elections, thus giving a firmer institutional footing to local authorities. Fifth, the Local 
Government Act 2001 provided a modern statutory framework for the local government 
system, introducing a common legislative code to apply to all local authorities containing 
a general statement of functions and a membership code. It provided for the presence of 
the oifice of Cathaoirleach (Chairperson) or Mayor in all local authorities. From 2004 the 
dual (national-local) mandate will no longer be permitted and the direct election of
‘56 The department of the Taoiseach sent the Commission back to the drawing board requesting that it 
take “due account of the need not to unnecessarily disrupt existing arrangements for decentralisation 
of functions of government to provincial towns” (Irish Times 19 August 1996).
>5“ It was also asked to distinguish between functions, involving no local discretion and powers, which 
do (Irish Times 19 August 1996).
,stt A minimum of one third of each SPC membership comes form sectoral representatives in order to 
bring in wider local participation. This was the only recommendation of the Department of the 
Environment’s White Paper maintained after the government change.
This was financed from the proceeds of motor tax (previously used for other purposes than roads) 
and from a government lump sum of IRE270 million in 1999 to be increased annually to take account 
of inflation and the changes in functions of local authorities.
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Council Cathaoirleach for a five-year term will take place. Although the White Paper 
which essentially forwarded the de facto  integration of local government and local 
development bodies was essentially disregarded after the change in government, the 
SPCs were retained.
These five measures to reform local government all build upon each other. The role of 
elected members is enhanced while at the same time, there are several attempts to 
enhance their policy competence, clout and capacity as well as their institutional 
standing, most notably through SPCs which were accorded statutory status in the 2001 
Act. Moreover, there is a deliberate intention in the 2001 Act to “support community 
involvement with local authorities in a more participative local democracy” and to 
consolidate local government legislation emanated haphazardly since the 19th century. In 
fact it aims to enhance the role of the elected member; support community involvement 
with local authorities in a more participative local democracy; modernise local 
government legislation, and provide the framework for new financial management 
systems and other procedures to promote efficiency and effectiveness.
Local co-ordination
Problems of co-ordination prompted the provision for the establishment o f the County 
Strategy Groups (CSGs) - one in each county with two and four groups in Cork and 
Dublin respectively -  in the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development. CSGs were comprised of members (usually the chairperson) of the ABPs or 
post-PESP groups, CEBs, LEADER companies, County Tourism Committees and the 
County Manager as well as a member of the NCT who acts as a liaison between the 
Taoiseach’s department and groups. Their role is to ensure that the objectives and 
strategies of the local development structures are co-ordinated, complementary and 
effective in order to engender effective social and economic development at local level. 
They are non-executive structures and are mainly concerned with co-operation and the 
exchange of information (Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural 
Development 1995:108). The CSGs met for the first time in 1995 to prepare co-ordination 
strategies aimed at avoiding duplication and competition among local development 
groups. Because o f questions raised in relation to accountability, the government sought 
to superimpose elected local government representatives on the CSG membership as set 
out in the Operational Programme (OECD 1996:49)- The need to avoid adding a 
“bureaucratic layer” to the local development process was recognised, according to the 
Devolution Commission (1996). However the problem o f the separation of local 
development from local government persisted. The CSGs remained intact until the
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change of government in 1997. The new government’s action programme was committed 
to “the restoration of real decision-making and power to local authorities and local 
people” and hence the Strategic Policy Committees and Corporate Policy' Groups were set 
up within each City and County authority (Department of the Environment and Local 
Government, August 1999)- The role of the Strategic Policy Committees160 (SPCs) and the 
Corporate Policy Group161 (CPG) is to formulate policy proposals, evaluate and report on 
policy implementation, for consideration and final decision by the full Council. They 
must not be concerned with individual representational or operational issues. The SPC 
system essentially presents Councillors with a prime opportunity to become more 
involved in policy formulation. It provides a chance to review and optimise committee 
structures and related procedures, which demands a rationalisation of existing 
committees and standing procedures. Each authority will have generally four SPCs, with 
the option of more in the very largest authorities. Area committees can complement the 
SPC system. Local operational matters should be assigned to the area committees, as the 
SPC system will not deal with local representational issues and operational issues 
(Department of the Environment and Local Government, August 1999).
Not content with the CSGs however, the County/city Development boards (CDBs) were 
launched by the new government to take over from them, on the recommendation of the 
Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Systems1'1* 
(Interdepartmental Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local 
Development Systems 1998). They are representative of local government, local 
development bodies (ABPs, LEADER groups and CEBs), and state agencies and social 
partners operating locally. They have been charged with drawing up a County/City 
Strategy for Economic, Social and Cultural Development by January 2002 after wide 
consultation161 * undertaken by the Director of Community and Enterprise164 and
l6" SPCs are chaired by one of the Council members and have a minimum total membership of nine. A 
minimum of one third of the members of each SPC is drawn from relevant sectoral interests; to 
provide relevant expertise and advice and allow for a range of inputs in the formulation of policy. 
Relevant organisations for each sector arc identified as early as possible, parallel with the drafting of 
the scheme. Each sector selects its own nominee(s) (Department of the Environment and Local 
Government, August 1999).
If>1 CPGs comprise the Cat haoir leach of the local authority and the SPC chairs and is chaired by the 
former and supported by the Manager.
162 The Task Force was chaired by the Minister for the Environment and Local Government and 
included representatives fmm Agriculture and Food: Aits, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the islands; 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment; Environment and Local Government; Finance; Health and 
Children; Justice, Equality and Law Reform; Marine and Natural Resources; Social, Community and
Family Affairs: Taoiseach; and Tourism. Sport and Recreation. It met five times and built on the work 
o f the Interdepartmental Policy Committee on Local Development.
Consultation is to take place through new voluntary and community/ora and area committees.
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subsequently overseeing its implementation. This “will be the template guiding all public 
services and local development activities locally”. The Strategy will have a ‘ten-year 
vision’ broken into 3 tos year targets. They will be responsible for avoiding duplication in 
local service delivery and for filling gaps in satisfying community needs. Emphasis is laid 
on counteracting social exclusion and a clear focus on economic and cultural 
development. Support structures will be put in place to facilitate input into the work of 
the Board by sectoral and community interests.
The Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development systems 
(1998:35) asserted that although the new model should enable local agencies to contract 
services for national bodies and EU programmes, “EU requirements should not drive the 
search for a better model of local governance”. It proposed the use of the county area as 
the basis of an integrated local framew-ork and advocated the adoption of common areas 
for all Departments and policies in order to facilitate co-ordination (1998:39). It realised 
that there could be no more avoiding o f some “rearranging of functions and/or 
institutions [...] with scope for a more developed role for local government in any new 
system” (1998:40). It recommended a series of steps to be taken during the transitional 
period when the CSGs would become CDBs. First, a Director of Community and 
Enterprise to be recruited from January 1999 in each council to strengthen CSGs, 
promote closer working relations within CSGs, make a report to the CSGs at the end of 
1999 after extensive consultation for the establishment of a CDB, reinforce local authority 
community development activity and keep inter-departmental implementation group 
informed on progress made.lf>5 CSGs were mandated to prepare the ground for the new 
structures to be put in place from 1 January 2000. Second, from January 2000 the CDBs 
replace the CSGs and begin working on the Strategy for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Development. Two recommendations were made to be undertaken as soon as possible. 
First, the Cathaoirleach of each county’ council should take a seat on the CSG (an 
additional seat to existing councillor membership). Second, ABPs and LEADER groups 
should immediately add councillors to their boards and after 1999 all local development 
groups shall have councillors on their boards. Third, rationalisation of existing local 
partnerships functions in order to avoid functional and territorial overlaps was proposed. 
Interestingly, the Task Force also consulted with (some unidentified) EU officials who 
aired the view that “the EU would in principle be prepared to work with structures
i'm The Director of Community and Enterprise is a senior local authorin' staff member appointed in 
1999 to put CDBs in place and beginning a consultation pnx*ess, They also lead local authority 
community development programmes.
A special inter-departmental implementation group was set up to plan for, actively promote and 
carryforward the programme.
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considered best by Ireland for local governance. Indeed, one of the officials felt that as far 
as the future role of local government was concerned, a much more radical approach 
could have been taken by the Task Force (1998:48)."
In April 1999 the Task Force published detailed guidelines for the Progress from CSGs to 
CDBs and advocated the following principles as the basis for the integration of local 
development and local government: involvement of local communities, social inclusion, 
participation, feedback, democratic legitimacy, voluntary effort, simplicity, value for 
money, openness and commitment to change, commitment by central government, 
process as part of the solution and flexibility.
In the current programming period of the Structural Funds, Ireland has been designated 
as two NUTS II regions: the Border, Midland and Western (BMW) region (enjoying 
Objective 1 Status until 2006); and the Southern and Eastern (S&E) region (transitional 
Objective 1 funding to 2005). Both of these NUTS II regions even made submissions to 
the European Commission s Cohesion Policy outlook document on the future of the 
policy. NUTS III regions continue to operate as before.
Conclusion
This chapter has given an account of institutional change conceived as a gradual process 
o f learning through experimentation, emulation and permeability. At a central level, Irish 
experience with the Structural Funds has led to the wholehearted embracing of Cohesion 
Policy’s approach to evaluation techniques, for example, as prior to the advent of 
Cohesion Policy, evaluation and monitoring were conspicuous by their absence (Hegarty 
2003). Now even where not strictly necessary, that is, in national spending, Irish 
authorities have made one fifth o f total expenditure fall under complex and effective 
monitoring and evaluation regimes as the NDP and CSF are implemented as integrated 
programmes. In relation to institutional re-organisation, all policy makers were keen to 
establish that all local development and government institutional considerations were 
acceptable to Brussels. Implementing Cohesion Policy led to the generation of a veritable 
experimental period. A flexible legal framework and the dearth of formal institutions 
facilitated this widespread experimentation. A certain degree of innovation and creativity 
can be attributed to the presence of many European policy documents plugging the same 
kind of change (see Chapter 2) which was emulated to a significant extent. Changes in 
local government were propitiated by permeability due to its contact with the partnership 
bodies. How can change be characterised? A hitherto essentially vacant local decision-
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making arena is now interspersed with dynamic bodies that are both representative and 
participator)', locally powered and centrally linked, flexible and workable and that 
promote the kind of governance advocated by the European Commission in Cohesion 
Policy. Although the future outlook has yet to form and the period of creativity is on­
going, an unprecedented new institutional governance will be at the core of the new local 
development institutional configuration in Ireland. First, a new degree of 
decentralisation has been achieved with a revamped local government reaping the 
benefits of own funding, for example. Second, the role of representative members has 
been upgraded and they have been given the means to ameliorate their capacity, 
especially in policy-making through the Strategic Policy Committees. Third, their 
presence on local partnership bodies means that local government as an institution has 
gained in capacity, and through their working together with development bodies, they 
have gained in dynamism and can boast significant ‘community’ standing through the 
participatory approach characteristic of local development bodies.
Anchoring the experimental parts of the Operational Programme for Local Urban and 
Rural Development in mainstream policy through the CDBs, can be seen as a potential 
third order policy change because it represents an endeavour to create a new 
participatory, representative institutional level marrying government to development, 
unprecedented in Irish local development policy. This has been facilitated by the change 
in the definition of the policy problem, that is, development disparities are now 
acknowledged to exist within Ireland thus warranting systematic policy attention, and 
are no longer considered to be of lesser importance than Irelands underdevelopment vis- 
à-vis other EU states. New found wealth and growth have certainly contributed to such 
an enlightened vision consolidated in the new National Development Plan for the years 
2000 to 2006 by a systematic spatial element in all policies. This paradigm shift was 
facilitated by the accumulation of local institutional anomalies such as the proliferation 
of local development bodies with no links to local government, that is to say, bereft of 
legitimation, and a central institutional rationalisation of functions moving authority 
from the Taoiseach’s department to the erstwhile Department of Tourism, now the 
Department o f Tourism, Sport and Recreation with links to the Department of the 
Environment. The policy debate in the form of White Papers meant that there were 
considerable ideas to choose from. But the main drive came from Cohesion Policy and 
Ireland’s striving to meet EU requirements in order to ensure maximum funding. 
Pursuing these goals led to much experimentation from which several policy issues 
emerged as unintended consequences that had to be taken on board.
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Fourth, on a wider institutional scale, the choice of the county level has been 
consolidated and the spurious search for 'regions’ for real policy matters has ended j
notwithstanding the new ‘regional paradigm’ invented by Irish decision-makers in order j
not to lose EU Structural Funding. This must be seen for what it really is -  a wily, j
casuistical expedient that demonstrates Cohesion Policy's capacity to adversely affect j
j
institutional matters in Ireland. Nevertheless, this sophistry is unlikely to have jj
repercussions at the local level. Chapter 7 considers explanatory' mechanisms at the basis 
o f the differing degrees of institutional change in Ireland and Sardinia.
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Chapter 6
Sardinia: Slow  to Come to Term s?
Introduction
Elements of misfit between Cohesion Policy and the Sardinian context responsible for 
significant adaptational pressure were highlighted and classified in Chapter 4. Initially, 
institutional change in Sardinia can be conceived as a formal process of knee-jerk, 
reactive legal reform whereby problems were dealt with as they arose in the ambit of 
existing local institutions. This reactive form of formal institutional change is slow to take 
effect operationally and did little to alter institutional inflexibility. An overbearing 
element of misfit is constituted by the extremely legalistic Italian system o f ‘doing things' 
and the inability to ‘do anything new’ in the absence of an enabling law. The path of 
formal institutional reform is a difficult one to follow because change is painstakingly 
slow and often goes against the tide of existing institutional vested interests. In any case, 
in this way it takes a long period of time for reform to pay off and there is little room for 
creativity and experimentation, as the rules are rigidly laid down on paper and are often 
difficult to comprehend. In Italy institutions are big, bulky, unwieldy and 
anachronistically resistant to improvement and thus stifle innovation, crowd out 
experimentation and render incremental reform arduous. The plethora of formal (often 
Byzantine) procedures, laws and other legal concoctions regulating all action, scupper 
initiative and strangle informal activity.
Cohesion Policy served to put the spotlight on these elements, and the Italian south in 
general became notorious for mal-implementation. The fact that Cohesion Policy was 
only one source of funding -  and the most complicated one by far -  available to Sardinia 
initially, meant that the adaptation momentum was slow in gathering pace. Parliament’s 
dissolution of so-called Extraordinary Intervention (intervento straordinario) in 1993» a 
code word denoting forty years of pumping money into the south, secured an increased 
relevance for Cohesion Policy funding regionally. It also coincided with a particularly 
negative decade for the Sardinian economy that culminated with a growth rate (GDP) of
0.8/Ó in the last year of the millennium166, which also marked the fifty year anniversary' of
166 The shadow economy is getting plumper however as the rate of shadow employment has been 
estimated at 28% compared with a national rate of 22.6% and a rate of 33.9% for the Mezzogiorno
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the election of the first regional council, when Sardinia attained its putative autonomy 
(autonomia). Adaptational pressure increased therefore because original misfit still 
obtained, but also because the Structural Funds became more salient as the only funding 
source available. The ever-increasing gap between Sardinia and the rest of Italy, and 
indeed the rest o f Europe, has underlined the urgent need to put these funds to good use. 
Literature on the critical nature o f bureaucratic-administrative efficiency for 
development success abounds, yet in Sardinia, in the words of one local analyst, 
“development projects are increasingly hamstrung by the delays, inadequacies and 
modest capacities of regional bureaucracies” (Fadda 2000b).16?
Thus while Ferrera and Gualmini conclude that “the Italian experience really 
demonstrates how internationalisation can be a solution rather than a problem  - at least 
for the institutional capacities o f political systems that are half way between 
backwardness and development” (1999, 155) in relation to macro-economic policy, this 
sanguine analysis does not hold true for Sardinia. In Sardinia, institutional change has 
been slow, difficult and unsuccessful. This, therefore, contrasts with Italy in general 
policy terms as,
“The most important effect o f exogenous shocks and the process of 
European convergence on the Italian political-institutional system has been 
encouraging the reinforcement o f the state and its institutional capacities: 
state (and also social) élites have learned that puzzling on collective 
problems in order to efficiently resolve them is a more important (and 
certainly a prerequisite) task than competing for the spoils of power for 
solely partisan aims” (Ferrera & Gualmini 1999:156).
Thus while state institutional capacities have been enhanced, at regional and local level,
institutional change in Sardinia has not been successful to this extent. This chapter
explores this institutional change. Suffice it to affirm at this point that change has been
unsuccessful because of the degree o f its contingency. That is to say, changes enacted by
the state in Sardinia are contingent on several sub-national and sectoral institutions
falling in line. Similarly, changes enacted by the regional government must conform to a
state model and are contingent on sub-regional and sectoral institutions falling in line.
These institutions do not share the same measure o f success or efficiency. It is reasonable
to hypothesise that were Sardinia a centralised state and thus able to enact, implement
and supervise changes, it would have done so earlier and more successfully. Another
significant explanatory factor is the variable geometry o f regional institutional capacity
in Italy. That is to say, some less unwieldy and more successful regions have secured a *li
(SVIMEZ 1998). Economists agree that a shadow economy has a parasitic effect on the mainstream 
economy and thus impedes its growth.
lli'  Even the Governor of the Central Bank (Banca (¡Italia), Fazio points to the importance of this 
factor for development (Fadda 2000b).
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wider role and increased competencies for themselves as well as the unwieldy and 
inefficient regions, irrespective of capacity. This chapter first presents central 
government management of Cohesion Policy and the experimentation characteristic of 
the programmazione negoziata approach. It then examines Cohesion Policy 
implementation in Sardinia and subsequently its experience with programmazione 
negoziata. Development policy spearheaded by the regional administration is then 
analysed and the state’s new approach to Cohesion Policy in the current CSF is 
contemplated. Finally, some conclusions are reached.
Preludes to and Conditions for Change: Central government management of 
Cohesion Policy
Cohesion Policy was somewhat of an itinerant policy area in Italy until 1998 when it 
became anchored in the newly established Department for Development and Cohesion 
Policies (dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo e coesione hereinafter DPSC) -  in the 
Treasury Ministry -  which was made primarily responsible for regional and territorial 
policy, planning and EU Structural Funds. Up until then several attempts had been made 
to co-ordinate development policy such as the Ministiy for the Co-ordination of EC 
policies, which was established as a non-departmental ministiy tied to the Prime 
Minister’s office in 1980. It was never in a position to fulfil its role however, due to a 
severe lack of resources and was unceremoniously abolished by the Dini government in 
1995* Next was the Department for the South set up by Law 64 of 1986 to co-ordinate 
initiatives in the south and generally reform southern policy which had been judged as 
largely unsuccessful given the amount of hinds employed. This reform was abortive 
because of conflicts over competencies and the technical incapacity of regions in the face 
o f increased responsibilities, particularly in planning (Bull & Baudner 2003). By contrast, 
what emerged from the implementation of the first round of the Structural Funds (1989- 
1993), alongside the introduction of the Documento di Programmazione Economica e 
Finanziaria,6ti (hereinafter, DPEF) which provided a framework for multi-annual 
planning, was the importance of the institutional capacities of some regional and local 
authorities as well as related structures to respond to and use aid effectively. Regions 
clamoured for more clout in dealing with the Structural Funds and the European 
Commission chose to dialogue with them directly (despite the criticism of the Minister 
for Community Policies) instead of the Cassa per il M ezzogiom o, the demise of which 
can be attributed to the Commission’s tendency to modify or reject its suggestions under 
the ERDF (Grote 1996: 275). The differential/variable institutional capacity' among
><>* Introduced by law 362 of 1988.
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Italian regions161* can explain this apparent contradiction: whereas some regions 
(generally in the centre north) performed well and implemented Cohesion Policy 
efficiently, others (generally in the south) did not. In institutional terms however, they 
have never been treated differently.
The Department of Community' Policies was set up in 1987170 and was further regulated 
by Law 139 in 1990 which also set up the Fondo d i rotazionc1?1 in order to collect and 
redistribute EC subventions to Italy. It was largely unsuccessful (Bindi 2002). To replace 
law 64, law 488 of 1992 was passed in order to regulate regional interventions. Unlike its 
predecessor, it was to apply to the whole country and, while emphasising the central role 
of local authorities in policy making, it accorded the Treasury with co-ordinating 
functions for regional development. Cohesion Policy's final placement in the Treasury 
can be attributed to its rising importance given the imminent austerity promised by 
efforts to join EMU. The Treasury was given responsibility for southern policy and was 
merged with the Budget and Economic Planning Ministry. It set up an Osservatorio for 
Structural Fund spending in 1993 which gave way to the Cabina di Regia (hereinafter 
CdR) in 1995 responsible to the Budget Ministry' and the Prime Minister’s office, and 
which subsequently worked alongside the Regional CdRs. Also in 1995» the Servizio per 
le politicks di coesione in the Treasury' was founded and took on the role of co-ordination 
and stimulation of regional and social institutional actors thus speeding up the 
implementation o f the 1994-1999 CSF (Graziano 2002). In fact, the year 1995 marked a 
turnaround for the quality of Cohesion Policy management in Italy as up until then it was 
largely characterised by disorganisation (Graziano 2000).1"2 In 1998 the Dipartimento 
per le politiche di sviluppo e di coesione (hereinafter, DPSC) was set up and it absorbed 
several functions of the former Budget Ministry' and is responsible for territorial 
development and Cohesion Policy.'7^
ll,lJ Sec especially Putnam (1993) who builds on Banfield (1958). Bagnaseo (1977:1985) and Trigilia 
(1989; 1992; 1995) give a more balanced view of territorial development in Italy generally. For 
successful regions see Garmise & Gmte (1990) and Amin (1994).
1-1 ’ Law 183. the so-called ‘Fabbri law’.
The Rotation Fund is based in the State Accounting Department of the Ministry of the Treasury 
managed separately from the national budget system. It manages EU funds and annual co-financing 
sums provided on the basis of guidance from CIPE. Its main function is to advance co-financing funds 
to implementing authorities. Its effectiveness has been blunted by mismanagement (see Bonaduce & 
Magnatti 1996:218).
r - This was largely due to Law 448 in 1992.
; In .January 1999 a new development agency called Sviluppo Italia was generated from the merger of 
7 agencies that had been working in the south on industrial promotion in an attempt to harness them 
into the new policy for the south.
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Thus, central government was laggard in ‘adapting’ to EU Cohesion Policy as it took from 
1985 until 1998 to formulate an adequate institutional response. Even though formally 
involved since 1985 with the IMPs, it failed to generate an institutional capacity to ‘take’ 
let alone ‘shape’ Cohesion Policy.'^ Initially this can be attributed to the dichotomy 
between domestic and foreign affairs» including European affairs which had been 
exclusively managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the mid 1990s. Another 
explanatory factor can be identified in the lack of institutional leadership to carry out co­
ordination among ministries. With the establishment of the Ministry for the Co­
ordination of EC Policies, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to bolster the 
Premier's office in matters concerning co-ordination of EU affairs in order to “fully 
assume responsibilities tied to participation in the European Union".1^  Moreover, this 
hapless Ministry did little to increase the Premier’s co-ordination capacity. In fact, apart 
from being throttled by meagre resources, it was also undermined domestically by its 
exclusion from European council meetings. Thus inter-ministerial co-ordination is 
conspicuous by its absence and any co-ordination is taken care of in the Minister’s 
cabinet. This makes for marked discontinuity as cabinet changes with Minister changes, 
which in Italy is comparatively frequent. Any attempt of the Premier’s office to take a 
lead in adapting to EU Cohesion Policy has been hampered by political weakness as 
premiers are never political leaders and therefore cannot even guarantee the loyalty of 
their own party. Additionally, within the government, the Premier’s office is weak given 
the collective style o f Italian governments which sees the premier as primus inter rather 
than supra pares (Hindi 2002).^
The absence of successful institutional responses cannot only be explained by the dearth 
of leadership. The lack of salience of Cohesion Policy in the face of more pressing issues 
also served to hamper effective responses. In fact, southern development policy had 
momentarily slipped off the political map (Bull & Baudner 2003) in the face of political 
upheaval and Maastricht requirements. Southern policy, that is, intervento straordinario 
had been dismantled due to inter alia the unravelling of the post-war consensus on 
southern development in 1992.'77 Its demise and overall characterisation as a failure left a 
policy vacuum in which the only new candidate paradigm wras European Cohesion Policy.
The terminology is from Borzel (2003).
*"5 Decreto legislative* 303. Law 400 of 1988 also attempted to bolster the Premier’s office according it 
responsibility for co-ordinating European affairs in order to ensure timely responses (sec art 5c 3a and 
Bindi2002)
in6 The May 2001 elections have seen some change in this regard with the election of Berlusconi, who is 
the political leader of the Form Italia party to the premier’s office. His is a strong premiership style.
Other reasons are the discrediting and subsequent disappearance of political classes that had 
exploited southern policy to bolster their clicntclistic survival as well as the upsurge of the northern 
Leagues (Graziano 2000; Bull & Baudner 2003).
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It thus became a point of reference (Graziano 2000) for Italian decision-makers. 
Coincidentally, it was also the positive experience o f Italy’s entry'to EMU that filled the 
leadership lacuna. Fresh from its success in securing Italy’s entry' to EMU in the face of 
notable difficulty when it used the EU as a sort of ‘external constraint’ (vincolo 
estem oX1?8 an advocacy coalition/policy entrepreneur (or ‘network of expertise’)179 
centred around the Treasury (Ciampi, top bureaucrats, social actors with gains to be had 
from Cohesion Policy), and in particular the DPSC decided to use the Structural Funds in 
the same manner, that is, to force reform on public administration and improve the 
quality of public spending (Bull & Baudner 2003). Therefore, not only did Cohesion 
Policy become a replacement paradigm for southern policy, it wras also to be employed as 
an emissary of institutional reform.
The Structural Funds were harnessed to long-awaited and hitherto unsuccessful 
institutional reforms as a sort of vincolo estem o  as central government endeavours to 
improve Italy’s abysmal performance in Cohesion Policy and formulate an effective 
southern development policy' were grouped together in a single solution.180 As Radaelli 
(2000:17) outlines “the Mezzogiorno is no longer ‘framed’ as a problem of economic 
engineering, but, rather, as a challenge o f social engineering (that is, public policy to 
change the context wherein economic activity and specific policy instruments 
interact)”.181 This change in frame can be considered a third order change or paradigm 
shift: Cohesion Policy provided a ready-made model to follow and decision-makers 
vigorously attempted to do so. The fretful, frenetic period of institutional 
experimentation that resulted, likened by some to “institutional panic” (Hine 2003) is 
indicative of these floundering attempts. It is to this experimentation that the chapter 
now turns. *lSo
'1 'ransmtional Institution Building for Losa/ Devtlijpmnt 7 7* Case ojhjir^pran Vniun Cohesion Poii.y in in-Lind and Sardinia
rS See Dyson & Featherstone (1996).
Sec Radaelli (1998).
lSo Administrative reform had been attempted in the Ciampi government (1993-4) under Sabi no 
Cassesc, and was taken up once again by Bassanini in the Amato government (2001) who attempted, 
inter alia, to decentralise public administration by transferring functions from the centre to local and 
regional authorities (laws 59, 94 and 127 1997). Reforms were vitiated by “overriding legalism, with 
insufficient attention paid to the problem o f changing the culture of Italian adm inistratif practice” 
(Ginshorg 2001:311), the failure to prioritise and make reform central and the neglect of political 
federalism.
'hi See also Amato Parliamentary Report, Premesse per una nuova politico generale a favore del
Meziogionto.
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i
Programmazione negoziata:'82 institutional experimentation and panic I
Planning in partnership'8-' (hereinafter, programmazione negoziata) succeeded •
contrattazione programmata (planned bargaining) as a method o f development and *
 ^ constitutes an attempt by central government (the Treasury and CIPE) to adapt and i
I come to terms with the ‘European way of doing things’, that is, involving the regions and
1 social partners. Contrattazione programmata was characterised by partnership i
1 between, on one hand central government and (mainly big) business, and on the other \
| central government and regions, on specific programmes of intervention. Its objective |
I was to rationalise government interventions through intese, accordi e contratti18^  d i |
! programma (programme agreements, accords and contracts). Programme accords were ¡j
j devised to implement a centrally devised development plan through a state-region f
I agreement. However, due to their complexity they never fulfilled the intention to become
j the main instrument for general development plans in the south as none were signed
I between the government and southern regions. An agreement protocol {protocollo
] d'intesa) in March 1993 recognised economic policy partnership along the lines of the EU j
j principle of subsidiarity and gave a new basis to sub-national authorities in economic
j policy. From this, programmazione negoziata was introduced in 1996 by Law 662, and
j was essentially an attempt by the centre to push through a bottom-up approach and
I bring together public and private actors at sub-national levels through four main j
I instruments. Public policy was to identify the strategic priorities of local and regional
j !
j areas, select suitable projects that ensured coherent implementation, made resources ;
j available and supplied a time-table illustrating deadlines for attaining objectives. The two j
j central operational instniments of this theoretical notion were to be Institutional j
j Agreements (intese istituzionali di programma) which enable regions to access direct
j public investment for priority projects over a number of years and Framework
I Programme Agreements (accordi di programma quadro) which define the conditions of
I implementation for this type of project and lay down the roles of the different institutionsJ and private parties involved. Locally, operational instruments included territorial pacts j
I (patti territoriali) and area contracts {contratti dared) both of which aimed to promote 1
co-operation among local actors, by defining local priorities, co-ordinating public and j
lb- This literally means negotiated programme planning but better translates as planning in 
partnership.
|S-’ Law 662 of 23 December 1996 (article 2, comma 203) is the legal basis of the instruments of 
prog ra mmazion e negoz ici fa.
'»-< Programme contracts were between big business and government for productive infrastructural 
investment. This had a marginal application in Sardinia as there is no real collaboration among 
business. Now however, they can be used by SMEs. CIPE introduced a new element allocating the 
possibility of proposing a contract to industrial districts or industrial consortia. However, this too had 
little impact in Sardinia and the south in general as industrial districts are to be found in the centre 
and north (Sassu 1997, to).
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private investment and stimulating economic development. Territorial pacts1*'1 are 
primarily concerned with business development and infrastructure, and private sector 
investment must account for 30 per cent. Area contracts are confined to areas 
undergoing industrial restructuring with rising unemployment and they promote 
investment using public funding and drafting local level agreements (among all social 
partners) on exceptional administrative measures.
Figure 14: Planning in partnership
Essentially, programmazione negoziata extends the concertazione (or partnership) 
model to a local level and activates a social partnership logic understood as an agreement 
among economic and social forces operating at a local level. Projects and programme 
selection as well as bottom-up planning are essential elements of this new approach 
which attaches greater importance to the territory' and environment in which 
development takes place. Centrally, this new approach initially fell under the 
responsibility o f the Finance Ministry but subsequently was taken over by the DPSC in 
theTreasury.186
Territorial pacts are different to the EU version of Territorial Employment Pacts, which also operate 
in Italy, although the European Omimission is said to haw taken its inspiration from the Italian 
brainchild.
,So It w a s  supposed to have been accorded to the OrmuYafo ik’U'intcsa istitu/Jonah which had yet to be 
set up in 1997 (Sassu 1997).
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Table 32: Instruments of Programmazione negoziata
Instrument Actors Aim Contents
Institutional Public actors(central state, Multiannual
agreement regions or autonomous development plan
provinces)
Finance, participants, 
necessary 
administrative 
procedures
Framework Central state or region on Implementing 
programme one hand and local institutional
agreement authorities or other public agreements
and private actors on the 
other
Activities, time-frames 
and implementation 
methods, participants, 
tasks, conciliation 
problems, monitoring 
and evaluation 
procedures.
Territorial
pacts
Programme
contract
Area contract
Local authorities, public Local development 
and private actors and 
social partners
Central state, big business Implementing 
andSMEs planning in
partnership projects
Administrations, trade Accelerating 
unions and employers’ development and
organisations generating
____________________ employment______
as above
as above
as above
These new policy developments were driven by the necessity to simplify and accelerate 
the administrative and bureaucratic procedures that have bogged the implementation of 
EU development programmes in Italy generally, but in the south in particular. They also 
come from an increasingly diffuse realisation of the importance of local development for 
employment as emphasised in many recent EU policy documents. The common theme 
running through these instruments of negotiated programming is a partnership among 
local, institutional and private actors and national and regional administration (Angius 
I997b:i). CIPE stipulated the procedural aspects of the new approach in March 1997. The 
main tenets of these instruments are outlined in Table 31.
Intese istituzionali d i programma
Institutional agreements are instruments within which the development objectives of 
national government, provinces and municipalities are established. Central government 
and the executive (giunta) of each region or province outline their development 
objectives and sectors. They aimed to cover all state-regional/province relations 
regarding development. A multi-annual development plan was to be formulated by these
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institutions for specific regions and provinces and implemented through an accordo di 
programma quadrotS~. Institutional agreements must contain:
- a development programme;
- framework programme agreements with peripheral state organs, local 
authorities, sub-regional authorities and all other public and private actors;
- criteria, time-frames and methods of implementing single agreements of the 
framework programme;
- methods of checking, monitoring and up-dating general objectives and 
implementation instruments by participants who must constitute an 
Institutional Management Committee (Com itato istituzionale di gestione) 
composed of representatives of the government and provincial/regional 
executive. The latter must establish a Joint Implementation Committee 
(Comitato paritetico di attuazione) comprising representatives of participant 
administration.
Before it is signed by participants, agreements must be approved by CIPE subsequent to 
obtaining an opinion from the Permanent Conference of relations between state, regions 
and autonomous provinces. Institutional agreements constitvite a way for regions to 
establish objectives that are defined along with central government on the one hand, and 
provincial and local authorities on the other. Sassu (1997: 13) holds that Institutional 
agreements remain disconnected from implementing instruments (Territorial Pacts, 
Programme and Area Contracts). Moreover, he maintains that unlike EU regulations, the 
region’s co-ordinating role in regional and local planning in Pact and Contract 
procedures is not recognised. In fact, regions merely subscribe to Pacts and Contracts.
Transnational Institution Building for Local Dts'tlugnient The Cast of European Union Cohésion Po/uy in Inland and Sardinia
Territorial Pacts
An institutional expression of social partnership to promote local and sub-regional 
development in under-developed areas was devised at a national level by CIPE and called 
Territorial Pact. This development model is the only Italian one to be mimicked by the 
EU as the recent DG-XVI Communication on Structural Assistance and Employment 
outlined, “the Italian model of ‘Territorial Pacts* based on employment areas is 
undoubtedly the most innovative and advanced form of [...] expanded and dynamic 
partnership” (Commission 1996). The main innovation o f the Territorial Pact which 
forms part of programmazione negoziata188 is the status o f public administration as an 
equal partner with other public and private actors Oocal sectoral interest groups,
,fi~ Article 7 of law 64/1986 prorides for the programme agreement. Law 142/1990 t<x>k on the 
programme agreement as an instrument for inter-institutional relations. See Fancello (1991; 1993; 
1995). More recently, laws and CIPE decisions redefined the instruments of negotiated programming 
such as laws 104/1995, 341/1995. CIPE decisions 24.02.1994, 10.05.1995, 20.11.1995. In Sardinia, 
regional law 14/1996 introduced the Progrcmuni integrate d ’area -  Integrated area programmes -  
which utilise the programme agreement and contract instruments in the implementation phase. Law 
662/1996 and CIPE decision 21/03/1997 introduced the further regulatory changes on negotiated 
programme planning (Angius 1997b;22).
Under law341/1995.
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employers, banks, trade unions and industrial consortia). Pacts constitute agreements 
among these actors to co-ordinate local development initiatives and are implemented 
through an idea form  in three sectors: productive activities, infrastructure for productive 
activities and local development. Infrastructural projects have to be directly linked to 
productive activities and cannot amount to more than 30 per cent of overall spending. 
Private funding must account for at least 30 per cent of overall financing. Overall funding 
cannot exceed 100 billion lire (70 billion for financial facilities to enterprises and 30 
billion for grants for infrastnicture projects) which comes from private, state, local, 
regional and EU sources. The Cassa depositi e presdti makes the necessary public 
funding available within thirty days of receipt of request in order to avoid delays. Pacts 
operate in a sub-regional area and must outline the financial and temporal commitments 
and obligations of all participants. Procedural aspects are also speeded up somewhat and 
the pacts must take account of, and be taken account of, in general regional development 
programmes. The recipients of funds are private enterprises, local authorities such as 
municipalities, regions, public-private companies and public local bodies. Cl PE decision 
(July 1996) gives local administration the role of promoting the Pact and the social 
partners have the role of implementing an exchange of income policy to value sub­
regional strong points. The objectives of the Pact are employment, new businesses and 
quality service infrastructure for the local economic system in line with the idea form  of 
the Pact. A Territorial Pact must contain:
- specific objectives of local development and its compatibility with regional 
planning;
- a co-ordinating body;
- commitments and obligations of all participants in implementing of the pact;
- projects and interventions with details of implementing bodies, temporal issues 
and implementation methods;
- a financial plan and time-tables for spending in relation to each project with an 
indication of the type and entity of public contributions requested from Cl PE 
and other resources;
- an agreement among public subjects involved in the pact's implementation.
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Box 2: Phases of operation of Territorial Pacts
1. Private enterpri.se, public .sector bodies, local trade unions and local authorities 
propose the pact. They put forward a letter of intent between trade unions and 
industry associations and the availability of investment projects for business 
ventures and integration among them.
2. Tlie Treasury assists proposers in the planning process with technical assistance 
provided by sen ice companies selected by tender. The planning and design 
prerequisites to join the Pact are investment in productive activities (Ministerial 
Decree 527/1995) and infrastructure as required by law 109/1994.
3. The Treasuiy evaluates each Pact and investment project employing specialised 
firms selected by tender. Evaluation methods and criteria arc laid down by law 
488/1992. Industrial investment must be outlined with a business plan, matching 
funding between needs, amount and owner’s equity and employment ret uni. 
Infrastructure must outline cost-bcncfit analysis and evaluation of finance. 
Finally, the overall consistency of the investment projects is taken into account.
4. The Treasury' decree outlines the existence of the prerequ ¡sites (letter of intent and 
positively evaluated investment projects), the region’s advice, the overall value of 
Pact priorities and ascertains the level of public funding necessary for the Pact. 
Finally, it approves the Pact with a decree (in order to speed up the process).
5. Official agreement among the public bodies involved in the development of the 
Pact (central and local administration, public-private companies and public 
agencies to identify and regulate the tasks to be fulfilled by participants, 
administrative acts to be adopted (permits, licences, shorter administrative 
procedures etc.), time-frames within which tasks arc to be completed and the 
monitoring of the agreement. The agreement must be signed by all public sector 
bodies within a period of sixty days from the issue of the Treasury decree.
6. A public-private company (Article 22 of law 142/1990) made up of public and 
private bodies as well as hanks etc. provides the public funding grants, the private 
funding for the overall finance needs of the Pact and monitors the fulfilment of the 
tasks and time-frames of the Pact. It also provides six-monthly reports to the 
Treasuiy on the progress of implementation and expenditure.
7. The Cassa depositi e prestiti provides public funding to the recipients according to
the short list of positively evaluated investment projects within a period of thirty 
days from the receipt of the list. Banks proride co-financing of investment projects 
to be developed within the Pact (credit market and structural funds).________
Transtuîtor.al Institution Building for Lo;,i/ Destlopmnt T U  Case r>f Httrnpran Union Cohesion Poiiiy in Ire fond and Sardinia
A study189 commissioned by the DPSC completed in January 2003 and financed by 
National Operational Programme on Technical Assistance of the 2000-2006 Objective 1 
Community Support Framework compared three types of pacts: first and second 
generation and EU employment pacts.190 It found that first generation and EU pacts 
performed better in relation to economic aspects and governance (defined as institutional 
functioning especially bureaucratic procedural efficiency, public-private co-operation 
and planning capacity through partnership). This was attributed to the higher degree of 
mobilisation and co-ordination of local actors characteristic of first generation and EU 
Pacts. By contrast, second generation pacts lacked leadership and partnership which is
i«s> For initial analyses see articles by Trigilia (2001), Cerosimo & Wolleb (2001), Barbera (2001) and 
Freschi (2001) in the special issue of Stato e Met'cato.
190 There arc 12 first generation Territorial Pacts which were approved in 1996 and 1997 with the old 
procedure providing for Treasury and Budget Ministiy’s investigation of the single initiatives. There 
are 39 second generation pacts which were approved with the new procedure outlined between duly 
199s  and February 1 9 9 9  in relation with the two “calls for projects” issued on 30 November 1 9 9 8  and 
10 April 1999. There are 8 Community Employment Pacts approved according to EU regulations as 
well as one hybrid which is financed with national resources but is procedural!)’ tied to EU regulations 
(Corte dei Conti 2002).
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due to mimetic isomorphism (ismorphismo mimetico) defined as dissemination by 
imitation (DPSC 2003: 38-9). The report also found that the co-operation of public and 
private subjects requires political involvement in order to make decisions that require co­
operation and reciprocal trust in the formulation and realisation of projects. Moreover, 
technical assistance was found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
success of Pacts. Lastly, ‘project facilitators’ with technical competence coupled with an 
ability to stimulate co-operation among actors on highly interdependent projects that 
require high co-ordination were judged to be important especially in fostering 
communication between technical and political aspects and personnel. Figure 15 below 
outlines the main results of the report. Interestingly it found that pacts in areas with low 
social capital have achieved better economic results than those with a high degree of 
social capital, and areas characterised by mixed political composition have performed 
better than politically homogenous areas. By contrast, Trigilia (2001) points to the 
important role played by factors influencing the quality of interaction among actors and 
the organisational choices in the implementation phase.
Figure 15: Territorial Pacts: study findings
First generation Pacts 
European Pacts
Weak economic 
development area
4  Î
Intensity of leadership 
and partnership
Mixed political 
composition area — » 1
Balance between 
political and technical -  
administrative 
leadership
Pact Performance
Source: DPSC 2003: 29
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7Area Contracts
Area contracts were also introduced under the new form of negotiated programming and 
constitute social partnerships as instruments for the generation of an economic 
environment favourable to new business initiatives and employment in manufacturing, 
services and tourism in unemployment crisis areas.1^  They were generated by an 
agreement reached between trade unions and business at the end o f 1996 spurred on by 
rising unemployment in the south. They differ from Territorial Pacts in three ways. First, 
they operate in industrial areas and second, they are directed at private enterprises and 
constitute an agreement among workers and employers. Third, there is no limit to public 
funding. Area contracts aim to generate a flexible environment in industrial relations and 
administrative procedures to attract new business. A  public body co-ordinates the 
activity of those responsible for single activities and measures, and ensures timely 
implementation. This co-ordinating body submits an implementation report outlining 
results, monitoring techniques etc. to the Ministry of Finance. An Area Contract must 
contain:
- objectives of entrepreneurial initiatives and possible infrastnictural 
interv entions connected to the development of these initiativ es;
- activities and measures and their implementing bodies, time-frames and 
implementation details:
- an implementation and co-ordination body;
- costs and resources necessary for interventions requested from CIPE and 
other sources within the limits laid down by sectoral regulations as well as 
private funding;
- agreement among social partners;
- agreement among relevant public authorities and administrations inv olved. *172
Transnational institution tiuiltiinji for Local Development The Case oftti/rnpean t  'nion Cohesion Policy in Inland anti Sardinia
I'>1 In Objectives 1,2 and 5b ureas as well as those outlined by laws 148/93 and 236/1993.
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Box 3: Procedural phases of the Area contract
1. Industry associations and trade unions propose tlie am tract to the Task Force for 
local development and employment in the Prime Minister’s cabinet, which is 
responsible for overall co-ordination. The prerequisites are industrial areas 
suitable for new plants and factories, a large number of investment projects and a 
public-private body qualified to manage an EU Global Grant.
2. The Task Force co-ordinates and involves public bodies and local authorities and 
prorides technical assistance to the proposers in the planning process through 
specialised bodies selected by public tender.
3. Investment projects in the Contract are evaluated by specialised bodies selected by 
the Treasury. The evaluation is based on methods and criteria laid out in law 
488/1992 (Business plan, owner’s equity, employment results etc.). The Treasury 
determines the existence of these requirements and the availability of public 
funding relative to the financing needs of investments.
4. The Contract must be signed by all the participants within a period of sixty days 
after approval by the Treasury’. Industry associations and trade unions must also 
sign an agreement within the same period as do public bodies involved in the 
contract among themselves.
5. The Cassa d epos it i e prestiti then grants public funding to the recipients
according to the list of projects provided by the management body within thirty 
days of receiving the list.________________________________________
Accordi di programma, contratti d i programma arid intesa di programma 
Essentially their purpose is to improve co-ordination among public and private actors 
involved in programme planning. They herald a new form of collaboration between 
public administration and the private sector. A Programme agreement (accordo di 
programma) constitutes an accord among public actors in complex and integrated 
projects. The IMPs can be considered the harbinger of the Programme agreement."'2 The 
Programme Contract* 193 (contratto di programma) is a normative framework instrument 
that regulates commitments taken on by the public sector with the private sector (namely 
large national and international industrial groups). The aim is to mobilise large 
organisational groups and demand for industrial research to encourage advanced 
technologies to move to the south. Packets of initiatives are agreed between private 
industrial groups and public enterprises.19* These were later extended to SMEs and 
service producers.193 The Programme understanding11* (intesa di programma) provided 
for the updating of the tri-annual programme for the Mezzogiorno (1990 to 1992) and is 
an implementation instrument (like the Programme Contracts) of strategic projects. 
These projects which are inter-regional or national characterise the new phase of 
extraordinary' intervention in the south. Commitments were to be of a political nature 
between the Minister for Extraordinary Intervention and other competent organisms in a
>9= Laws 210/1985 on rail, 64/1986 on extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno. 305/1989 on tri­
annual programme planning for the environment and 142/1990 on local autonomies all am tain some 
elements of the Programme Accord.
193 provided for by Cl PI decision 16 «July 1986.
>94 For example, programme contracts with IRI and EN1. 
lt,‘ Provided for by Cl PE decision 16 February 1990.
‘9*> provided for Cl PE decision 29 March 1990.
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specific sector, for undertaking actions functionally connected to multi-annual 
frameworks. Obligations were to be political rather than legal in the Programme 
understanding, which really represents the introductory phase o f the agreement
All of these programmazione negoziata instruments become automatically operational 
and finance was made readily available within the agreement, thus considerably altering 
procedurally practices and speeding up programme operations. Once these instruments 
were put in practice, EU funds were to be directed to them in order to curb spending 
problems (Angius 19973:23). These single instalments were to be activated from the 
‘bottom’ independently of regional planning. Following the philosophy of this new 
‘partnership planning’ for local development, the best regions can absorb Institutional 
Agreements into their regional development plans for those parts requiring a large 
commitment from the state and the region. This plethora of instruments as one regional 
civil servant warned, risked a bout of inflation (interview) and indeed Hine (2003) likens 
this period of experimentation to panic and Piattoni (2003,120) to ‘devolution overload’. 
What is significant about these instruments is the minute detail laid out at the outset -  
even each lead up stage is detailed -  regulating all procedures, phases and such, thus 
significantly limiting experimentation. Second, the complexity of the measures is 
remarkable and few actors fully grasp the entire spectrum. Indeed Hine (2003) asserts 
that “Italy’s attempts to adapt to some of the features of the European approach to 
partnership planning, and vertical integration of tiers of government may actually have 
hindered its capacity to adapt to the higher rate of absorption required under the EtTs 
new structural funds plan”.
Thus programmazione negoziata represents a very conscious attempt to formally change 
institutions and model them on the ‘European formula’. The problem with this formal, 
overtly prescriptive (even pedantic) way of bringing about change is that it is 
painstakingly slow and there is little room for creativity and experimentation as the rules 
are rigidly laid down and sometimes seem to require specialised knowledge to 
comprehend. Moreover, all these new instruments of programmazione negoziata failed 
to achieve the desired result which was strengthening Italy’s Structural Fund absorption 
capacity. Indeed, rather than strengthening absorption capacity, administrative 
incapacity to incorporate all the elements o f programme planning was highlighted and it 
became apparent that mimetic isomorphism does not necessarily bring about the desired 
results as in this case, it tended to perpetuate the already characteristic obsession with 
procedure in administrative circles. Nonetheless, this “undiscriminating adherence to 
decentralisation and participation gave way to a partial re-centralisation” (Hine 2003) in
Transnational institution Building (or Local Derelupnunt The Cast rifijumptan l ’nion Cohesion Policy in Inland andSardinia________
174
It.lit« 111 i f'JT'Srr (' ì,*Tttn*r lira >  i >/»»■ la ƒ tr>* (
the newest CSF and more innovative and apparently successful attempts at institutional 
engineering. Before going on to discuss the 2000-2006 CSF however, this chapter dwells 
on Sardinia during this period of Cohesion Policy implementation and programmazione 
negoziata experimentation.
Sardinia’s Competing Paradigms: Master Plans and Fragmented
Interventions
As was highlighted in Chapter 4, the first CSF was hampered by the following quandaries: 
low absorption or spending capacity resulting in tardiness, excessive fragmentation as a 
result of the inclusion of a myriad of actors, and the absence of private actors.1''? This 
section proceeds to examine the extent to which these issues were dealt with in the 
second CSF. The second Community Support Framework (1994-1999)"* attempted to 
avoid some of the problems outlined in the first Community Support Framework 
evaluation. In particular, there was a drift away from dispersion (or fragmentation) to 
concentration:
“to avoid making the same errors as in 1989-1993, the region, while 
confirming some sectors of intervention, decided to concentrate EU co- 
financed investments in some specific sectors” (Community Support 
Framework 1994-1999:195-6).
These sectors were chosen in accordance with the overall strategy elaborated by the 
Italian government and the region. This strategy gives competence, to be governed by the 
new rules defined by CI PI (comitato interministeriale di programmazione industriale) 
decision 22 April 1993, for industrial grants, water infrastructure, rail transport, 
environment and cultural goods to the central state administration. The priorities 
outlined in the Community Support Framework were as follow's for a total cost of 
2,097.052 million ECUS:
1. communications;
2. industry, artisans, services and local development;
3. tourism;
4. diversification, utilisation of agricultural resources and niral development;
5. support infrastructure for economic activity;
6. utilisation of human resources;
7. and technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation. 9
i9~ On 30 September 1994, no private payments had occurred for the 1988-1993 CSF apart from the 
8,656 million lire under the FEOGA part of the OP.
*(>8k>s ]{appears that the strategies adopted in the Operational Programme an* laid down clearly by the 
national ministry as all regions essentially follow the same format of presentation of the Italian 
Community Support Framework.
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Table 33: Community Support Framework 1994-1999 in million ECU
Funds 2.4 local 4.2 rural Total CSF
development
and crisis areas
development
l.public part - • total 8,000 88,400 1,605,152
la.EU funds Total 4,000 60,000 967,100
ERDF 4,000 0 415,000
ES F 0 0 219,500
EAGGF 60,000 332,600
lb.Nat. per Total 4,000 28,400 638,052
fund
ERDF 4,000 0 392,951
ESF 0 0 87,501
EAGGF 0 28,400 157,600
2.Private sector 3,000 24,000 49L9 0 0
Total cost 11,000 112,400 2,097.052
Source: Community Support Framework Objective One Italy 1994-1999
Under the seventh priority, the region aimed to improve the functioning of public
administration and especially a more efficient use of public resources. Thus, computer
monitoring of interventions was planned. Moreover, in order to build up a reserve of
projects that could be undertaken quickly, planning future interventions to be co-
fmanced by EU funds, was stipulated as
“in past years, Sardinia did not make recourse to these possibilities and this 
meant tardiness in the implementing programmes and the impossibility of 
undertaking some measures as well as serious difficulty for Community 
Support Framework monitoring” (Community Support Framework 1994- 
1999:201).
Furthermore, the region intended to indicate the actions to be taken vis-à-vis local 
authorities and administrative organs in order to reduce time frames of implementation 
administrative procedures.
In contrast to the former Community Support Framework, local development features as
a part of the industry, services and artisans priority:
“to develop local resources and maintain and create jobs, the region has to 
help firstly SMEs and artisans as they have a real possibility of survival and 
competition with other businesses” (ibid. 197).
Moreover, the Community Support Framework (1994-1999:113) outlines that:
“the promotion of local development, with interventions to encourage 
territorial initiatives which are limited in relation to equipment and 
infrastructure such as aid and services for SMEs, assumes an increasing 
relevance in the context of a correctly understood regional development 
policy. [..] Local development measures mainly, but not exclusively, consist of 
promotion, in the broadest sense o f the term, of that which can be defined as 
mobilisation o f initiative, capacity and qualified human resources to favour 
the birth o f productive systems oriented towards innovation and
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internationalisation. In reality, local development aims to change the 
mentality of development actors”.
It also stipulates that first, local development must be based on partnership among 
public and private local development actors, local authorities, business associations, 
universities and research institutes, financial institutions, chambers of commerce etc. 
Second, a dear definition of a project or global strategy at a territorial level based on a 
correct diagnosis of the potential, limits and structures able to combine supply and 
demand through organic and integration packages, is necessary. Third, it must be 
founded on the promotion of relational systems that break isolation and open up to 
markets external to the region. Fourth, a combination of local strategies with sectoral 
orientations of regional and national infrastructural programmes is necessary (ibid.).
Box 4: Local development policy measures
information, training and generating awareness among local actors through the use’ of 
local structures or creating them as well as exchange and transfer of experience; 
fostering the elaboration of local development strategics and the definition of their 
content especially support and organisation of local sen ices of management and financial 
consultancy to industrial businesses, artisans and co-operatives such as management and 
commercialisation, finance, marketing. Innovation, including technological, research and 
transfer of new knowledge, diagnosis, financial engineering services that mobilise local 
savings;
research and innovation services as well as transfer of knowledge especially in clean 
technology sectors;
support for local business initiatives of a smaller size which can be situated in a 
framework of concerted local action;
training of personnel for business initiatives in a specific local development ambit; 
different types of small sized plants and infrastructure that are excluded from national nr 
regional programmes but are important for meeting load demands; 
support for the elaboration of local development strategies, especially methods 
(evaluation, diagnosis, setting objectives, implementation measures) and consultancy and 
technical assistance;
helping the medium-term or long-term evaluation of strategies and their relevance and 
efficiency and their possible modification.____ ____________________________
The Community Support Framework also outlines the special attention to local 
development in big cities and agglomerations of the Mezzogiorno. Rural development is 
also mentioned as a priority in the Community Support Framework. It was allocated 
631,814 million ECUs. Rural tourism1** is to be promoted in order to diversify and 
integrate farm incomes but it must be accompanied by measures to improve the 
organisational and managerial capacity of businesses through the creation of 
associational forms. Other interventions include integrated agricultural tourism with 
operations to recover rural heritage (such as towns) and the utilisation of local produce. 
In monetary terms, local development fared fare worse than rural development as the 
former got 5.94 per cent of its priority and 0.53 per cent of the entire programme while
Although there is a separate measure for tourism (71.429 million ECUs), rural tourism was included 
under rural development.
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the latter was allocated 17.8 per cent of its priority and 5.36 per cent of the total 
programme. Together they account for 5.88 per cent of the entire programme.200
Figure 16: Relative importance of rural and local development in C S F 1994-1999
A most interesting factor of rural development programmes is the indicators chosen. For 
the objective of diversification and integration of agricultural income, indicators such as 
the number of beds in agricultural tourism farms and rural tourism, rural villages, 
utilisation of typical produce and improvement of grazing areas, were chosen. Other 
performance indicators outlined are, the presence of agricultural tourism structures, 
rural tourism, degree of use of these structures, rural villages, businesses participating in 
promotional initiatives as a percentage o f agricultural business, environmental forestry 
as a percentage of total surface and improvement of grazing land as a percentage of total. 
It is evident that there is a massive concentration on tourism as the main axis of rural 
development.
Operational Programme 1994-1999
Many of the priorities adopted under the first Operational Programme were also adopted 
for the second, with some minor changes. First, more weight was attributed to strategic
Interestingly, the multi-regional programme was supposed to spend 2.77 per cent of its budget on 
local development and nothing on rural development. This is not withstanding the tact that in contrast 
to 1989-1993 when multi-regional programmes regarded three sectors in rural development 
(technological transfer and research, qualitative improvement in the fruit and vegetable sector, 
spreading of expertise in agriculture and especially training experts), the 1994-99 Community Support 
Framework aimed to pay more attention to problems connected to rural development. However, this 
was understrxxl as interventions to sustain the process of diversification of agriculture (pp.6l). The 
multi-regional measures are managed by the Minister for Agricultural resources, food and forestry but 
the implementation instruments such as the Operational Programme etc. are left to the region. It is 
interesting to sec1 how other regions opted to spend funding. Molise spent nothing on local 
development and 13.70 per cent of its budget (520,437 mccus) on rural development; Campania 
(3,392,519 mccus) spent 8.31 per cent on local development and 1.86 per cent on rural development; 
Calabria (1,852,46 niecus) spent 7.02 per cent on local development and 7.19 per cent on rural 
development; and Basilicata (1.206,380 mccus) spent 8.75 per cent on local development and 5.37 per 
centón rural development (Community Support Framework 1994*1999).
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infrastnicture such as energy and research which involved a multiplicity of institutional 
actors and private capital. Second, sub-regional initiatives that included the social 
partners were privileged. Third, more concentration of funds was sought by selecting 
priorities on the basis of maximum funds available, that is, water, rail and 
telecommunications. The three funds were to operate independently of each other, 
although there was one monitoring system for the entire programme in order to 
guarantee co-ordination and common objectives. According to the evaluation of 31 
December 1996 (subsequently updated to April 1997) which was compiled by the 
Regional Centre of Programme Planning, the Operational Programme had notable 
implementation difficulties: 24.86 per cent of total funds had been committed and 6.13 
per cent of funds paid at that stage (RAS1997: 3). The main problems were encountered 
with ERDF infrastructural projects. This is one of the drawbacks of the new 
concentration strategy, as it is enough for one or two projects201 to be slow or late in 
starting to put the entire sum at risk. Interestingly, the implementing agency', which is 
the state road agency ANAS, appears to be the cause of delays (interviews and 
evaluation). Moreover, bureaucratic difficulties impeded the starting up of services to 
business as well as animation202 and economic assistance. If funds are less concentrated, 
the risk spreads but fragmentation may occur. FEOGA commitments stood at 48.03 per 
cent and ESF at 54*05 per cent, whereas payments stood at 27.38 and 23.10 per cent 
respectively.
A  startling difference emerges when comparing the Regional Operational Programme to 
the Community Support Framework, that is, local and rural development as explicitly 
defined in the Community Support Framework, are absent. They appear to be replaced 
by a myriad of ESF training and employment schemes.2** Looking at rural development, 
the measures cited are the development of the Anglo-Arab-Sardinian horse, land reform 
as well as financial engineering, advertising and information studies. However, the 
measure on recovering rural heritage had its public funding reduced by 2.5 billion lire. 
Moreover, due to the novelty of the measures, problems arose acquiring authorisations 
and controversies on the use of territory. Local development measures include economic 
assistance and animation as well as a host of measures for industrial and artisan SMEs 
and services to firms.
-,J1 In this case, the new state road from Cagliari to Tortoli was the problem.
-OJ Generally, animation is defined as economic animation in Sardinian development programmes. 
ESF programmes generally do not require co-funding.
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In sum the ERDF part of the Operational Programme for Sardinia concentrated on five 
macro-areas. First, development of the tourist potential of the island and seasonal and 
geographical diversification (upgrading parks, in-land areas, historical town centres, 
enhancing hotel supply and infrastructure such as airports). Second, developing a 
network of SMEs by reinforcing supply o f services to firms, financial incentives and 
strengthening research. Third, improvement of internal cohesion through the 
improvement of connections between low population areas and major urban centres 
(through road building) and upgrading of public services (water and refuse 
management). Fourth, improvement of the quality of life in major town centres focusing 
on improving transport systems. Fifth, improvement of the capacity of the Regional 
administration to manage EU and other regional economic development programmes. 
The evaluation carried out by Gemini Management Consulting (2000) affirms that the 
ERDF identifies shared priorities and the distribution of resources is coherent with the 
needs of the Region. However, the articulation of the ERDF in measures does not 
correspond and therefore, a strategy within each o f the five priorities is missing. 
Furthermore, the link between the different measures and implementing actors is 
insufficient. Lastly, the translation between strategies and identification or 
implementation criteria o f specific projects is not developed. The ERDF also encountered 
some major advancement problems in relation to some important measures20-» (Gemini 
Management Consulting 2000:6).
The evaluation found that the ESF had advanced well and was sufficiently articulated but 
was not always coherent with the main training needs of the Region. Moreover, the fact 
that the Sardinian labour market tends to require less qualified/educated labour force is 
not reflected in ESF spending (RAS 2000). The FEOGA was evaluated vis-à-vis efficacy 
and efficiency and was judged to have performed “well”. Niche sectors were found to be 
neglected in view of their strength in the regional agricultural economy as there was a 
concentration on olive-growing. This fund’s individual sectors and strategic priorities 
were also, however, found to be bereft o f strategies and implementation processes 
(Gemini Management Consulting 2000: 7). Moreover, FEOGA’s aims were characterised 
as contingent as opposed to integrated and thus fail to affect broader rural development 
policy problems such as depopulation (RAS 2000).
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' These measures were the state road mentioned previously (no. 121), the metropolitan transport 
system in Caglian and technological parks.
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In terms of naked figures, budget commitments were wound up on 31 December 1999 for 
Italy overall, while several files are still open (situation in 1999 Report of the Structural 
Funds) from the 1989-1993 programming period.
The biggest obstacle to the success of the Regional administration in terms of quantity 
and quality of EU funding, according to the evaluation, is organisation, defined as 
processes that enable the interaction o f professional resources among offices, regional 
ministries and other administrations. This view has been taken on board by the Regional 
administration in the current Regional operational programme (RAS 2000) in which it 
affirms its aim to improve communication within the administration as well as with other 
implementing actors and to have a clearer allocation of responsibility. It also set out its 
intention to improve indicators and monitoring systems given that only some specific 
results are measured and there are no global impact data systems (situation 1999). The 
main ‘lessons’ learnt from the 1994-1999 programming experience were the need for a 
*parco p rog ettf, that is, a pre-formulated series of projects. In fact, there is a tendency 
to choose immediately operational projects due to tight temporal constraints. But this 
has undermined planning and has resulted in a low degree of integration of measures 
around strategic programmes, which lessens overall impact. Other lessons include the 
need to slim down legislation and procedures as they hamper efficiency, reform public 
apparatus and privatisation and the need for more co-ordination among different 
programmes. What is clear is that the need for authorisations continued to slow down the 
regional administration during this programming period even leading to the 
abandonment of some measures20-'* (RAS 2000). Moreover, the (excessive) ex ante 
control exercised by the regional section of the Corte dei Conti has continued to be the 
source of unjustifiable implementation delays. The (2000-2006) current regional 
operational programme will group all development instruments relevant to the region 
(CSF, Institutional agreement, CIPE funds, other regional policy measures and article 13 
of the regional statute) thus becoming the overall development programme -  mother 
board -  the region had been seeking since the days of the IMPs.
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Programmazione negoziata in Sardinia
Paci identified seven types of programmazione negoziata instruments in Sardinia 
accounting for 81 different development programmes (see Table 34). The majority in 
numerical terms are Integrated Area Programmes which points, perhaps, to a preference 
for locally managed instruments because of their administrative simplicity or relative
a°j For example, the Sulcis gassificatorc project.
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accessibility. Moreover, Integrated Area Programmes are present on 62 per cent of 
territory and out o f a total of 6,000 billion lire funding for the 81 projects, they have the 
lion’s share -  2,000 billion or 36/6 of the total.
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Table 34: Programmazione negoziata in Sardinia
Programmes Year of approval
1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5 1996 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1999 2000 2001 Total
Area Contracts 2 1 3
Pregramme 1 1 5 7Contracts
LEADER II 1 11 4 3 19
Integrated Area 9 14 14 1 3 8
Pregrammes
Territorial Pacts 1 3 2 6
Territorial Pacts 1 1
for Employment
Thematic 7 7
Territorial Pacts
Total 1 0 1 21 22 18 4 14 81
Source: Paci (2001:92)
It is interesting to note that Integrated Area Programmes are also the programmes 
characterised by the most significant delays in spending: 70 per cent of spending was still 
at the initial stages at the end of 2001, even though nearly three years had passed since 
they were approved. Paci (2001) points to the serious nature of this situation given the 
Integrated Area Programmes pervasiveness in monetary, numerical and territorial terms. 
However, implementation delays are not unique to Integrated Area Programmes. As is 
evident from Table 35, over half the projects are only still at beginning stages -  the 
implementation period goes from 1994 to 2001. Obviously time is an important factor 
and one which continues to dog project implementation in Sardinia. Paci (2001:93) gives 
the example o f five projects approved in 1997 that, still in 2001, record spending less 
than 10 per cent of overall resources, and two thirds of projects that were approved in 
1998 have spent less than 20 per cent. He points to broad participation of local actors 
when drafting plans, respect for town planning, procurement and environmental 
regulation procedures, ongoing control of resource allocation and spending and 
monitoring as responsible for slowing down implementation time-frames.
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Table 35: Stages o f implementation of development projects in Sardinia
Program m es Implementation ph ase206
Begun Being Near Concluded Total
0- implemented oonchtsion 100%
25% 25-75% 75*99 %
Area Contracts 0 3 0 0 3
Programme Contracts 5 0 1 1 7
LEADER II 0 16 3 0 19
Integrated Area 25 8 5 0 38
Programmes 
Territorial Pacts 5 1 0 0 6
Territorial Pacts for 0 1 0 0 1
Employment
Thematic Territorial Pacts 7 O 0 0 7
Total 42 -2SL 9 1 8t
Source: Paci (2001: 92)
In spending terms, the graphs in Figure 17 offer a specific example of two categories of 
spending: public works and intangible spending. Overall spending is 5>734 billion lire 
and public works accounts for approximately 13 per cent o f that, while intangible 
investment accounts for 4 per cent.
Figure 17: Programmazione Negoziata Spending
Spending for public works
R o a d  p o r t 
and a irp o r t 
in fra s tru c tu re "
E nh a nc in g
n a tu ra l
harrtage
10% E nhancing
2 1% cu ltu ra l
Vita ter. s e w e r 1 
and  *
heritage
19%
p u rif ic a tio n  - \ E nhancing
in fra s tru c tu re In fra s tru c tu re to  uns t
16% to  s u pp o rt V a c c o m m o d a ti
p ro d u c tio n
2 1%
on s tru c tu re s  
13%
Intangible spending
T e rr ito r ia l a n d  
p ro d u c t  
m a rk e tin g  
19%
C o m p u te r  
s y s te m *  ■ 
12%
P ro fe s s io n a l
tra in in g
46%
S M E  s e rv ic e s  S o c ia l
19%  s e rv ice s
4%
The following sections examine LEADER and Territorial Pacts. Subsequently, Sardinia’s 
own dabbling in programmazione negoziata, that is, the Integrated area programmes 
are analysed. At the time of writing no comprehensive evaluation of all these instruments 
had yet been undertaken as they were still in the course of implementation.
2itti Phase of implementation is defined by overall spending. A project at the beginning stages will have 
spent up to 25% of overall resources and so on.
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LEADER 1 and II
In Sardinia, there was only one LEADER I programme which was in the province of 
Nuoro.207 Curiously, the reason that LEADER came to Sardinia had to do with the 
presence of a Euro-parliamentarian who had contacts in Brussels208 and was thus able ‘to 
bring LEADER to Nuoro\ This group (GAL - gruppo di azione locale Barbagia-Baronie) 
worked directly with the Ministry' for Agriculture and Brussels administration. LEADER 
II modified this procedure somewhat as the region entered the scene as co-ordinator and 
approver of LEADER programmes. The region also had to draft a regional LEADER 
programme in LEADER II.2°(-> According to LEADER actors, the entrance of the region 
onto the scene has meant longer time-frames. This is because prospective LEADER 
groups could not ‘set up shop’ or begin operation until the region drafted the regional 
LEADER programme. This took some time to compile. Groups had to ‘show interest’ in 
1994 and the regional LEADER programme was compiled as late as July 1996 (there 
were two previous drafts in October 1995 and February 1996). In December 1996, groups 
had to send in their plans and in April 1997 these were approved by decree. By contrast, 
LEADER I took much less time to become operational (from August to September 1992) 
and was approved directly by the European Commission. Further to this, CIPE approved 
it in March 1993 and issued the decree in December 1993. Funds arrived in January 1994 
and in May of the same year, spending began (interviews with LEADER Barbagia- 
Baronie actors).
The regional executive set up a partnership or committee on conception and decision in 
January 1996 according to the criteria laid down by the regional LEADER programme. 
This committee selected LEADER groups (Local Action Groups are limited to a 
population of 100,000 and deal with rural development multi-sectorally and Collective 
Operators which are mono-sectoral and generally deal with either agriculture or rural 
tourism). Nine LAGs and 2 COs were approved. A working group in the regional planning 
centre, which forms a part of the above-mentioned committee, was set up to assist the 
groups and select local action plans. Since Sardinia has activated a permanent table of 
consultation with the social partners (trade unions, LEADER groups, business groups
Originally the LEADER programme was intended for Oristano hut the prospective LEADER group 
was unable to obtain a hank guaranty (fideiussione bcincxiria) from the Treasury Ministry. This 
situation was remedied somewhat with a regional law introducing the subsidiary guarantee (qamnzia 
sussidiaraia) of the region.
-l>fl H is interesting to note that since Sardinia and Sicily together constitute one constituency in 
European elections, Sardinia's chances of haring a Euro-MEP are substantially reduced as Sicily has a 
population of over 5 million compared to Sardinia's 1.5 million. There is obviously a strong tendency to 
vote for local candidates as it is difficult to imagine voting for a candidate from another island that is 
also geographically distant.
-'*> Member states stipulated the drawing up of a regional LEADER programme in a communication.
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and other association representatives) and the regional administration did not wish to 
‘overload the procedure’, a consultation partnership was not specifically established.
The regional LEADER programme stipulated that FORMEZ (training and study centre) 
provide training for actors involved in the management of the local action programmes 
and generate awareness among local partnerships (Report April 1997:1-6). A technical- 
administrative commission is responsible for monitoring and is composed of regional 
functionaries. Most LEADER programmes concentrate on rural tourism. The first 
LEADER experience in Nuoro would appear to be a positive one but without detailed 
evaluation, it is difficult to conclude. At the time of writing, LEADER II was still 
operating.
Nuoro Territorial Pact
The only first generation pact in Sardinia was approved in April 1997 in Nuoro and aimed 
at undertaking an articulated plan of investments for business and infrastructure for an 
overall figure of ITL. 53,858.1 million (State’s contribution ITL. 44,371.1 million) with 
198 new jobs in 48 months, before July 2001. The plan was made up of 16 business and 1 
infrastructural projects managed by a limited liability company called Società consortile 
Patto Territoriale della provincia di Nuoro. The idea forza  of the Nuoro Territorial Pact 
is self-centred endogenous development (lo sviluppo endogeno autocentrato) putting 
local entrepreneurs at the forefront of spreading a network of enterprise projects. 
Projects must be coherent with the aspirations and objectives of the Pact and are selected 
on the basis of the complete nature of documentation presented and overall credibility of 
projects. 106 productive projects were presented for a total cost of 769,486 million lire of 
which 20 were selected for a cost of 133,823 million lire. O f this total, public funding 
comes to 75,618 million and private investments are 58,205 million (43.5 per cent of 
total). The average cost per job comes to 276 million for a total forecast of 684 jobs. O f 
the 106 projects presented, 81 were industrial (76.4 per cent), 18 tourism (17 per cent), 4 
real services (3.8 per cent), 2 agricultural (1.9 per cent) and 1 trade (0.9 per cent). Of the 
industrial projects, 21 were agri-food (19.8 per cent), 20 w'ere chemicals, electronics and 
textiles (18.9 per cent), 15 were metal mechanics (14.2 per cent), 13 were building (12.3 
per cent) and 12 were timber industry (11.3 per cent).
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Table 36: Productive projects presented to Pact
Sectors Projects number percentage
Industry (81- Agri-food 21 19.8
76.4%)
Chemicals, 20 18.9
electronics etc. 
Metal mechanics 15 14.2
Building 13 12.3
Timber industry 12 11.3
Tourism 18 17.0
Real Services 4 3-8
Agriculture 2 1.9
Commerce i 0.9
Total 106 100
Source: Nuoro Territorial Pact (November 1996).
The projects approved confirm the “industrial vocation” of the Pact as 19 were industrial 
(95 per cent of total), and 1 was agricultural (5 per cent) (TP, November 1996, 20). O f 
these 7 were agri-food (35 per cent), 5 metal mechanics (25 per cent) and 2 timber 
industry (10 per cent). The remaining 5 are chemicals etc.
Table 37: Productive projects approved for Pact
Scct< >rs Projects number % Investment Average cost per iob
Industn-11' Agri-food-1’ 7 35.O 16,370 188.2
Other010 5 25.O 72.241 161.3
Metal mechanics^1 5 25.O 37,572 308.0
Timber industry-1'* 2 10.0 4736 236.8
Agriculture-1'» 1 5.0 2.904 414.9
Total 20 TOO ' 33.833 ------------------- !25± .
Source: Nuoro Territorial Pact (November 1996). Expressed in million lire.
In evaluating productive projects, the following points were considered:
the managerial capacity of the project proposer (professional profile, 
financial capacity);
the market concerned (degree of integration and control, trends and 
competitive advantages);
the economic nature of the initiative analysed in relation to forecast budgets 
and financial plans developed for seven years.
Projects conforming to the coherence of the Pact were preferred. This meant that some 
projects which would not have been chosen on the basis of economic viability and income
-K Industry had a total of 19 projects approved, amounting to 95 per cent of the total with an average 
cost per job of 130.919 million lire.
-11 Washing and packaging of cereals, eoffee torrcfaction, ham, frozen pasta, packaging, egg selection 
and spivadable cheeses.
Under ‘other’, projects in the energy (1), chemical (1), printing (1). and textiles (2) sectors were 
approved.
J1'; Recycling, plant engineering, light structural work, steel and chroming and flexible tubes.
-* > Collection and treatment of cork oak trees and mineralised timber production.
Hen project.
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generation were selected. However, all projects that did not present adequate elements 
were excluded. The majority of proposals were for enlarging or expanding an existing 
activity (8 proposals - 40 per cent) but the new initiatives (7 - 35 per cent) required the 
most investment (about 66 billion lire). Development proposals numbered 5 (25 per 
cent). Tourism, services and commerce projects failed to be included in the Pact.
Infrastructural projects are selected on the basis of economic cost-benefit analysis and 
coherence with the Pact as well as the viability of proposals especially in relation to 
projects requiring the management of third parties. Moreover, they have to be of tangible 
benefit to productive activities because “the under-development [of Nuoro] appears to be 
related to the dearth of endogenous entrepreneurial initiatives” and thus due to budget 
constraints, the Pact prefers productive initiatives, relegating infrastructural projects to a 
secondaty level o f importance (TP Nuoro, November 1996, 27). Five projects were 
presented by the municipalities of Olzai, Silanus and Bolotana as well as the mountain 
communities 12 (Barbagia-Mandrolisai) and 13 (Sarcidano-Barbagia di Seulo). The latter 
two (a packaging company and a meat plant respectively) were rejected because an 
economic evaluation was impossible and the proposals failed to indicate how the projects 
were to be managed. The other three initiatives216 were approved for a total investment of 
31,185 million lire although documentation was incomplete in some instances (TP Nuoro, 
November 1996). The airport development project was approved as Nuoro’s under­
development is in part attributed to its peripheral position in Italy.
Table 38: Nuoro TP
Interventions Pact Pact Per Private Per
investment finance cent finance cent
Productive 133,823 75,6 i8 78.60 58,205 84.60
Infrastructural 81,185 20,601 21.40 10,584 1540
Total 165,008 96,219 100.00 68,789 100.00
Source: Territorial Pact Nuoro (November, 1996,33). Expressed in million lire.
For productive projects, the private sector provides 43.5 per cent o f the total finance, of 
which 12 per cent will come from credit institutions such as SFIRS. The Pact will be 
implemented over a period of three years. Apart from local development and 
employment the Pact states as its objective the “responsabilizzazione and involvement of
aif’ Olzai - recovering and upgrading historical-tourist-environmental resources over three years with a 
cost of 5 billion lire; Silanus - an equipped artisan area to host 13 enterprises PIP-Silanus (Piani per 
insediamenti produttivi which are directed at municipality size industrial areas) over a period of one 
year with a cost of 985.1 million lire; and Bolotana - airport construction for Central Sardinia over a 
period of 2 years with a total cost of 25,200 million lire. The first two arc entirely financed by the Pact 
and the third has 64 per cent of its finance from the Pact (16,125 million lire).
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public and economic private actors in planning” (1996,VII). Nuoro TP claims to have 
achieved this objective especially since the main protagonists of the Pact were local 
economic actors.
The Pact distinguishes two areas in the Province of Nuoro: Nuoro and Ogliastra.217 The 
public participants of the Pact are five municipalities in Nuoro Province, Nuoro 
Provincial administration, Nuoro Chamber of Commerce and several industrial 
consortia. SF1RS lent an employee to the Chamber of Commerce to help with project 
formulation.218 The private participants are Provincial Industrial Association 
(Associazione Provinciale Industrial0 , Provincial Farmers’ Union {Unione Provinciale 
Agricoltori), Provincial Association o f Business {Associazione Provinciale del 
Commercio), Provincial Artisan Union ( Unione Provinciale Artigianato) and the 
Provincial CNA, as well as CGIL, CISL and UIL trade unions.
The first step of Nuoro TP was the Interest Group Forum (Forum degli interessi) 
established in 1994 which highlighted the function of Pacts as instruments for local 
development. An ‘Agreement Protocol’ (Protocollo dintesa) was signed by CNEL and 
relevant public and private actors in 1995 with the primary local initiative of trade 
unions, Confindustria, API and the Farmers’ Union. The Chamber of Commerce then 
entered the fray as the principal co-ordinator of the initiative. Initially in the first 
Agreement, the area covered by the Pact included Goceano and Alto Oristanese as well as 
the province of Nuoro. Law 123/1995 however clarified that Pacts were to be directed at 
integrated development at a sub-regional level and thus the Pact covers only Nuoro 
Province. Initial funding requests were for 1,123 billion lire, which was scaled down to 
100 billion lire. Nuoro Pact was signed in December 1996. The management company 
outlined a number of elements as critical to the success of the pact, co-ordination and 
integration of projects, maximising the effects of public resources through activating 
private funding, concertazione in industrial relations, use of local credit system, 
simplification and acceleration of administrative procedures, and ways of resolving 
controversies and binding participants to their obligations. CIPE decision (10 May 1995) 
outlined the tasks and characteristics o f the Pact agency:
capacity to represent all Pact participants and interests; 
co-ordination of projects and their direct management;
Trans fuittonji institution Building for Local Dtvthpment Tht Cast ofUimptan Union Cuheswn Potdy in Irtbnd and Sardinia
Ogliastra may become a Province in the near future.
-,fi GEP1 promised to provide risk capital for industrial initiatives (medium and large) and ENISUD 
provided assistance during the planning o f some entrepreneurial initiatives. They will continue to 
provide such assistance for the duration of the Pact.
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promotion of actions and acidities to enhnmv th.' area In mobilising 
necessary professional and entrepreneurial techniques;
ensuring financial resources to advance fund and/or co-finance projects.
Nuoro Pact (entitled, p er  io sviluppo della Sardegna C entrale) implementing agency
became a public company (sociefà consortile per ozioni) on 20 September 1996 with
‘social capital’ of 20 million lire. Its members are Nuoro Chamber of Commerce (to per
cent), Industrial Association of Nuoro (10 per cent), Nuoro Farmers' I ’nion d o  per cent)
and API Sarda of Nuoro Province (10 per cent). The Province complies with the Agency,
and along with the Chamber of Commerce provides organisational and management
resources until CIPE funding becomes available. The Administration Council is headed
by the President o f the Chamber of Commerce and made up of farmers, industrialists and
API representatives. ENISUD» GEPl and SF1RS have all manifested interest in
participating in the Pact. There are nine members including the Province and the three
above-mentioned bodies. In the end, it was decided to keep the Pact Agency slim and it is
made up of the Board of Directors only. Its aims are:
- to promote direct activities for productive and emplovmont development in 
Nuoro Province also through national, regional and FI! funds:
- to promote the understanding of the problems and pros|xvts for the dev elopment 
of the local economy;
- to en ha nee local human resou rees;
- to stimulate local entrepreneurship and attract foreign firms:
- to promote technological innovation and competition;
- to rediscov er and enhance local cultural identity and favour the integrat ion of this 
with industrial culture;
- to promote economic development compatible with local environmental 
resources:
- to supply technical support to local public institutions to unde Hake and promote 
economic dev elopment to support the role of development incubator of the loeal 
authority according to the in novations of law 142/1990:
- to supply integrative advantages with respect to that laid down by national, 
regional and EU regulations through supph of real and financial services to 
SMEs:
- to dev elop the role of the area of Central Sardinia as a pole for a rtisan SM Es;
- to supply adequate real and financial sen ices to business.
These objectives are to be achieved through the setting up o f a Centre of Service 
Intermediation (Centro di intermediazione Servizî) capable of supplying real quality 
services. The sectors that the Pact chose to prioritise are industry, agri-food 
manufacturing and tourism. The Pact also set up a consultative body for the social 
partners apart from the main operative structure.
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Over the period of operation o f the Pact, five private company beneficiaries withdrew“"1 
thus freeing up ITL. 25,685 million o f which ITL. 20,278.4 million was reprogrammed: 
then there were 12 private companies, so-called Pact ‘beneficiaries’ costing the state ITL. 
36,930.1 million. The new employment forecast was 161. The Treasury Ministry has had 
to ‘urge’ the implementing company to be more “punctual and diligent” in delivering its 
six-monthly reports. The latter attributed delays to lack o f  resources, both human and 
economic. Nevertheless, despite the delays in emanating decreti di concessione (from 1 
July 1998 to 19 September 2000) and the fact that the plan was not complete at the time 
of writing, the Corte dei Conti’s report concluded that the project managed to “take o f f  
and the reprogramming of resources demonstrated the local will not to squander the 
energies that the Pact’s approval mobilised. In terms of job creation, 59 jobs were created 
compared with the 161 forecasted (Corte dei Conti 2002).
Transnational Institution Building for Local Dmbtpment The Case of European Union Cohesion Policy in Irvhinrf anti Sardinia
Box 5: Pact Agency Tasks
The Pact Agency set out its tasks as follows:
developing a consultancy and assistance office for different aspects of firm 
activity with particular reference to the development of industrial, artisan and 
manufacturing economic activities as well as tourism and sen ices; 
creating an information and promotion centre for businesses and other 
economic and institutional actors to use available instillments within the 
framework of public regional, national or EU programmes; 
implementing research and development, training, spreading technical and 
scientific knowledge initiatives in order to ensure a better organisation of 
human resources and productive factors;
promoting production services with particular reference to the possibility of 
setting up collective structures for firms (strutture con sortili interaziendali) in 
agri-food and other sectors of the Prorince;
undertaking projects to enhance existing firms and develop new 
entrepreneurial initiatives in new sectors;
promoting services for product standards and improving the quality and 
certification of systems according to UNI-EN 9000 regulations; 
establishing training for introducing new’ technologies and methods for 
imploring quality;
developing co-finanecd investment programmes by public and private actors 
according to the logic of project financing.__________________________
Caffè Devoto, Salumificio Murru A., Nuova Tessiture Mompiano. Sarda Emiflex and Cromotec 
System.
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Table 39:Roles of Pact signatories
S ig n a t o r y F u n c t io n
C h a m b e r  o f  C o m m e r c e p ro v id e s  e c o n o m ic  in fo rm a t io n  on  m a t W t N o n  E l  t e d m ic a l 
re g u la t io n s;
p rov  id e s  su p ix ir t  to  e xp o rte rs;  
a s s is t a n c e  a n d  c o n su lt a n c y  on  qua lity ;
f in a n c ia l s u p p o r t  to  p ro d u c tive  in it ia t ive s  o f  to t iri-t  s e c to r  
(ce rtif ic a tion  o f  qu a lity ).
E m p lo y e r s ’ A s s o c ia t io n p ro v id e s  a ss istance , c o n su lta n c y  and  t ra in in g  d i n  v ie d  at n e w  a n d  
e x is t in g  p ro d u c t iv e  in itiatives.
T r a d e  U n io n s p u r s u e  a co n ce rta tio n  p o lic y  re g a rd in g  w o rk  h o u r s  flex ib ilitv  a n d
w o rk  o rg a n is a t io n  a n d  t ra in in g  w ith  p a rt ic u la r  re fe rence  tr> r e ­
in se rt io n  o f  the lo n g -te rm  u n e m p loyed  in to  the  Lil»>ur m arke t; 
e n s u re  a b e tte r  use  o f  p lan ts;
a d o p t  in c o m e  p o lity  c o n d u c iv e  to b u s in e s s  start-tips m a x im is in g  
e m p lo y m e n t  effects.
P r o v in c e  A d m in i s t r a t io n in  l in e  w ith  law  1 4 2 / 1 9 9 0  p ro v id e s  g u id a n c e  a n d  s u p ra *  
m  u n ici pal i ty rep re sen  tat i< >11; 
b r in g s  p la n n in g  in to  l in e  w ith  Pact; 
s p e e d s  u p  a u th o r is a t io n s  a n d  u p g ra d e  s e n  iu -s; 
p ro m o te s  a n d  a d d re sse s  t ra in in g  c h o ic e s  o f  the  Pact a lo n g  wi t h  
trad e  u n io n s  a n d  e m p lo ye rs .
M u n ic ip a l i t ie s sp e e d  u p  pe rm  its a n d  a u th o r isa t io n s;  
fa v o u r  p ro d u c t iv e  e sta b lish m e n ts.
L o c a l B a n k s  a n d  C r e d it se t  u p  a gu a ra n te e  o r  rotation  fu n d  (F o n d i d i g a ra n / ia  0  d i
A s s o c ia t io n s ro taz ione ).
Source: (TP Nuoro, December 1996).
Although not studied in the aforementioned study commissioned by the DPSC (2003), 
Nuoro TP seems to be an example of a relatively functioning pact. Most certainly in a 
weak economic development area, it attained important results from the point of job 
 ^ creation and anchoring private investment. This is in part due to the period o f
I mobilisation in which an apparently strong institutional leader, the chamber of
| commerce came to the fore and contributed to building tip a substantial partnership
I which in turn led to the underpinning of institutional improvements beneficial to Pact
1
participants. Therefore, the ability of Territorial Pacts to function in contexts rife with 
, institutional problems would seem to be important. This remains a tentative conclusion
! and requires further corroboration.
I
1
P ro g ra m m e a cco rd
In Sardinia, the Accord constitutes the principal instrument for implementing the 
1 Agreement Protocol (p rotocollo  d in tesa )  approved and committed to by the government,
1
region and trade unions on 19 December 1990. It relates to projects in the tri-annual 
programme for the Mezzogiorno and in annual plans that require integrated arid co­
ordinated action of many public agencies (regional, local and state administration) for 
implementation. It is based on the unanimous consensus of actors, legally, the Accord is 
an administrative act with a prescriptive content stipulating direction, co-ordination and
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planning). It simplifies procédural relations among administrations and constrains 
actors to work within the accord. Amato (1992: 56-9) holds that the Accord is limited by 
institutional make up. This is because the promotion of the Accord falls within the 
competence o f the Minister for Extraordinary Interventions in the mezzogiorno who has 
the prerogative of activating the necessary mechanisms. The co-ordination committee is 
a technical organ composed of representatives of participant administrations and chaired 
by the Department of the Mezzogiorno. This committee is responsible for inter- 
institutional co-ordination and monitoring the programme. The programme accord 
specifies the public actors involved, the obligations of each participant, costs, timeframes, 
financing sources, integration among interventions, possible EU funding and ways of 
accessing EU finance as well as the responsible part>' for management of the accord. In 
Sardinia, there is only one Accord among government, region and trade unions to 
industrialise central Sardinia and raise standards in public administration (see Amato 
1992,59).
This section has dealt with national development policy vis-à-vis Sardinia. The following 
section examines the regional administration’s own development policy.
Sardinia regional authorities and local development
In Sardinia as in most of southern Italy, the development model espoused was exogenous 
and dependent on infinite public funds. In fact, spending on public works prevailed over 
spending on industrial incentives. This model raised incomes in the island but in the long 
term led to the region living beyond its means. Moreover, rising incomes meant rising 
imports, which in turn meant decimation of small indigenous producers that could not 
compete with northern imports. The result was dependent development and no 
incentives for entrepreneurial spirited individuals. Industrial poles, the cornerstone of 
Sardinian industrial policy, further exacerbated this situation as the heavy, capital- 
intensive industry did not positively contaminate the Sardinian economy, but had an 
ephemeral hey-day, the decline of which entailed grave consequences for the Sardinian 
economy. In a way, another type of development once again promoted from outside the 
island is tourism. The beaches and sea around Sardinia are famous all over the world but 
surprisingly add very little in terms of income to the Sardinian economy. This is because 
it is essentially controlled, promoted by and thus fills the pockets of non-Sardinians 
resident outside of the island. Sardinian regional authorities developed their own 
instrument for internal development called the Integrated Area Programmes to overcome 
previous deleterious models and it is to them that this chapter now turns.
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Integrated Area Programmes
The Sardinian region devised Integrated Area Programmes (Programmi integrati 
dareaX  which were launched in April 1997 for planning development and occupation in 
the four Sardinian provinces (Cagliari, Nuoro, Sassari and Oristano). Integrated Area 
Programmes operate at two levels, regional and local. The regional one which is made up 
of strategic programmes in productive sectors, infrastructure, the environment and 
services and is compiled by the regional executive (g/unfa) with the collaboration of the 
provinces (regional law 14/1996). The regional council (consiglio) outlines the objectiv es, 
the general means to reach objectives, constraints on methods and priorities in 
formulation and implementation, overall spending as well as criteria to be adopted to 
check results. The regional Department of Planning (Assessorato alla programmazione) 
is responsible for the formulation of the programme with the collaboration of other 
departments, taking account of the opinion of the provincial administrations which also 
express an opinion on the proposal presented to the regional executiv e. Programmes are 
approved by decree of the president of the executive after deliberation with the executive.
Local level Programmes are directed at a municipality or a level higher than that of the 
municipality. The province was allocated the responsibility of promoting co-ordination 
among municipalities, mountain communities (comunità montane), public and private 
actors as well as economic and social forces in order to formulate and co-ordinate the 
Programmes and come up with an integrated provincial programme. It also determines 
resources to be allocated to each Programme. Integrated Area Programmes can also be 
formulated at provincial level or among two or more provinces.
Integrated Area Programmes must contain:
- an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of territory in relation to infrastructure 
both generally and sectorally;
- an analysis of the characteristics and development conditions of the area 
concerned, highlighting the strong and weak points of the local system in which the 
programme operates;
- identification of sectors for intervention, defining the objectives to lie achieved, 
motivating choices and describing characteristics and essential elements. This 
means that although the Regional Development Programme 1996-1998 established 
productive activities aimed at the export market and tourism promotional 
activities as the main foundations of economic development in Sardinia, this does 
not constrain the choice of other sectors;
- interventions directed at local development in productive sectors, infrastructure 
and services;
- interventions must be described and defined and the costs and financial sources as 
well as programme time-frames must be outlined.
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- projects aimed at regional development or inter-pro\incial development are 
excluded from the Programmes as they are already included in the regional 
Programme.
The regional executive approves the Programmes within thirty days of receiving the 
approval of the budget by the regional council. The priorities for selecting Programmes 
are defined according to the following criteria:
- intensity of employment generated in relation to the financing required by the 
programme;
- intensity of co-financing of participants and in particular, that of private funding;
- degree of definition of interventions in relation to the realisation of the 
programme;
- degree of efficiency and effectiveness of the management of works and 
interventions;
- incidence of productive activities on the programme (Article 7 of regional law 
14/1996).
Co-ordinators wrere appointed to implement the Programmes and to stimulate and co­
ordinate projects. Implementation is done through Programme Accords that specify 
financial obligations and commitments assumed by participants as well as funding 
sources. For the Integrated Area Programmes, 200 billion lire for 1996,130 billion for 
1997 and 220 billion for 1998 were made available.
The regional executive set up an evaluation group in the Regional Centre for Planning 
0Centro Régionale di Programmazione) and four groups in each Province to monitor the 
formulation of the Programmes from the initial stages. The Province had all the 
documentation necessary to begin formulating programmes from March 1996. Between 
March and June of the same year the Provinces sent material to be approved to the 
Provincial Council. This material was then sent to the Region for evaluation and 
approval. However, this material was not adequate, according to the evaluators, for 
evaluating the programmes. Essentially, this was because the Department of Planning 
held that the Provinces emphasised “an activity' of re-elaboration of the programmes, 
subsequently assembling and amalgamating them in terms of single projects and 
inte rventions in the context of a vast territorial area” (La valutazione dei PI A). Thus, the 
Region requested further documentation from the Province such as copies of projects 
proposed by the various participants. The information provided was, however, still 
inadequate in relation to the contents and viability of projects. Further information was 
provided in August. The evaluation group evaluated the Programmes proposed in the 
various provinces individually (17 in Cagliari, 6 in Oristano, 25 in Sassari and 16 in 
Nuoro). The following types of projects were rejected out of hand:
- proposals for financing without indication of the implementing agency or manager 
of the intervention. e.g. a proposal for a productive initiative with reference to a 
company which had yet to be established;
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- proposals exclusively relating to financing without investment:
- interventions relating to urban infrastructure (roads, garden*. sewers e:r.). urban 
renewal and infrastructure for productive areas that were not functional to new 
productive activities;
- intenentions without evaluation elements or without analysis or motivation or 
that did not explain the viability or contribution to be made to local development.
The evaluation group reformulated proposals with ‘abnormal’ financial requests on the
regional budget. The Integrated Area Programmes are principally directed at local
development understood as a partnership operation between public and private local
operators. All applicants did not grasp this tenet of the initiative as some applications
consisted of lists of public works such as road building, which falls outside of the realm of
the Programmes. The private sector was absent in many proposals as were references to
effects on or attempts to promote productive activities. Some projects did not specify
time-frames and others were anything but integrated. Duplication was rife among some
proposals which means that the co-ordinating body did not adequately deal with this
issue. Some proposals lacked e* ante evaluations or cost-benefit analyses. Other
proposals did not take into account the specific characteristics of the area or sufficiently
involve local actors (Internal Regional Executive Document, April 199").
16 programmes were approved initially (5 in Nuoro and Cagliari, 2 in Oristano and 4 in 
Sassari) and a co-ordinator was nominated to each programme. A total amount o f 800 
billion lire from public and private sources was made available for the 16 Programmes. 
100 billion was made available by the regional executive ( L ' l ’nione Sarda  20 April 199“ ) 
and 180 billion comes from CIPE.
The Integrated Area programmes attempted to introduce many novel elements into 
programme planning practice in Sardinian sub-regional authorities. Firstly, time frames 
were drastically reduced and explicitly defined. Second, more recourse is made to decrees 
than laws, once again to ensure speedier implementation. Third, they are based on 
partnership and subsidiarity. Fourth, the Province has become the fundamental interface 
in relations with the local level and the regional level. Thus, it has responsibility for 
approving the Programmes submitted by municipalities and co-ordinates the initial 
phases of programme formulation. (This then has to be approved by the region, which in 
the most recent case undid much of the Province's work.) This last innovation largely 
comes from state law 142/1990, which provided for an increased role for the Prov hire in 
development and in relations between the region and the municipality. Fifth, the 
Province ensures the collaboration of economic and social actors (trade unions, 
employers efc.) from the beginning of programme formulation. Sixth, the Region
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established a working group in order to ensure the continuity of relations with initiatives 
as well as technical assistance for programme formulation. The working group is 
integrated by experts from other Departments and regional authorities in relation to the 
professional needs of programme contents. The lack of capacity of the Province as a co­
ordinator and local government in proposing projects emerges quite clearly from the 
experience with PIAs. Thus, some legalistic type reforms appear to be quite sterile if 
responsibility does not match capacity. Nonetheless, the experience also shows the 
Region administration beginning to experiment along the lines of Cohesion Policy 
practices.
Cohesion Policy', Competence and Capacity'
This chapter has illustrated Sardinia’s experiences with development policy on three 
fronts, EU, national and regional during a period of much experimentation and change in 
policy terms, decreasing resources overall and increasing salience for EU Cohesion 
Policy. Although Sardinia is an ‘autonomous’ region, this autonomy has been distorted as 
in policy terms it has been classified as an instrument to request funding from the central 
state (Fadda 1999). Moreover, the bearer of this autonomy -  the Region -  has been 
identified as a sort o f factotum  to satisfy all the needs of citizens. Underpinning all of this 
was the state’s massive intervento straordinario. The end of southern development 
policy forced a general rethink of all the past developmental ‘givens’. However, the 
advent of Cohesion Policy sidelined debates on development objectives and directions 
and pushed them towards discussions on allocation instalments and accessing financial 
means. Furthermore, southern Italy’s tremendous underachievement in Cohesion Policy 
in terms of spending led to a panic contemplation of institutional matters, hence 
experimentation evident at all levels. In Sardinia, the Territorial Pact in Nuoro, while not 
being a substitute for development policy was relatively successful as state legislation 
enabled it to bypass conventional bureaucratic procedures and extremely legalistic 
mores. In fact, all new development instruments seek to shorten infamously long time- 
frames in an attempt to improve performance and eventually rectify the Cohesion Policy 
underspend. Working against this rectification however, are attempts to set up 
meaningful, decentralised partnership development and the allocation of competence 
that this implies -  irrespective of capacity. In order to overcome this lack of capacity 
(affects regions, provinces and local authorities) often pedantic and excessively detailed 
steps and procedures are outlined w'hich are ultimately complicated and stifle innovation 
and more spontaneous efforts. However, capacity not only obtains in relation to 
spending, there is an administrative incapacity to take on elements of programme
Transnational Institution Building for hocal Development: 7 'hr Case ofhnmptan Union Cohesion PolLy in in-Lind and Sardinia
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planning.2*0 Other institutional problems are communication deficits and fragmentation 
between the Regional Planning Centre and other Departments of the Regional 
government (Pischedda 2002), inability to taken on real ex ante evaluations and local 
institutional quagmires leading to delays in implementation (ANAS. Corte dei Conti etc.).
Interestingly, in Italy generally, the regional level seems to be less open to learning than 
the provincial or municipal level and municipal dynamism often contrasts with regional 
immobility (Graziano 2000). Although its effects were slow in emerging, legislation 
introducing the direct election of mayors has been important in making use o f this 
dynamism as it facilitates the emergence of strong political leadership.2-1 However, new 
approaches to development and problem-solving are thwarted by the low cultural level o f 
bureaucratic staff, which in any case spend much time coming to terms with the myriad 
o f new instruments for development and for Cohesion Policy end up “emptying 
wardrobes o f unfulfilled projects” instead of promoting high quality and suitable projects 
(Pili 2002). Another persistent difficulty was that of involving the private sector which is 
reluctant to work with such inefficiencies. Many of these difficulties are not specific to 
Sardinia but dog other Italian regions also -  especially in the south. After a period o f 
extensive experimentation bordering on panic, the central state through the DPSC 
attempted to take the situation in hand in order to improve performance in the 
subsequent programming period 2000 to 2006. It is to this period that the chapter now 
turns.
Hijacking Cohesion Policy for institutional engineering: CSI; 2000-2006
In the first two rounds of Structural Funds, there was a general indifference to the 
formulation o f Cohesion Policy. By contrast in the subsequent period, the Italian 
government came up with a policy document in an attempt to shape policy for the first 
time. In fact, the process of negotiation of the 2000-2006 round began a year before the 
programme began. Furthermore, precise timing and procedures to be respected by all 
institutional actors were laid out. The role of the regions increased notably as ro°o o f 
resources were to be managed by them compared with less than 50% in the 1994-1999 
period. Moreover, the regional executive seems to have been strengthened vis-ft-vis 
regional legislative bodies and the national executive, networks of interests and actors
—11 RAP 100 (network of professional assistance for local development actors) running from 1099 to 
2000 was supposed to improve the capacity of loud actors to engage in dexclopment projivts and 
improve Cohesion Policy performance (Deidda 2001).
-~l Legislation introducing the direct election of the President of the Regional Council (as a sort of 
American-style yoivrnor) in 2000 could lx* propitious also in the future.
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involved in formulation and implementation were opened and party influence on 
decision-making was decreased.
In the new programming period 2000-2006, there are 14 programmes in the CSF,222 7 
regional programmes for the Mezzogiorno regions and 7 sectoral ones dealing with local 
development, transport, research, education, fishing, public safety and technical 
assistance. By contrast with the 1994-99 programming period, these 14 programmes will 
not contain details on development strategies. To use the available funding, they must be 
completed with a new series of documents, programming complements, which will be 
decided at national or regional level and not, as hitherto, negotiated between the EU and 
the state. The same applies to all member states (Dipartimento per le Politiche 
Comunitarie della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 2000).
The three macro-objectives of the CSF are: creating institutional capacity especially in 
territorial administrations of the Mezzogiorno; using attributed programmed resources 
hilly and additionally, not in substitution and; undertaking projects that fully respond to 
qualitative objectives and analyses undertaken with significant indicators. What is most 
notable about the current CSF is the use of sanctions and rewards. In relation to the 
former, they will apply to those who fail to plan 60% o f resources by December 2002 and 
10O/0 by the end of 2003.
The cornerstone of the new policy to bolster adaptation to EU Cohesion Policy builds on 
rewards, that is, the so-called ‘4 per cent performance reserve’ spearheaded by the 
European Commission to be awarded at mid-term to those who satisfy 6 out of 8 of the 
effectiveness, management and financial management criteria laid out (see Box 6).
--- The CSF for Objective one regions was approved in August 2000 by the Eumpean Commission.
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Box 6 :4% Performance reserve mid-term CSF 2000-2006
1. The effectiveness criterion is the basket of outputs calculated by comparing 
actual and planned outputs for measures covering at least half of the\aluc of the 
programme.
The management criteria arc:
2. quality o f  the m onitoring system  - introduction of a system of indicators and 
monitoring procedures that respond to national standards and guarantee the 
availability of financial, physical and procedural data from January 2001;
3. quality o f  financial control - upgrading the control system to the model 
proposed in the CSF;
4. quality o f  project selection systems - application of selected procedures 
based on feasibility studies and criteria fostering environmental sustainability 
and equal opportunities;
5. quality  o f  evaluation systems - appointment of the independent evaluator by 
October 2001 and the definition in terms of reference responding to national
standards;
6. quality o f  lab o u r m arket analysis system - setting up within the managing 
authority of a system of analysis of the most significant aspects of lahour market 
and employment effects of interventions and dissemination of results.
The financial management criteria are:
7. financial absorption - attainment of 100% of declared expenditure in relation 
to planned expenditure in the financial plan 2000 and 2001;
8. public-private partnership - implementation of at least 4 public-private
______partnership schemes for the financing of projects.______________________
The idea behind this is to upgrade public investment and administrative standards. The 
current CSF 2000-2006 sees 80% of funding earmarked to the south and the Treasury' 
acts as co-ordinating and managing authority. What Radaelli (2000,17) calls the general 
demand for ‘new Maastrichts\ that is, employment of external/European constraints to 
push through reform, led the DPSC to hijack the performance carrot, adding a further 6 
per cent reserve to be awarded according to criteria defined by itself to improve 
institutional capacity -  a real attempt at institutional design. The 6 per cent reserve has 
different indicators of institutional enhancement (10 indicators with 3.5 score each2--1), 
integration (1 indicator with score of 15) and concentration (i indicator with score of 10).
22-, means that for each of the 10 institutional enhancement indicators satisfied, regions obtain 
0.35% of their initial budget allocation. If they satisfy- all 10. then they obtain 3.5% and so on.
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Table 4 0 :6% R esene Performance criteria
Aim C riteria Indicators
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1
implementing national legislation 
fostering the process o f public 
administration reform and procedural 
simplification
delegation of managerial responsibilities to officials 
(digs 29/1993),
establishment and implementation of an internal 
control management unit (art. 4 digs 286/1999), 
implementation of one-stop-shop for scniccs. 
implementation of employment sen ices
design and implementation o f 
organisational and administrative 
innovation to accelerate and make 
effective structural fund spending
setting up regional and central administration 
evaluation units (art. 1 L 144/1999) 
developing the information society in public 
administration
earning out measures aimed at the 
ini piemen tat ion of sector reforms
preparation and approval of territorial and
landscape programming documents;
concession or management hv a private-public
operation of integrated water sen1ices;
choice of management mode and its
implementation for urban solid waste within
optimal service areas;
establishment and operational performance of 
regional cmimn mental agencies
In
te
gr
at
io
n
PO
R
implementation of territorial 
integrated projects (PITs) incidence of commitments of integrated territorial 
projects on the total amount of resources budgeted 
for integrated territorial projects in the operational 
programme
g
Ï3
! ? z  
% 0~  b,
degree o f integration o f national 
operational programmes with 
regional planning
share of commitments of investments program med 
within a programme framework agreement 
(accorda di programma quadra) or any negotiated 
agreement between central and regional 
administrations over total commitments
M
u
Ö c
concentration of financial resources concentration of financial resources within a 
limited amount of measures
Source: Ministero delfEconomia e delle Finance 2002:15).
It also differs in that it rewards attaining an exogenously set benchmark common to all 
programmes rather than awarding the attainment o f declared performance. Moreover, 
single portions can be awarded for any single benchmark (as opposed to an overall score) 
as attainment of each target can contribute to improving the planning process and 
implementation. Access to single portions and affordable benchmarks benefit public 
administration (Anseimo & Raimondo 2002,6). Regional administrations can extend the 
system to local governments and build internal incentives where they are directly 
involved (integration, concentration, one-stop shop and water and waste). This incentive 
system (both the 4% and the 6%) was put in place a year before the approval of the 
current CSF and so plenty of time was had to enact the necessary changes. It contributed 
to reducing uncertainty characterising dialogue between different levels of government, 
reduced the risk of renegotiating rules and pressure to change rules, and encouraged
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administrations to assume responsibility for objectives and targets. Credibility was gi\en 
by the European Commission and the feedback system ensured that effects were had on 
implementation and programming. The mid-term evaluation was the milestone for 
assessing how the reward system functioned.
Mid-term evaluation POR and PON
In the mid-term evaluation (Ministero deU’Economia e delle Fmnnze March 2003: 9-11), 
Sardinia’s Regional Operational Programme (POR) was deemed to have had an overall 
“good performance” notwithstanding some critical points (cn/fciVd) due to the lack of 
human resources, complexity and duration of some procedures, inability to launch a 
considerable number of measures and concentration of spending relative to FF.OGA and 
the ESF on a few measures. In order to improve the situation, the mid-term review 
continues, the Sardinian region must reinforce the Centro Regionaledi Programmaz¡one 
and provide technical assistance to local authorities especially in the implementation of 
PITs.*2* In July 2003, the entire measure for new business was blocked and there was no 
assistance for businesses interested in the PITs.
In relation to the National Operational Programme on Local Development, some 
mismatch was found between programming and implementation because of the difficult 
system of communication between programming and management. This in turn can be 
attributed to the fact that implementation was left to traditional methods due to the need 
to start spending quickly. While the POR is implemented in 10 different ways, PON is 
implemented along the lines laid dowm by regional law 15 1994. Sardinia’s ‘structural 
problems’ are said to compromise the part of the local development plan dedicated to 
Tourism. It was found that where the Management authority is weak vi.s-.Vvis 
departments o f agriculture, implementation is problematic. Co-ordination is furthermore 
said to be lacking between the management authority and the fund authority. This ‘weak 
governance’ obtains because the regional organisation is aggravated by conflictual 
relations with the regional development agency responsible for implementing some 
measures. The evaluation concluded that serious re-programming could be in the offing 
if  measures are not taken.
I
---* The CSF introduced Integrated Territorial Programmes ils a new means of ensuring integrated 
programming. A PIT is essentially a unitary project articulated in a series i>f in tenon mvtul projects 
aimed at achieving one or more objectives of the CSF. It is territory-spu ilje in terms of mills and 
potential and is essentially a way to implement the CSF. In Sardinia with the current CSF, there an* to 
PITs (13 territorial covering SM'NS of municipal administrations ami 68.8'V of the pi ipul.it ion) (I'VAL 
2003).
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Sardinia’s institutional performance
Sardinia only satisfied one of the 10 institutional enhancement criteria, that is, 
establishment and operation of evaluation units and its performance, as can be seen in 
Figure 18 was the worst of the regions concerned.
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Fig 18: Institutional Performance in the Mezzogiorno -  6% reserve
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Table 41: The outcome for the 6% performance reserve (million euro)
Institutional performance Territorial integration Concentration Total
Basilicata 26,53 6.06 7,58 40,17
Puglia 75,42 0 26,94 102,36
Sicily 110,24 0 23,62 133.86
Campania 8i ,97 58,55 23,42 163.94
Calabria 21,37 0 12.21 33.58
Sardinia 6,95 15,89 11,9» 34 ,76
Total 322,48 80,5 105,69 508,67
Conclusion
Radaelli (2000b, 20) holds that the Europeanisation of the Italian state is embedded in 
its institutions hence it cannot be characterised as mere temporary adaptation (in the 
inertia, adaptation, transformation, retrenchment continuum Radaelli 2000a), as the 
policy-level effects of Europeanisation may produce major institutional change. From the 
time of the IMPs it is clear that Italy has been unable to come up with “simple coping 
strategies or mechanisms” for European Cohesion Policy. That is not to say that it did not 
tr>f. Its attempts floundered however, as it continued to register abysmal performance. At 
a national level during the 2000-2006 period of programming, it is reasonable to assert 
that Italy's adaptation is akin to (deliberate) transformation characterised by the 
employing of Cohesion Policy to improve institutional performance. By contrast,
202
Sttù+t 1,'ƒ i . k f  ** f  J, ttré-nsi J in  It i *«•* t* 1 m*;t>
although Sardinia has registered some change, it cannot be called transformation as it 
still has not come to terms with Cohesion Policy in its modus operandi The reasons for 
this are manifold. First, no institutional leader has emerged at a regional le\el to adopt 
Cohesion Policy and link its success to it. The Regional Centre of Planning would have 
been a likely candidate for regional leadership but it carries too little political clout and 
lacks leadership capacities. Moreover, no strong advocacy coalition has come to the fore. 
But leadership was also slow to emerge at a national level. Distance from locus of 
decision-making makes understanding more difficult. In fact, what happened bears out 
the fact that change had to permeate national institutions before reaching regional ones 
and delays with the former led to delays with the latter. Second, institutional 
fragmentation is rife among the different institutional levels and therefore innovation is 
difficult to engender. Too many actors operate and there is a general lack of co­
ordination. Third, the action capacity and competence of formal institutions as a system 
is grossly inefficient and the quality of administrative personnel in local institutions is 
slack. Ginsborg (2001:239) points to the “intensely inward-looking* ruling class and the 
“nature and failings” of public administration as explanations for Italian performance 
vis-à-vis Cohesion Policy. This bears out for Sardinia too. Moreover, partnership is 
difficult because of institutional culture and informal institutions which are characterised 
by conflict rather than co-operation. Fourth, excessive legalism has constituted a severe 
brunt on attempts to adapt to Cohesion Policy and creativity. Chapter 7 considers some 
possible explanatory mechanisms for Sardinia’s poor ability to adjust to Cohesion Policy.
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S e c tio n  IV 
Co m p a r a t iv i: V iews
Chapter 7
Comparative Analysis: Explaining Institutional Change
Introduction
“There are no simple generalisations to be made about the mechanics of 
member states’ adjustment to Europeanisation, given the mediating factors 
influencing outcomes" (Schmidt 2001:13).
This chapter accounts for the differing adjustment to Européanisation in the case- 
studies, Ireland and Sardinia. In other words, it endeavours to clarify the variation in 
outcom e of the European Commission's institution building. Tlu* experience of the two 
cases is comparatively presented and the main hypothesis is discussed: where there is a 
low  formal institutional density at local level, institutions are more readily built- This can 
in turn lead to institutional change in other spheres through permeability. By contrast, 
where there is a high formal institutional density at a local level, institutions are difficult 
to  build and institutional change is thus more complex. The experience of the two cases 
with the two rounds of the Structural Funds will be compared and contrasted in order to 
garner a greater understanding of the different kinds of misfit and adaptation strategies. 
Crucial to adaptation strategies is the issue of salience. The domestic impact of Cohesion 
Policy is then discussed in relation to policy and institutions and the European 
Com m ission’s capacity to influence institutions, or indeed build institutions, will be 
exam ined. It is to adaptational pressure that the chapter now turns.
Misfit, Practical Discordance and Pressures for Change: the First Round of 
Structural Funds 1989-93
The situation in our case-studies before the advent of Cohesion Policy implementation is 
rather similar with regard to some aspects. Firstly, Ireland has long been characterised by 
excessive centralisation with no regional authorities, an inept and ineffectual local 
government system and no local development structures. Although régionalise»! in the 
1970s, Italy too was characterised by significant centralisation, and in turn, within
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Sardinia, its regional government had largely been characterised by centralisation since 
its inception in the post-war constitution. This led to significant difficulties in developing 
the sub-national or sub-regional level o f development as envisaged by the European 
Commission. However, in a way, the advent of Cohesion Policy (and in the case of 
Ireland, the Common Agricultural Policy) bolstered centralised ‘traditions* and discourse 
in the name of increased efficiency and the need to tap resources effectively, when, in the 
years immediately preceding Cohesion Policy internally, policy thinking and formulation 
had been moving away from centralisation. Policy took a significant U-turn in Ireland 
with central decisions to first, designate the entire Republic as one region for the purpose 
of Structural Funding, and second, to wholeheartedly and uncritically embrace the 
centralised ethos crucial to c a p  implementation, on accession to the k e t .  In Sardinia, 
local development had been a policy consideration since the 1950s but the region’s 
autonomia was unable to withstand the State-imposed petro-chemical mono-culture and 
so national industrial policy was responsible for a U-turn. Thus, from the point of view of 
development discourse and policy orientation, significant fit can be observed between the 
European Commission and our case-studies prior to the onset o f policy U turns.
The period prior to Cohesion Policy implementation cannot be taken in isolation from 
the initial one of Cohesion Policy implementation if the degree of fit and policy 
performance is to be adequately determined, as its development model only really took 
shape after the first reform of the Structural Funds in the late 1980s. Heretofore, it is 
difficult to argue that it constituted a policy at all. The case-studies began to take on 
different paths in this first period of Cohesion Policy implementation. Firstly, the ‘state’ 
status of Ireland, as well as its centralised overtones, can be seen to give it significant 
advantages in terms of ability to adapt, while Sardinia’s previous experience with 
development policies, namely the bounteous Revival Plans, which were articulated in a 
similar fashion to Cohesion Policy, while seemingly providing an advantage in terms of 
fit, proved to be a hindrance in terms o f adaptation. This is because, while its multi-tiered 
structure and several paying funds mirrored those o f Cohesion Policy, the inability to 
programme a fixed amount of resources over a fixed period of time in the ambit of a clear 
development plan, constituted a major break from the strict programmatic guidelines, 
and more especially, the deadlines imposed by Cohesion Policy by which resources had to 
be committed and spent Thus, Ireland’s main element of misfit, that is, a largely 
centralised administration of Cohesion Policy, while mildly berated by the European 
Commission, also constituted its strength in terms of fund performance as a central, 
potent administration was quick to enact the necessary changes for Cohesion Policy and 
was nimble in its management of Structural Fund spending. By contrast, Sardinia’s status
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as a region, and consequent ‘estrangement’ from the locus of decision-making, coupled 
with the availability of massive amounts of national funding from the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo, meant that in the initial years, local actors had very limited understanding 
of Cohesion Policy and had no real stimulus to excel in spending. Experience with the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, the precursor to the 1988 reform, is emblematic 
of the fundamental lack of comprehension at regional decision-making level of what the 
developmental policy entailed.
Without a doubt, the ability to adapt at this stage was largely conditioned by the salience
of Cohesion Policy in the case-studies. In Ireland, a country with a lot of catching up with
the rest of Europe to do in terms of development, the Structural Funds became
immediately salient and consequently significant political and bureaucratic energy was
dedicated to becoming experts at ‘drawing down1 funds, adapting spending needs and
meeting deadlines. In fact, Irish decision-makers were quick to define State preferences
and interests in relation to Cohesion Policy, as catching up with the rest of Europe in
economic terms became a policy priority. Moreover, access to unprecedented and
considerable development binding provided the means to achieve this policy priority. As
Laffan (2000: 133; 2001) outlines, Irish policy style is "consensual, collegial and
pragmatic” and directed to vital policy areas like the Structural Funds.2-'! This style
"owes much to the intimacy of the senior echelons of the Irish civil service and 
the ease of personal contact. Interests can be identified and aggregated with 
relative ease” (Laffan 2000:133).
Structural Fund salience is also behind the State's eagerness to keep a tight rein on 
spending as there were lots of political gains to he had, for example, from the ability to 
bring a new' kit road to political constituencies. This meant that easy spending routes 
were chosen w'hen formulating development plans and any territorial operational 
programmes were studiously avoided in favour of sectoral ones. Thus, any local 
development dimension was forsaken. Due to the availability of other copious funds in 
Sardinia. Cohesion Policy was slow to acquire salience. W’hen it did, no such 
centralisation of Structural Funds administration ensued and in fact, Cohesion Policy got 
bogged down in the national and regional bureaucratic quagmire. For instance, any 
action to adapt to Cohesion Policy and facilitate performance required a law to be 
approved and these were inevitably subjected to delays. In fact, delays in activating 
national law's slowed down any proactive initiative regionally, as did the legal 
pernicketiness of central state organs like the Coite dei Conti. Even setting up
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administrative committees proved to be arduous. This kind o f bureaucratic misfit was 
avoided in Ireland by keeping close central control of Structural Funding and issuing 
restrictive guidelines when working with sub-national authorities. In fact, the 
partnership principle was significantly diluted so that the central government could 
dictate who was to be involved and in what capacity. Sardinia's misfit was only 
exacerbated by the involvement of too many actors with little capacity or competence, 
and the widespread Italian administrative concentration on procedures as opposed to 
actual performance.
How' can the outcomes of Europeanisation be characterised in our cases at this initial 
stage, that is, after the first round of the Structural Funds? The outcome in Ireland is 
clearly absorption as Cohesion Policy was ably accommodated without significant 
change. Although Cohesion Policy did not have a very' good ‘fit’ with national policy 
legacies, preferences were conditioned by economic backwardness and a wish to draw 
down resources, and relevant institutions were well capable of adaptation. Policy legacies 
and preferences were maintained at virtually no cost at all in the short term, and neither 
politics nor economics were at issue. The outcome in Sardinia, by contrast, can be 
characterised as inertia as actors resisted change because of weak economic pressures to 
change. Moreover, there was a certain degree o f ‘fit* in terms of long-standing policies 
and policymaking institutions, that is to say, at a descriptive level concerning regional 
and local level institutions, multi-tiered and multi-fund development. However, misfit 
obtained in practice, during implementation. There w'as little capacity to negotiate or 
impose change, and/or no adequate incentive that could persuade of the necessity and 
appropriateness of change. Thus, policy legacies and preferences were maintained at the 
price of adjustment. Looking at the situation from a programmatic perspective, misfit 
was rife in both cases during this period. In Ireland, elements o f misfit included a lack of 
data due to the arbitrary' use of boundaries for development, a lack of data collection 
systems essential for monitoring, no spatial development, no co-ordination, and 
elements such as monitoring and evaluation were not up to standard. However, since the 
drive to meet spending targets took precedence over all other considerations, Ireland was 
considered a good performer. In Sardinia, by contrast, programmatic foibles such as not 
enough projects, fragmentation of measures, technical difficulties with monitoring, 
programmatic incomprehension and lack of co-ordination were not overruled by 
commendable spending performances, but further scuppered by the heretofore 
mentioned obsession with procedure as opposed to performance. In other words, 
Ireland’s institutional capabilities enabled it to nimbly avoid sluggish procedures 
inherent in Cohesion Policy and tailor plans and projects to suit easy spending. In
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Sardinia, on the other hand, institutional incapability to come to terms with Cohesion 
Policy procedures in its plans, jettisoned spending. Moreover, attempts to extend 
partnership and involve actors led to the identification of the inclusion of too many, and 
often weak actors, as a programmatic weakness.
So although Ireland was able to absorb Europeanisation and adapt without too much 
institutional overhaul, it did not completely avoid the issue of institutional change being 
(covertly or not) pushed by the European Commission in this period. On the contrary, it 
engaged in parallel experimentation with new structures for local development separate 
from local government. Institutional high-handedness in Ireland, which enabled it to 
successfully adapt to Cohesion Policy and at the same time experiment new institutional 
forms in order to be able to continue to operate successfully in this field, was facilitated 
by the early emergence of a central leadership at the Department of the Taoiseach with 
significant capacity to move the players on the board, and at the same time determine at 
a European level how they should be moved. An institutional vacuum at a sub-national 
level further bolstered this leadership ability to make changes that suited it such as state 
dictated partnership, for example. Moreover, this leadership could rely on an advocacy 
coalition nationally (made up of the e sr i -  a renowned and well-respected think tank). 
No similar leadership emerged in Sardinia at a regional level226 and indeed it took a long 
time to emerge nationally in Italy and to alter the knee-jerk reaction to Brussels policy 
characteristic of its institutions until the 1990s. This is because the Structural Funds were 
slow to acquire salience. In any case, it did not emerge in Sardinia because the regional 
level was too far removed from eu policy-making to be able to easily generate regional 
‘cognoscenti* and even if it had, it would still have been difficult to generate changes so 
expeditiously and painlessly. Any even minor institutional changes, such as establishing a 
single administrative committee for all eu programmes, were brought about laboriously 
and over a long time-frame. Nevertheless, this and other changes such as the 
introduction of a procedure whereby budget changes do not require laws, certainly 
proved significant for the second stage of Cohesion Policy implementation. In fact, some 
policy learning, albeit not altogether painless, was underway in Sardinia with some tough 
lessons on the seriousness of temporal constraints -  heretofore not at all an issue with 
the Revival Plans the real meaning of integrated programming as opposed to periodic 
ad hoc programmatic changes and the importance of having instruments that match 
objectives so as not to slip from initial aims in implementation.
The Regional Planning Centre of the Planning Department of the Region attempted to provide
le a d e r s h ip  r e g io n a l ly  h u t  lu cked  n e c e s sa ry  p o l it ic a l  c lou t.
Europeanisation and Change: From the Second to the Third Round of the 
Structural Funds
The above-described outcomes did not remain static, however. During the period from 
the second round o f the Structural Funds to the third, the outcome of Europeanisation in 
Ireland was something akin to transformation. Changes have occurred that reversed 
policy legacies and went against traditional policy preferences. In order for this outcome 
to obtain, economic vulnerability and significant political institutional capacity played an 
important part. The price of adjustment was the end of policy legacies and preferences. 
This can be likened to a paradigm shift and likely conditions for a paradigm shift are the 
accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures 
causing a shift in the locus of authority over policy and a wider contest between 
competing paradigms. In Sardinia the outcome of Europeanisation continues to be 
inertia despite continuous conscious attempts, on the part of the Italian government to 
bring about transformation. Inertia is the outcome despite significant economic 
pressures to change heightened by the end o f the so-called intervento straordinario, the 
abundant state funding for the south, theoretical ‘fit’ in terms o f policy preferences and 
(theoretical) legacies, as well as the apparent will to change on the part of actors. In fact, 
the real obstacle to transformation would appear to be the diminutive capacity for 
negotiating or imposing change even though the need to change is apparently obvious to 
all.
The difference is fundamental. Whereas, in Ireland wily decision-makers attempted to 
keep change at bay by making minor adjustments to accommodate Cohesion Policy and 
optimise spending, both Italian central and Sardinia decision-makers attempted to 
consciously alter the institutional context in order to conform to Cohesion Policy. 
Centralisation of clout and an institutional vacuum locally, worked in Ireland’s favour as 
it was able to bring about any kind o f changes that suited its strategy, however specious 
they may have seemed. This led to a period of creative experimentation that generated 
many interesting results. In Italy local institutional quagmires made any novelties or 
creative exploits impossible, or at least very slow to enact due to the undoubtedly gradual 
nature of institutional change. In Ireland, even mere comprehension of Cohesion Policy 
was facilitated initially by proximity to the European Commission whereas Sardinia was 
far removed. Moreover, a political culture characterised by the lack of formality' in 
communication in Ireland contrasts with an extremely formal political culture 
characterised by a plethora of unspoken rules and protocols conditioning communication
i runs national Institution Building forhocal Development The Case of Humpean Union Cohesion Policy in Ireland and Sardinia
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in Italy.227 On top o f institutional differences, yet (at least partially) contingent on them, 
is the question of policy leadership and advocacy'. The emergence of a strong policy 
leadership in the Taoiseach’s office in Ireland led to confident innovations in policy' 
implementation and experimentation. Obviously such a high office was well placed to 
anticipate, influence and understand policy emanations from Brussels, which further 
garnered its authority. Moreover, it swiftly surrounded itself with other, new policy actors 
(some NGOs), thus generating policy networks which again bolstered its leadership. In 
Italy, such central level leadership did not emerge in the Cohesion Policy field until the 
late 1990s due to, first the breakdown of the political system subsequent to tangentopoli 
and second, when such a leadership did emerge it was in response to the hazards of being 
excluded from the imminent Euro-zone and was therefore characterised by an obsession 
with meeting the Maastricht criteria. Once the danger of being excluded from EMU 
dissipated, this leadership did turn its hand to Cohesion Policy matters and eventually, to 
policy innovation and attempts to negotiate and impose change228 (using reserve 
funding) came about, but only in this current phase of Structural Funding. The effects of 
these innovations and strategies to enact institutional change however, are slow to come 
about as institutional change is gradual, and that is why, even after the review of 
performance according to criteria laid down by the Italian government, Sardinia fares the 
worst of the six regions of the Mezzogiorno as it satisfied only one of the 10 institutional 
enhancement criteria. Also in implementing the Regional Operational Programme, the 
European Commission found that the region still needed to reinforce central leadership 
in the Centro Regionale di Programmazione and provide technical assistance to local 
authorities who continue to be out of their depth due to their low capacity'. Change in 
Ireland was not so deliberate or conscious. On the contrary, it was precisely the canny 
adaptation strategies that brought about solutions that worked and permeated other 
institutions and policy sectors. Even the kind of experimentation adopted in Ireland 
proved to be more conducive to institutional learning compared with the period of 
institutional panic in Italy, in which conscious attempts at adaptation concentrated on 
laying down cumbersome procedures and may actually have hindered spending capacity 
(Hine 2003). Ireland has been performance-oriented from the veiy beginning, whereas 
Italy and Sardinia continue to get bogged down in procedures. Streamlined 
administrative procedures along with an early successful adoption of monitoring and 2
2-~ At u conference in Louvain in March 2004, administrators involved in El* Structural Funds 
mentioned their frequent informal contacts with desk officers as one of their conditions for success. 
Moreover, English as a native language has facilitated Irish communication with the European 
Commission. Knowledge of foreign languages is poor in Italy generally so Italian administrators are 
often compelled to speak with other Italian nationals, thus limiting communication.
Central level changes include the NUVAL monitoring and evaluations system. Locally, in Sardinia a 
new programme intent on improving public administration, RAP100 was set up.
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evaluation techniques certainly enabled Ireland to be dextrous in its spending 
techniques, moving commitments from areas likely to under-spend, allocating funds to 
areas that can be implemented easily and quickly, and having projects in reserve. Taking 
these kind of decisions in Sardinia is much more arduous as its experience of getting 
stuck in the conundrums of its own programmatic decisions in both the 1989-1993 and 
1994-1999 c s f s , demonstrate.
Domestic Policy' Impact of Cohesion Policy
An important factor determining the domestic impact of Cohesion Policy or other 
European policies is official attitudes to the European Union. The case-studies differ 
considerably in this regard. First, Irish decision makers quickly embraced the EC and 
endeavoured not only to fulfil criteria and participate, as in the European Monetary 
System in 1979, they also endeavoured to influence and be a leading part of integration, 
as in the Dooge Committee2^  on the Single European Act (O’Donnell 2000:175). Second, 
Irish policy makers were quick to befriend the European Commission and acknowledge 
its importance in the early phases of the policy process (Laffan 2000:133). They 
established good working relationships with directorate generals and became shrewd at 
the kind of horse-trading that characterises policy deals. Italian decision makers, by 
contrast, were intensely inward-looking and European issues were “nearly always 
demoted by the Italian political class to a secondary place” (Ginsborg 2001:239). The 
experience of the first Italian president of the European Commission is illustrative: he 
served the minimum term and nobody could be found to replace him in Italy. In the end, 
Italy surrendered the Presidency.^0 Moreover, Italian representatives were never the 
most ambitious as “Brussels was considered a sort of exile from the delicious intrigues 
and power-brokering” of the Italian parliament (Ginsborg 2001:240). Secondly, the 
Italian national interest vis-à-vis the Structural Funds, for example, was never explicitly 
defined or prioritised and the failings of public administration ensured that performance 
lagged. In latter years, Italy was to become quite ‘pro-European’ but its approach 
remained reactive, uncritical and was not famed for excellence in implementation. 
Ireland’s approach has matured, thanks also to prosperity, and has remained largely pro- 
European. The difference is that Italy sees the EU as a deiis ex macchina and a functional 
‘external constraint’ to finally bring about much needed reforms, whereas Ireland 
continues to have a performance-oriented approach to policy implementation.
Jim Dooge, an Irishman, chaired the historic committee.
Franco Maria Malfatti resigned in 1972 from the Presidency (see Ginslx>rg 2001:240).
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In terms of ideas and discourse, Cohesion Policy has had a significant impact in Ireland 
and Sardinia. Policies have completely changed during the implementation of Cohesion 
Policy from the 1980s to this current programming period. However, as illustrated in the 
two empirical sections (II and III), much of Cohesion Policy’s tenets on territorial 
development and inclusion of sub-national and other social actors was already evident in 
policy thinking and discourse in the run up Cohesion becoming an Kir policy'. They 
remained theoretical and rhetorical however, as they found no real place in practical 
terms. Nonetheless, over the years of Cohesion Policy', these notions gradually found 
practical implementation, nudged on by the conditions inherent in Cohesion Policy' as set 
out and verified by the European Commission. Cohesion Policy' discourse has been totally 
and virtually uncritically absorbed in the two case-studies as the financial incentives it 
provides prove quite convincing. Irish policy outlooks no longer uniquely look to 
development differences between it and the rest of the ku, but now pay homage to 
internal differences in development and ‘territorial disparities’ that were inconceivable 
hitherto. Undoubtedly, this enlightenment has been facilitated by Ireland’s new-found 
prosperity'.
In terms of policy content, significant effects can be evinced in Ireland and Sardinia over 
the last twenty years or so. In the first place, Cohesion Policy has led to significant policy 
innovation and emulation: policy experimentation and blatant policy imitation took place 
in both cases. The results differed, however, mainly because experimentation was 
procedure-obsessed in Italy, taking little account of institutional capacity, and emulation 
is “not less difficult than autarchic decision-making” (Giuliani 2000:66). In relation to 
substantive content, impact is high. For example, Ireland’s current development policy is 
dotted with unprecedented territorial and spatial concerns such as the National Spatial 
Strategy and the regional operational programmes, as well as numerous local 
development agencies. Indeed, during the 1994-1999 programming period the 
Operational Programme on Local, Urban and Rural Development marked a starting 
point in this direction. Dividing the country into two different regions to beat the system, 
that is, to avoid the entire country being classified as Objective 1 in transition, 
contrivance though it may be, led to two large regional operational programmes that are, 
in fact, agglomerations of the sub-regional programmes. Much funding is still being 
spent on roads,211 however, but the situation has come a long way from when roads 
seemed to be the answer to Ireland’s development problems. Sardinia’s policies have
—1 The rsRi have questioned spending on roads due to inadequate cost-benefit analysis in the mid­
term reriew of the 2000-2006 programming period, without howvvcr. undermining the importance of
infrastructure.
213
Transnational Institution Building for Local Development The Case of Huntpean Union Coheswn Policy in livlind and Sardinia
always been territorially inclined and continue to be thus. However, policy content is very 
much influenced by easy spending routes, as it is in Ireland. In fact, the concentration on 
training spending in Ireland in the last round o f the Structural Funds and in Sardinia in 
this current round, is due to the benefits of total financing by the e s f  and the relatively 
easy way training courses can be activated. In fact, from the concentration on training 
spending, it would seem that Sardinia’s development problems are primarily to do with 
the under-trained labour force.232
For obvious reasons, Cohesion Policy has led to a significant increase in resources in 
Ireland, as before no such munificence existed. Undoubtedly such munificence facilitated 
a clear definition o f interests and consequent pursuance of those interests vis-à-vis the 
Structural Funds. In Sardinia, initially resources were not increased as such since the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was fairly bounteous. However, in Sardinia too, Cohesion 
Policy made a significant impact on available resources when the intervento 
straordinario concluded. In both case-studies, to differing extents, Cohesion Policy 
resources encouraged activating private resources in forms of public-private partnership.
Cohesion Policy has significantly opened up the decision-making process in Ireland as a 
whole plethora of previously excluded actors are now a part of the policy process. This 
has happened without any fragmentation and with successful results in terms o f 
individual Operational Programme Monitoring Committees, for example.233 Moreover, 
policy-makers have become increasingly sophisticated (Finnegan 2001:188). In Sardinia, 
it has led to simplifying many procedures and making decision-making processes less 
toilsome. Here too, processes have become more open but allowing access to “weak” (or 
less euphemistically, incapable) actors has generated problems of its own. In Italy 
generally, as Giuliani (2000:65-7) illustrates, Europeanisation has tended to render 
actors more open to European processes and has led to the formation of epistemic 
communities that may in time shape institutions.
Table 42: Europeanisation: Degree o f Impact
Policy elements Ireland Sardinia
Ideas/discourse HIGH HIGH
Content HIGH HIGH
I nst ru m e nts / resoti rces HIGH HIGH
Decision-making processes HIGH HIGH
-■ '* They are not.
The e s r ] has found in its 2000-2006 mid-term review that each Operational Programme has its 
own monitoring committee of public sen  ants. European Commission representatives and outside 
interests, thus contributing to a successful outcome.
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Ireland readily adapted to Cohesion Policy by designing programmes primarily to draw 
down copious funds. The National Development Plan was taken as an overall Master Plan 
with multi-annual budgeting for capital purposes leading to a more efficient deliver)7 of 
investment and higher rates of return. Moreover, evaluation procedures altered the way 
in which administrations approach public expenditure. For Italy, and more especially 
Sardinia, it was not so simple. First, its attempts to adapt came later than in Ireland and 
although it always sought a Master Plan to encompass all development efforts, it only 
found it in the last round of the Structural Funds -  2000-2006. Second, a dense 
institutional environment made adaptation more laborious, and this was further 
compounded by the lack of policy leadership and serious co-ordination problems at all 
levels. The main impact that Cohesion Policy had in Sardinia and Italy more generally, 
was highlighting the urgent need for reform of the public sector. Moreover, it was also 
used to engineer institutional change*« and reform in this current round of Structural 
Funds. Co-ordination at a national level greatly improved under Cohesion Policy’, but 
only in 1995-1998 when the Treasuiy had leadership of this policy area and the DPSC was 
established within this ministry. Other previous changes wrought, or at least brought 
about by the exigencies of Cohesion Policy, were the setting up o f the Fondo di rotazione 
in 1990 and the 1996 legislation on planning in partnership {programmazione 
negoziata). This last reform, which was to lead to much confusion and not so much 
institutional reform, was the Italian state’s attempt at pushing through, top-down, the 
European Commission’s bottom-up partnership approach. In fact, it served to highlight 
the lack of capacity of some regions which were incapable of taking on some of these 
instruments.**5 Law 142 (1990) brought to the fore the role of the province which in 
many cases (Sardinia) was unable, ill-equipped and totally unprepared to co-ordinate 
municipalities or plan socio-economic development on a large scale. Similarly in Ireland, 
Cohesion Policy led to the emergence of Regional Authorities in 1994» which although an 
improvement on the previous institutional configuration seemingly unfettered by logic, 
were not suitable to co-ordinate or even be the main territorial level at which 
development was to be planned. The importance of the county-level as the most 
appropriate territorial division kept coming to the fore, but Irish local government was 
inadequate to the task at hand and so considerable experimentation resulted on the side, 
as it were. In terms of institutional arrangements, Cohesion Policy garnered the central 
leadership role of the Taoiseach's office which was to facilitate decision-making in
S E C t  lO \  11 —  CltTfifrr 7 C-wnpariitirr A itahsix Explaining !n.U.'!ut'on Chany
Bassanini also attempted -  unsuccessfully -  to use the so-called ‘external constraint’ in oixler to 
force the adaptation of administrative structures (sec Hinc 2000:5?).
-'-5 See, for example. Giuliani & Piattoni (2001:139).
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Ireland but it took a long time for such a leadership role to emerge centrally in Italy due 
to internal institutional vicissitudes. That is to <;ay, the lack o f co-ordination between the 
Premier and other ministries was further confounded by weak inter-ministerial co­
operation. This overall fragmentation characterised by a system of party vetoes and 
interest group pressure impeded the capacity’ to introduce innovative public policies 
(Ferrera & Gualmini 1999,125). Moreover, the Premier’s office was never a co-ordinating 
or leadership role as such, as incumbents were never party leaders and could therefore 
barely muster party' support let alone coalition cohesion. Subsequent to the collapse of 
the party system evident in the 1994 elections, the executive was strengthened somewhat 
and the Premier acquired an increased role of guidance and co-ordination vis-à-vis other 
ministries, and therefore the government w7as more cohesive (Ferrera & Gualmini 1999, 
129). The emergence of policy leadership at the Treasury7 in this sector was as a 
consequence of a successful experience with Maastricht. Indeed, this leadership has yet 
to emerge in Sardinia as is evident by its abysmal performance on the 6 per cent reserve 
at the mid-term review. The situation seems to have changed very little since the failure 
of law 64 (1986), which increased the role of regions in development and floundered 
because of the incapacity7 of these regions to take on such functions. Co-ordination 
remains an on-going question needing constant attention. In Ireland, at central 
government department level, some headway has been made in terms of 
interdepartmental policy groups etc. At local level it has also received much thought and 
seems to be under control in the County Strategy7 Groups or County Development Boards.
European Commission’s capacity to permeate or influence institutions
What does this tell us about the European Commission's capacity to permeate or 
influence institutions? In Ireland, undoubtedly the immediate salience of Cohesion 
Policy was made possible by economic backwardness. Economic backwardness also 
obtained in Sardinia but policy to offset it was not dependent on European Commission 
resources alone, as a steady flow of significant resources had already been clinched from 
national government, with which, in terms of size, Cohesion Policy could not compete. 
Thus the European Commission’s capacity to influence institutions by tying funding to 
certain conditions is contingent on economic needs and competing resources. Dealing 
directly with a ‘region’ in terms of policy has clearly furthered European Commission 
influence in Ireland, whereas Sardinia’s inability to directly access the European 
Commission has hampered both Structural Fund understanding as well as good 
relations. In the context of Cohesion Policy therefore, the European Commission’s ability 
to influence institutions is increased in state-regions or in regions in which it can 
dialogue directly with regional government. In terms of policy approaches, in regions
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characterised by administration that concentrates on performance criteria rather than 
procedures in spending Structural Funds, institutional change has come about more 
smoothly as striving to excel in performance has indirectly influenced institutions. By 
contrast, deliberate conscious attempts to bring about institutional change through 
introducing Cohesion Policy procedures has been less effective, as there is a tendency to 
get bogged down in a quagmire of detail and performance lags. Institutions are better 
coaxed along by striving to reach targets or results than reformed consciously. 
Institutional experimentation has been a positive experience in Ireland where it 
happened alongside existing institutions, as it led to a spurt in creativity and innovation. 
In Italy, by contrast, the kind of experimentation championed by programmazione 
negoziata was a very conscious attempt to formally change institutions and model them 
on the European formula, which left little room for creativity and imposed rigid rules. 
Creativity is an important component facilitating institutional change, also because it 
facilitates the emergence of leadership. An adequate leadership can mobilise resources to 
push through changes and, by identifying with the policy, can make it a symbol of its 
success, thus adding further motivation to perform successfully.2^  These are the main 
factors determining the ability of Cohesion Policy’s capacity to influence institutions 
(summarised in Table 43) when the following factors are equal: economic backwardness, 
policy recognition and acceptance of merits of Cohesion Policy tenets, degree of 
experimentation and willingness to facilitate, or even foster change. Even though local 
government institutions in the two case-studies were both characterised by a low 
capacity, the capacity to reinvent them through loose experimentation made a significant 
difference. In fact, it was the weakness of local government in Ireland that enabled the 
Taoiseach’s Department (policy or norm entrepreneur) to bypass it in creating an 
environment conducive to creativity. Conversely, it was the strength of local institutions 
and their firm entrenchment in Sardinia that prevented any such strategy from being 
adopted. Therefore, the degree of entrenchment of institutions may even affect the ability 
o f norm entrepreneurs or leadership to emerge. Without a doubt, proximity to nu powder 
also facilitates the emergence of leadership as, inter alia, knowledge resources are easily 
accessed.
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Giuliani & Piattoni (2001:129-39) draw attention to the capacity and vision of some dynamic 
regional political leaders to overcome the passive resistance to the implementation of Cohesion Policy.
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Table 43: Factors affecting Cohesion Policy's ability'to influence institutions
Factors Ireland Sardinia
Salience of Cohesion Policy High Low
Proximity to power High Low
Performance oriented High Low
Locally devised experimentation High Low
Creativity'space High Low
Active Leadership (pro-Cohesion Policy) High Low
Strength of local institutions Low High
Facilitating factors are necessaiy to generate sufficient conditions for institutional 
change/building. Firstly, actors are provided with new opportunities and constraints 
which sometimes lead to a domestic redistribution of power depending on actor capacity 
to exploit opportunities and avoid constraints. The same opportunities and constraints 
were provided to both case-studies by Cohesion Policy, and more particularly its reform 
in 1988. Ensuing power redistribution took longer in Italy than it did in Ireland. At 
central government level, the Taoiseach’s office took on policy leadership in Cohesion 
Policy in the early 1990s, wtiile in Italy, the Treasury took on policy leadership in the late 
1990s. Both leaderships were able to count on an advocacy coalition. In Ireland the ksri 
had a large sway over official thinking and it was quick to espouse good practice. In Italy 
the same advocacy coalition that brought Italy into the Euro zone was mobilised for 
Cohesion Policy. In Sardinia, the Regional Centre of Programme Planning's lack of 
political clout could go some way to explaining its lack o f assertiveness and low 
leadership capacity.
Power dispersal makes pushing through change difficult, as fostering domestic consensus 
is not easy. A large number of veto points impinges on domestic actor capacity to achieve 
changes. Ireland’s centralised status gave significant leeway to the Taoiseach’s office to 
push through changes, and even create parallel structures to experiment rather than 
devolving tasks to an ineffectual local government system. At the same time, it sought to 
reform local government in order to prepare it to take on local development tasks at a 
later date. In Sardinia, change was not so easy because o f multiple veto points of a dense 
quagmire of institutions. Therefore, it would appear to vindicate what della Cannea 
(2001:131) proposes: hierarchy as opposed to loose multi-level co-ordination can be an 
effective instrument of governance.2^ 7
Formal facilitating institutions enable action capacity of some actors. This relates 
somewhat to norm entrepreneurs that persuade others to redefine interests and
Della Cannea (2001:131) draws this conclusion from Italy’s last minute successful bid to join EMU.
2 l 8
SECTIOX  /T — ChnfittT 7 Cörnfiaratn* /¡ttfj/ys/s: Institution Chatty— - —■ — — ■ - — . * - * - ♦ - - j - ^
identities. Persuasion and social learning are important and affect both policy and 
institutions. The Treasury and the Taoiseach’s office can be considered formal facilitating 
institutions as they enabled regional administrations and local partnership bodies to gain 
capacity.
Political culture and other informal institutions are significant due to the way they 
condition actor action: consensus or conflict. Consensus often leads to sharing of costs of 
adaptation thus facilitating the accommodation of pressure for adaptation. Game theory 
and social psychology illustrate that “co-operative and consensual type relational systems 
tend to produce superior outcomes in terms o f well-being: they stimulate learning and 
the search for innovative solutions” (Ferrera & Gualmini 1999:123). A confrontation, 
pluralist culture by contrast, can inhibit change. Ireland has long been dabbling in 
consensual partnership arrangements nationally and so political culture in this sense can 
be characterised as consensual. By contrast in Italy, political culture is notoriously 
conflictual and stand-offs are fairly common.
Explaining institutional change
Chapter 1 described the institutional change brought about by the intricacies of Cohesion 
Policy as exogenous and in fact, most explanations of institutional change refer to 
external institutional variables such as changes in resource allocation, changes in actor 
preferences or technological changes etc. that disturb the institutional balance and 
generate conditions in which the validity o f consolidated rules, relations and behaviour 
models are questioned and new ones emerge. The exogenous change here is Cohesion 
Policy and is constant for both cases. Conditions for institutional change were not ripe in 
either case at the onset of the reformed Cohesion Policy. In Ireland, no great attention 
had been paid to territorial development as sectoral concerns prevailed. Thus the 
European Commission’s institutional paradigm was deftly handled so as to pay lip- 
service, without bringing about significant change. It was through paying this lip service 
however, that institutional experimentation and creativity resulted. This period, also 
characterised by confusion, called into question consolidated institutional arrangements 
such as the emasculated nature of local government, and gave credence to the European 
Commission’s institutional paradigm. Without a doubt, successful implementation of 
Cohesion Policy and best practices adopted (monitoring and evaluation) contributed to 
lending further credence. In Italy, conditions for change obtained after more pressing 
policy issues had been dealt with successfully (that is, entry into the Euro zone), and in a 
situation in which the debacle of the previous southern development paradigm wfas
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irrefutable. So both countries were ready for change. However, the same exogenous 
factors can provoke different changes in different institutions because endogenous 
factors filter external changes. Change must be ‘interpreted’ by institutional cognitive 
maps and organisational paradigms and thus takes on different meanings according to 
how it its deciphered. Change did, in fact, take on different meanings in the case-studies 
due to adaptation strategies adopted, local institutional facilitating conditions and, 
related to these last two factors, degrees o f success. In Ireland central level institutions 
were quick to ‘interpret’ Cohesion Policy and adapt accordingly in order to draw down 
Structural Funding. Attempts were made to absorb Cohesion Policy without 
wholeheartedly enacting the European Commission’s institutional paradigm. Sardinia’s 
interpreting endeavours came much later, when Cohesion Policy became more salient 
due to the demise of intervento straordinario. The regional institution’s first attempt at 
interpreting change was with the im p , and it did so incorrectly as it sought to use it as a 
mother board for all development projects on the island. Italian central institutions did 
not lend as much energy to interpreting Cohesion Policy as Irish ones mainly because 
this largesse was more salient in a country commonly considered as economically 
backward, than in an industrial power. In a way therefore, Europeanisation was 
hampered in Sardinia because of it being a part of a better off country.
An institution’s ‘permeability’, that is to say, its capacity to neutralise change and 
preserve its stability depends on its degree of institutionalisation. Permeability can 
extend the validity of legitimation principles from one organisational field to another in 
an unforeseen and unexpected way. Permeability had a large part to play in bringing 
about changes in Ireland. By setting up several partnership bodies that had some 
working connections with local government, and putting in place a series of partnership 
practices at other levels also, previously staid, unimaginative actors were playing on the 
same field as dynamic actors. This led to much cross-pollination of ideas. Local 
government structures were well placed to take all of this in due to their low degree o f 
institutionalisation. Sub-national institutions are largely permeable in Ireland. By 
contrast, Sardinia’s plethora of highly institutionalised institutions, region, provinces, 
mountain communities, municipalities alongside national agencies etc. operating on the 
island (ANAS, Corte dei Conti), are well capable of neutralising change and maintaining 
stability. Most of these behemoths are impermeable.
Innovative responses depend on epistemic and cognitive heritage as well as the 
institutional sources from which it learns, and thus the same change can lead to different 
innovative responses. There is no doubt that the most innovative responses that left most
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room for experimentation and creativity were in Ireland. It is also true that low 
institutionalisation of sub-national actors meant that central government could go about 
experimenting without any protests. Such an experiment, a feat of hierarchical, political 
leadership, would not have been possible in Sardinia due to high levels of 
institutionalisation of sub-national actors. Irelands change had more to do with the fact 
that higher echelons of a well-heeled public sector dedicated themselves to the task of 
responding to Cohesion Policy, than cognitive or epistemic heritage. In Italy and 
Sardinia, this was not the case until much later and even then, in Sardinia, no such ■
institutional leeway for innovative action nor political leadership existed. \
J
For a necessary institutional change to be adopted, players who desire that particular 
institutional change are necessary, and secondly, they must have the means to prevail 
such as political power, personal charisma and financial clout. In Ireland, the intervenor 
was the department of the Taoiseach, and in Italy it was the Treasury' or DPSC. In 
Sardinia, such an intervenor could be the Centro Regiomle di Programmazionc but it 
| lacks political power and thus has not been successful in bringing about institutional
j change in Sardinia or in emerging as a dynamic leader. In fact, as we have seen
I leadership is a cnicial factor in determining institutional change. But in order to make a 1
| difference, leadership must have political power, otherwise it will not be able to negotiate
I or push through changes.
I
j  Europeanisation
I Two conditions have been formulated for expecting domestic change or adaptation^J processes in response to Europeanisation. First, Europeanisation must be ‘inconvenient',
| i.e. there must be some degree of misfit or incompatibility' between European-level <
I processes, policies and institutions on the one hand, and domestic-level institutions on
the other. Misfit obtained in both our cases across both policy and institutions.
Institutional misfit was higher in Ireland where at a sub-national level there was a :
significant institutional vacuum, although nationally consensual policy-making had {
become a relevant phenomenon. In Sardinia, the sub-regional level is replete with
institutional layers similar to the European multi-layer governance, but conflictual
relations tend to prevail. Policy misfit in Ireland obtained because of the absence of
territorial development policies, while in Sardinia the ethos of southern development
policy clashed with Cohesion Policy principles. Misfit is a necessary condition for
j domestic change. Some facilitating factors must respond to adaptational pressures for
I change to occur. Rationalist institutionalism which treats actors as rational, coal-
I
I
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oriented and purposeful, holds that misfit between European and domestic processes, 
policies and institutions provides societal and/or political actors with new opportunities 
and constraints in the pursuance of their interests. Whether such changes in the 
domestic opportunity structure leads to a domestic redistribution of power depends on 
the capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints. Two 
mediating factors with opposite effects influence these capacities: the existence of 
multiple veto points in a countiys institutional structure can empower actors with 
diverse interests to avoid constraints leading to increased resistance to change; and 
formal institutions may exist providing actors with material and ideational resources to 
exploit new opportunities leading to an increased likelihood for change (Borzel & Risse 
2000:7)* Multiple veto points characterise the institutional make-up in Italy sub- 
nationally and in Sardinia sub-regionally, thus hampering the emergence of empowered 
actors or winning coalitions clamouring for change (or a leader). Different institutional 
actors have been very nimble in avoiding constraints and resisting change. By contrast, 
Ireland’s centralised status and power concentration have made resisting change more 
difficult, and facilitated the emergence of leadership. Moreover, nationally formal 
institutions did not begin to take an active interest in Cohesion Policy until after Italy’s 
place in the Euro-zone was secured whereas, in Ireland the Taoiseach's office was the 
facilitating formal institution actively dedicated to Cohesion Policy from the early stages. 
Sociological institutionalism, which argues that actors are guided by collectively shared 
understandings of what constitutes proper behaviour in a given rule structure and 
processes of persuasion, holds that European policies, norms and the collective 
understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level 
processes because they do not resonate well with domestic norms and collective 
understandings. Two mediating factors influence the degree to which such misfit results 
in the internalisation of new norms and the development of new identities: change agents 
or norm entrepreneurs mobilise in the domestic context and persuade others to redefine 
their interests and identities; a political culture and other informal institutions exist that 
are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing (Borzel & Risse 2000:7). In 
Ireland, the change agent has been the Taoiseach’s office which has been able to persuade 
and cajole also due to significant Structural binding. In Sardinia, no such change agent 
has emerged, although nationally in the Treasury Ministry, the DPSC may be considered 
just such a norm entrepreneur. Its persuasion techniques were bolstered by the 6 per 
cent reserve in the last c s f . Irish political culture can be characterised as fairly 
consensual when compared with that of Sardinia which is highly conflictual. Reasons for 
this are the nature of political divisions and historical trajectories.
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Both rationalist and sociological institutionalism have been helpful in accounting for the 
explanatory factors for change in the case-studies. The bridge provided by 
Europeanisation between these different theories of institutionalism provides a useful 
conceptual framework and takes account of both agency and structure. The outcome of 
Europeanisation was different: in Ireland, first absorption and then transformation; in 
Sardinia, inertia. There is also a temporal factor to be taken into account as change takes 
longer in highly institutionalised situations (along institutional paths) than in 
institutional vacuums. That coupled with Cohesion Policy’s delay in acquiring salience in 
Sardinia could mean that transformation may obtain in years to come. In Italy generally, 
it is reasonable to assert that the outcome of Europeanisation has changed, that is 
transformation has occurred, to differing extents in different regional settings. Many 
reasons have been offered for this variation,1*3® but arguments based on evidence of not 
just north-south variation, seem to be the least simplistic. Giuliani and Piattoni 
(2001:129) point to dynamic political leadership as the main reason for differing 
Cohesion Policy performances which would appear to concur with the main thrust of this 
thesis.
Cohesion Policy’s institution building has tended to set off domestic experimentation and 
change the nature of local institutions involved in local development. Loose 
experimentation enables creativity and facilitates the emergence of new institutional 
forms. Moreover, institutional permeability may lead to changes spilling over to existing 
institutions. Experimentation of this kind is easier to accomplish in the absence of 
entrenched local institutions, as more creativity is permitted and actors learn from 
experience. This leads to increased levels of innovative institutional ‘ways of doing things’ 
geared at improving performance. In Ireland, Cohesion Policy’s delivery system mainly 
generated participative rather than representative institutions, thus including previously 
excluded actors. There was a shift away from local government to local ‘management 
structures’. Business interests as wrell as the community and voluntary sector were 
accorded institutional roles in the new local development ethos pioneered in the 
Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development, from 1994 to 1999- 
The community and voluntary sector rather than the business sector constitutes the real 
newcomer to the local development scene, and its participation was by no means linear 
or without pitfalls as w'e saw in Chapter 5 (monopolies of some community 
representatives, community representatives having difficulty dealing with the 
predominant business management ethos etc.). Experimentation resulted in most of
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The most controversial account is undoubtedly Putnam's (1993), which attributes enormous 
importance to social capital and historical path dependency.
these problems being resolved at the local level and subsequently spilling over into the 
national sector: in fact, NESF, the national body representing the community and 
voluntary sectors, became an active partner in national partnership agreements. 
Hitherto, national partnership agreements had been the realm of business, trade unions 
and government. Partnership, which was a requirement for Area Based Partnerships and 
County Enterprise Boards, but not for LEADER groups even though it was chosen as the 
preferred operating structure by them also, succeeded in bringing these actors together. 
Often, partnerships developed according to the dominant partner and in some cases 
ended up resembling state agencies in Ireland. Nonetheless, the picture that emerges 
from Chapter 5 is a wide participatory partnership approach, encompassing the 
community and voluntary sector, state agencies and social partners, to local development 
which is more area-based and locally-specific, with a broader policy agenda than ever 
before. By contrast, Chapter 6 has shown some experimentation pioneered by the 
Sardinian region in the late 1990s with the Integrated Area Programmes. Creativity was 
somewhat stultified by the necessity of operating through existing jaded, inexperienced 
institutions that had been accorded new competencies by national legislation (law 142 of 
1990), irrespective of lagging capacity: municipalities and provinces. Yet, experience 
suggests that experimenting with, or expecting creativity from such an outdated, 
procedure-obsessed public administration was folly. Where development stntctures 
veered from existing local institutions, namely the Nuoro Territorial Pact, some progress 
was made in mobilising local resources.
In Ireland, loose experimentation did not mean lack of control however, as local 
partnership bodies were monitored, guided and often constrained by central government 
ministries. Moreover, the fact that they were linked seemingly inexorably to the life span 
of the second Community Support Framework, facilitated creativity as actors were 
motivated to perform well in order to bring about their very survival. However, it also 
generated a significant degree of uncertainty which may have hampered performance in 
terms of long-term strategies. Interestingly, where public officials were most involved, 
the County Enterprise Boards, creativity and innovation was low. In Sardinia, it has been 
difficult to siphon off ‘development power’ from embedded local representative 
institutions and public officials, and institutional experimentation with existing 
institutions did not a!lowr for the same degree of institutional creativity. When the Italian 
government belatedly began experimenting with different types of local partnership, it 
did so in a rigid, complicated way, attempting to shape each and every move made by 
structures. This primarily led to confusion rather than creativity among local actors.
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In Ireland, this period of loose experimentation harboured the accumulation of 
anomalies which led to various attempts to bring order to chaos by enacting institutional 
change. The role in local development, or absence thereof, of local government was called 
into question leading to a fluriy of thinking about how to resolve questions of 
participation with those of representation, without dissipating the local development 
drive. Ideas were manifold from different bodies specifically charged with ‘thinking’: the 
Devolution Commission and the Inter-departmental Task Force on the Integration of 
Local Government and Local Development Systems. In the end, a vibrant local 
development institutional scenario prevailed, with specific links to local government 
through first Strategy Groups, and then, Development Boards, with a view to a long-term 
integration o f development and government structures. More importantly, the question 
of spatial development became a policy norm and was grafted onto the county level. In 
Sardinia, for institutional change to take shape locally, more time is necessary to reform 
existing institutions. Even the last mid-term review judged its institutional performance 
to be the worst of the regions of the Mezzogiorno, thus decreasing its intake of 
performance reserve funding. However, as Chapter 6 shows, the early years of the new 
century have witnessed the increased cognisance and understanding of these foibles as 
well as resulting policy moves are being made to come to terms with the shortcomings of 
public administration both nationally (NUVAL) and sub-nationally (RAPxoo). Reform of 
this kind is lengthy and difficult to engender as it tends to be path dependent. The 
importance of a leadership role at regional level was specifically pointed to in the last 
mid-term evaluation (of the 2000 to 2006 programming period), which advised the 
reinforcement of the role of the Regional Centre of Programme Planning.
The third hypothesis was that the openness of domestic institutions constitutes the main 
overriding contributoiy factor to the effectiveness of the ‘new’ institutions insofar as the 
quality of their participation is incisive. That is to say, central government openness to 
the tenets o f Cohesion Policy and its delivery system is crucial to its successful 
implementation in regions. Without policy leadership nationally, very little can be 
accomplished by wfay of change locally: the state is gate-keeper as it filters through 
change in the implementation of Cohesion Policy. It may not agree with the institution 
building propensities o f the European Commission, but it is encouraged (or bribed) to 
acquiesce in order to draw down funding and therefore, it willingly opens the gate. New 
institutional forms take shape and acquire a life and logic of their own. Institutional 
effectiveness was examined in the case-study chapters in terms o f policy implementation 
performance. The expectation was that innovative institutional forms are more effective 
than traditional ones because traditional ones are not equipped to deal with Cohesion
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Policy. This holds true in the case-studies analysed here. Initially, Italian domestic 
institutions could not be characterised as being particularly open to Cohesion Policy. On 
the contrary, Europe was considered as a “disturbance factor by Italian politicians, 
introducing as it did norms, directions and requirements which threatened to upset time- 
honoured patterns of resource distribution” (Ginsborg 2001:241). The matching funding 
requirements were
“inconvenient or in conflict with narrower patterns of local patronage, as were 
the controls that the Community wished to enforce on the spending of its 
funds. It was better not to have the funds than to unleash external 
interference, better to stay out o f the European mainstream than upset 
carefully constructed centre-peripheiy clienteles (Ginsborg 2001:242).* 2&
Yet, when central government did belatedly attempt to conform to the delivery system, it 
did so in such a rigid way that Hine (2003) asserts that “Italy’s attempt to adapt to some 
of the features o f the European approach to partnership planning and vertical integration 
of tiers of government may actually have hindered its capacity to adapt to the higher rate 
of absorption required under the EU’s new structural funds plan”. This is because it 
attempted to work with a process-obsessed public administration that it never succeeded 
in reforming. In Ireland, by contrast, public administration is not so process-obsessed 
and has benefited enormously from interactions with counterparts from other countries 
and Brussels in general (O’Donnell 2000; Laffan 2000; Finnegan 2001). Experience with 
the Structural Funds has brought out a performance oriented approach, geared at 
obtaining maximum funding. Such a performance oriented approach looked to 
respecting spending targets and formulating the best means to do so. Much lateral 
thinking ensued with institutional experimentation as the result.
The fact that Sardinia is a part of Italy means that it has less leadership capacity than 
Ireland: less access to negotiating tables; less ability to identify interests and represent 
them; and less ability to build consensus around strategies pursued. The ability to adapt 
to Cohesion Policy is enhanced in a state as interests are more readily aggregated at 
national level and can be more clearly and forcefully represented at pertinent and potent 
negotiating tables. Leadership in Cohesion Policy- was well placed in the hothouse of 
power at the Department of the Taoiseach which was in turn well placed to push interests 
at European tables and to gather knowledge resources, whereas Sardinia’s interests are 
not so readily identified nor represented by Italy-40. In sum, Dublin adds capacity to 
region-Ireland in a way that Rome does not vis-à-vis Sardinia. However, Sardinia is at a
Ginsborg draws on an analysis by Giuliani (1992).
2 The fact that Sardinia was part of a better off country also hampered adaptation as Cohesion Policy 
was slow to become salient.
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farther disadvantage according to Piattoni (2003:136), as its Objective 1 status means 
that it receives a lot of policy' support from the state (the DPS) and therefore does not 
appear to feel the full responsibility of decentralised decision-making: it awaits state 
input but does not tolerate it so well. Thus, state-Italy and region-Sardinia do not work so 
well together. However, some other Italian regions have successfully developed 
leadership capacity notwithstanding Objective 1 status which points to the explanatory 
power of a different variable, namely politics. Political stability could be a more 
important variable than state status because it is what lends coherence and durability to 
leadership be it central or regional. The successful experience of many regions in Italy 
and elsewhere vis-à-vis Cohesion Policy tends to support this argument as does the 
central role of politics in policy-making.2-»1 Sardinia does not possess this kind of political 
stability which, more than its region-status, hampers its leadership capacity.
The findings presented in this research clearly validate the institutionalist claim that 
institutions are not neutral and that they do merely reflect social forces but can shape 
actors’ identities, power and strategies. Sociological and historical institutionalism are 
useful frameworks for explaining stability and lack of change while economic new 
institutionalism attributes a greater role to actors in, for example, choosing institutions. 
The Europeanisation framework developed by Bürzel (2002) and Bürzel & Risse (2000) 
cleverly weaves these differing degrees of emphasis on structure and agency together and 
forwards a blueprint for analysing the domestic impact of European policy. It posits a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for expecting change or adaptational processes, 
that is, the incompatibility of European policies and domestic ones o r ‘misfit’. Moreover, 
it develops four facilitating factors that constitute sufficient conditions for expecting 
change: a low number o f veto points; formal facilitating institutions; the presence of 
norm entrepreneurs that persuade others to redefine their interests; and a political 
culture oriented to consensual relations. Different degrees of change occur as a result of 
Europeanisation, that is, inertia (low), absorption (modest) and transformation (high). 
The analysis of the effects of Cohesion Policy on institutions in Ireland and Sardinia has 
demonstrated the utility of this framework which neither underestimates or 
overestimates the role of actors or structure but places them on the same level as 
facilitating factors. Agency is crucial to understanding the impact o f Cohesion Policy in 
our case studies as the role of policy entrepreneurs and veto players demonstrates. 
However, capacity for leadership can be structurally dependent as wras the case in 
Ireland: leadership on local development issues was taken by the Taoiseach's Department
2 •'* Sec for example Piattoni & SmyrI (2003) w ho document the positive experience of the Tuscan and 
Abi-uzzo regions and the less positive experience of the Liguria and Puglia regions.
227
which was able to take a cavalier attitude to existing, albeit weak, institutions in order to 
ensure adaptation. In a centralised state with a strong executive, that is possible; in Italy 
or Sardinia, it is reasonable to assume that that could never occur. Political culture is an 
important determining factor also in terms of whether it is conflictual or consensual. 
Political stability and low ideological differences paved the w'ay for a ready identification 
of interests and the ability to pursue them systematically over time in Ireland, whereas in 
Sardinia, the opposite is true. Moreover, Sardinia, as a regional government had a weak 
position in structures and networks o f interest representation (Piattoni & Smyrl 
2003:136) and was unable to press its interests at important tables at the same level as 
Ireland.2-»2
An additional facilitating factor that appears important from evidence presented here is 
the issue of salience of policy. This in turn is tied to questions o f motivation and timing. 
In Ireland, Cohesion Policy became immediately salient due to economic backwardness 
vis-à-vis the rest of the EU and the lack o f funds to promote development and thus policy 
makers were highly motivated to become au fait with policy tenets. In Sardinia, it took 
longer to acquire salience due to the presence of less complicated kinds of funding and 
therefore policy makers were not motivated to become familiar with policy and it 
continued to be a source of confusion well in to the 1990s (Piattoni & Smyrl 2003:137). 
Different outcomes in the case studies could change in time with changes in facilitating 
factors, like increased salience for example. Cohesion Policy acquired salience in Italy 
after its status with EMU was sorted out thus the Treasury Ministry' Unit dedicated to 
development policies only actively began seeking to bring about institutional change in 
order to better implement Cohesion Policy in the current round of Structural Funding 
(2000-2006). By contrast, institutional leadership in Ireland to actively pioneer 
adaptation had emerged almost ten years earlier.
Experimentation and learning has played an important part in adaptation processes and 
often the kind of experimentation enabled in the case studies proved to be an important 
variable. In Ireland, experimentation was open and left a lot of room for creativity 
whereas in Italy, experimentation w'as more rigidly set out on paper and did not leave 
room for creativeness. Experimenting ‘on the side’ rather than within mainstream 
institutions provided obvious advantages in Ireland where a whole new plethora of actors 
were brought into the process while local government was kept on the fringes. 
Nonetheless, this decoupling led to demands for reform and institutional change in local
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government. It is doubtful whether such creativity and inclusion could have been 
accomplished if the local development drive had been anchored to local government in its 
original early 1990s emasculated state. Experimenting with mainstream institutions is a 
more difficult matter exacerbated by complicated arrangements and obsession with 
procedure in Italy.
Europeanisation “has contributed to the emergence of new insight, original explanations, 
and interesting questions on three important issues: the understanding and analysis of 
‘impact’, how to endogeneise international governance in models of domestic politics, 
and the relationship between agency and change” (Radaelli 2004:2). It is especially 
useful in terms of policy impacts on institutions. It can be likened to institutionalisation 
or institution building and therefore has three dimensions.2«  First, typifying certain 
practices and differentiating them from others within a domain. Second, certain elements 
are no longer judged by efficacy but become automatic and are validated ceremonially. 
Third, depersonalisation of practices so that they are independent of the discretion of 
individuals (Lanzalaco 1995). Therefore, the value of Europeanisation is as a framework 
to facilitate understanding rather than a theory with powers of prediction.
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Conclusion
The empirical evidence comparatively presented in this chapter serves to corroborate the 
main hypothesis of this thesis, that is, where there is a low formal institutional density at 
local level, institutions are more readily built. This can in turn lead to institutional 
change in other spheres through permeability. By contrast, where there is a high formal 
institutional density at a local level, institutions are difficult to build and institutional 
change is thus more complex. Significant misfit characterised both cases in the first 
round of the Structural Funds but the substance of misfit differed. In the second and 
third round of Structural Funds, adaptation strategies diverged and brought about 
distinct outcomes due to facilitating factors such as inter alia leadership. 
Europeanisation is useful in accounting for institutional change. Moreover, the ability of 
the European Commission to bring about institutional change or indeed, build 
institutions indirectly through Cohesion Policy and its institutional paradigm has been 
demonstrated. The factors facilitating or constraining successful institution building for 
local development have been outlined. Moreover, this analysis has showm how Cohesion 
Policy can be perceived as the European Commissions tool to provoke reform of local 
institutions. Italian decision-makers have wholeheartedly adopted the EU tout court as
S e e  a l s o  G iu l ia n i  ( 2 0 0 4 : 1 0 )  w h o  dev e lo p s  t h is  a n a lo g y  in  de ta il.
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an “external constraint” in different policy areas in the late 1990s in order to finally put 
their house in order. This forms part of what Giuliani (2000:51) calls Europeanisation as 
normalisation which denotes an idealisation of foreign experiences, or even xenophilia, 
and leads to attempts to push through domestic reforms by tying them in some way to 
the EU. In the current round of the Structural Funds, from 2000 to 2006, they have 
embraced Cohesion Policy’s institutional indicators to bring about institutional change 
and facilitate European Commission institution building. Irish decision-makers had a 
more canny attitude to Structural Funding from the beginning when it acquired 
immediate salience. That is to say, that in attempting to maximise draw-downs from the 
Structural Funds, they willingly facilitated the European Commission’s institution 
building. In Ireland, Europeanisation can be said to have brought about transformation, 
whereas in Sardinia, the outcome has been inertia. In the latter case, however, given the 
unfolding of events and policy developments, the outcome may change in coming years 
although much depends on the success of reform of a complex public administration.
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Conclusion
This thesis presented an analysis of the difficulties of building institutions and making 
them effective in the context of the deliveiy system of the European Union’s Cohesion 
Policy. Chapter 1 presented the theoretical framework which draws heavily from new 
institutionalism and the useful bridge among the different branches of institutionalism 
provided by Europeanisation literature. In particular, the concept of misfit was borrowed 
in order to establish how domestic institutions differed from European ones in the 
context of Cohesion Policy. Moreover, factors facilitating or constraining change were 
identified in the literature. Subsequently, the research design was presented as a 
comparative study o f two objective 1 regions, Ireland and Sardinia. For analytical 
purposes, the period of study was disaggregated into two periods which correspond to 
Section II and Section III of the thesis: first, the period up to the 1988 reform together 
with the initial programming period of Cohesion Policy, from 1989 to 1993; and, second, 
the second programming period from 1994 to 1999. Hypotheses regarding the domestic 
impact of Cohesion Policy in terms of institution building were then formulated. They 
related to institution building, innovation and effectiveness. Lastly Chapter 1 outlined the 
data sources and methodology used throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 charted the 
development of Cohesion Policy from its inception to its current format, examining in 
particular its key moments such as the 1988 reform.
Chapter 3 forayed into the differing local development approaches in Ireland both prior 
to Cohesion Policy and during the first programming period of Cohesion Policy 
implementation. Evidence points to much penetration of Commission thinking in Irish 
policy-making despite a high degree of misfit or adaptational pressure, centred mainly on 
centralised government and inept local government, data lacunae, co-ordination 
conundrums, and a lack of experience with area-based or spatial policies. High 
adaptational pressure spurred decision-makers to rectify the situation and a period of 
experimentation ensued. This period of experimentation was spearheaded by the 
Department of the Taoiseach and adaptation was a policy priority' due to the importance 
o f drawing down Structural Funding. Chapter 4 established misfit between Cohesion 
Policy and domestic development policy in Sardinia: legal delays and overemphasis on 
legal matters mainly due to concentration on procedure as opposed to performance; low 
administrative efficiency and verve; and partly linked with the low efficiency is the failure
231
to comprehend Cohesion Policy exacerbated by the lateness with which it acquired 
salience.
The establishment of misfit or adaptational pressure lays the basis for Section III which 
explores institutional change or building in Ireland and Sardinia. Chapter 5 outlined the 
Irish experience of learning through experimentation, emulation and permeability. That 
development problems exist within Ireland has been acknowledged and the accumulation 
of institutional anomalies such as proliferation of partnership bodies, typical of periods 
of experimentation, has led to moves to underpin good practice institutionally. This is to 
be achieved by tying participative local institutions to representative ones without 
dissipating the drive of the former or the legitimacy of the latter. Moreover, territorial 
disaggregation finally settled on the most historically consonant division which is the 
county. The County Development Boards embody institutional transformation at a local 
development level in Ireland. Chapter 6 illustrated Sardinia’s tardiness in coming to 
terms with Cohesion Policy and its poor performance thereafter. An explanatory factor is 
certainly the lack o f an institutional leader at a national level to espouse Cohesion Policy 
norms or encourage change. When experimentation was provided for, it was highly 
restrictive and did not leave much room for creativity. Moreover, institutional 
fragmentation and distance from decision-making exacerbated this situation. Capacity 
and competence of Italian public administration is notoriously poor (see inter alia 
Ginsborg 2001), and greatly hampers policy performance. Furthermore, it makes 
institutions impervious to change. Local entrenched institutions have also proved 
impermeable and regional institutional leadership was not forthcoming. Formal active 
institutional change is currently being engineered in the Community Support Framework 
with incentives offered in the form of more funding. Even among its counterparts of the 
Mezzogiorno, not renowned for wonderful performance, Sardinia lags at last place 
behind Calabria.
Section IV has drawn conclusions from the empirical evidence presented in the previous 
two Sections. Chapter 7 attempted to explain institutional change in the case-studies and 
discuss the hypotheses forwarded in Chapter 1. It then evaluated the explanatory’ power 
of the literature on Europeanisation and isolated the most important explanatory factors 
for differing institution building results in different settings. Salience of the policy 
determines the degree to which drawing down Structural Funding, and therefore 
implementing Cohesion Policy, is a priority. Apart from economic factors, salience can 
also be facilitated by proximity to the locus of decision-making. Therefore, state-regions 
may be at an advantage over region-regions. Moreover, an outward-looking ruling class,
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as is evident in the Irish case, is of benefit to the sub-national level and drawing <h*n 
funding, rather than an inward-looking mling class, like the Italian one, reluctant to take 
an active role in European matters. In fact, the degree to which Cohesion PoIic> can build 
institutions in member states ultimately depends on the degree to which policy tends are 
embraced by existing domestic institutions and in turn, their capacity and will to 
these changes through in their respective regions. Capacity is important to bring about 
desired changes. The unwieldy, inefficient, procedure-oriented yet potent public 
administration in Sardinia weighs heavily against change and is not prone to creative 
experimentation. By contrast, the lightweight, albeit inept local administration in Ireland 
was unable to unduly negatively affect institution building which was wholeheartedly 
embraced by national, performance-oriented institutions. Moreover, institution building 
for local development is facilitated by the absence of entrenched institutions locally and a 
consensual political culture is more suitable than a conflictual one in bringing about 
change.
Recent developments in the elected cases
In June 2002 the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs was set up with
responsibility for local development, rural development and community development
programmes, which somewhat rationalised central institutional articulation/“  In fact.
the new Department took on LEADER as well as other community initiatives along with
the Local Development and Social Inclusion Programme of the 2000-2006 N'DP and
works with ADM as well as the Western Development Commission. The rationale for its
establishment was to produce a “more co-ordinated engagement by the state with
communities around the country as they pursue their own development“. In order to
effectively pursue this objective, a review process of existing practices and structures was
initiated in February 2003. At the time of writing this process is still underway and no
results have of yet been published/--1 ^  A desire for more coherence at local level among
different development structures and enhancing the driving role of the County or Citv
Development Boards appears to motivate the review as it found that
“the multiplicity and complexity' of structures is to a great extent the result of 
the approach of central Government departments over the years. Across the 
range of departments dealing with disadvantage and social inclusion, it is 
difficult to see a consistent coherent approach to tackling particular issues.
2 '1 S e e  tab le  3 0  a n d  31 f o r  p r e v io u s  a rt icu la t io n .
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d e m o c r a t ic  a c c o u n ta b il it y  o f  a g e n c ie s  a n d  se rv ice  p ro v id e rs  in this area.
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Even now, after the establishment of the Department o f Community, Rural 
and Gaeltacht Affairs, new structures and schemes could be formulated within 
Government departments and agencies to tackle specific issues that might be 
better left to existing local agencies and bodies’*.
This leads to the conclusion that while lack of co-ordination, duplication and complexity 
still appear to be problems at a local level and even at central level, the institution o f the 
Department is an important step to overcome these problems centrally and the review 
process is an important tool to effect rationalisation at a local level. Locally co-ordination 
has already improved but it is still not satisfactory. The involvement of the CDBs in 
endorsing agency annual plans has generated some resentment as being so close to the 
local authority structure has diminished the autonomy of the local agencies. The 
Department intends drawing up guidelines to enhance the monitoring role of the CDBs. 
Once again the choice of the county level has been consolidated as it provides a 
“manageable and comprehendible locus for measuring the expenditure and impact of 
programmes and schemes for communities”.
At the same time the enhanced policy role of elected members of local authorities, 
namely through Strategic Policy Committees, was reviewed by the Institute of Public 
Administration (2004) at the request of the Department of the Environment and Local 
Government.246 The SPCs were set up as a result of the 1996 White Paper and given a 
statutory basis with the Local Government Act of 2001 to “consider matters connected 
with the formulation, development, monitoring and review of policy which relate to the 
functions of the local authority and advise the authority on those matters”. Strategic 
Policy Committees focus on areas such as housing, infrastructure, planning, 
environmental services, community, social and cultural development. Their role is to 
assist local authorities in the formulation, development and review of policies for their 
respective areas o f responsibility. Inter alia whether SPCs have contributed to the 
formulation, development and review o f policy in their local authority; links between 
SPCs and CDBs, other relevant agencies outside the formal local authority structure, and 
the Department o f the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. It found that 
“there was doubt among a number of contributors as to whether the discussion within 
SPCs was properly reflected in the county/city development board (CDB) forum by SPC 
chairpersons”; “there could be better feedback to SPC members on the activities of the 
CDB, and those elements of the county/city strategies that impinge on the activities of 
the SPC”. In relation to central government departments, the report found that
The IPA also carried out a more detailed review of the Local Government Modernisation 
Programme which examined progress in areas such as corporate planning, financial and human 
resource management, customer action plans, integrated service delivery, and the use of JCT.
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“it is difficult for SPCs to function where local authorities an* r ^
straightjacket. It is important that a “policy space’  he left <•'. 
government priorities can be adapted to local circumstance'. (Vj\,;rT>~,^ 
departments, when they are issuing guidelines (as opj^ osed 
direction), need to make it clear that they are just that: guidelines, rath-r tKin 
instructions".
The report concluded on a relatively sanguine basis asserting that the M*c process f 
elected members and sectoral interests a greater role in policy development thm 
hitherto:
“whether or not SPC members take that opportunity is partly up to themselves 
and their level of commitment to the process, and partly dependent trv*n 
whether or not they receive the support needed to fulfil a policy development 
role".
This finding is consistent with the variation among SPC progress in different U.s! 
authorities and within local authorities.
These latest institutional developments centrally and reviews locally show the level ( f 
transformation achieved as a result of pressure from Europeanisation in Ireland. I1ie 
Local Government Act of 2001 built on the white papers that preceded it in order to give 
indelible expression to a modernised local government with a heretofore inronrriv.iMv 
enhanced policy role for the elected member. It underpins the programme of local 
government renewal, introducing a range of reforms to enhance the democratic nature t f 
local government. The Act consolidates local government legislation, which is scattered 
throughout various enactments dating back to the 19th century. The central aims of the 
Act are to enhance the role of the elected member; support community involvement with 
local authorities in a more participative local democracy; modernise local government 
legislation, and provide the framework for new financial management systems and other 
procedures to promote efficiency and effectiveness.
The predominance of the county level as opposed to a dubious regional one has U » 
consolidated with the County Development Boards. The CDBs have also cemented local 
authority membership in local development structures with the requirement that th-y 
must endorse development body plans and co-ordinate them in their area. Each CD It has 
now drawn up an agreed Strategy for Economic, Social and Cultural IVvelopmer.t f >r its 
county or city. These Strategies will be the template guiding the delivery of public and 
local development activity over the next ten years. The CDBs will aim to ensure the 
avoidance of duplication in the delivery of services at local level, as well filar.: gap* in 
meeting the needs of their communities. At a central government lex el. a n>re rat: e d
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institutional expression has been given to policy areas of local, rural and community
development in the form of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
which has finally succeeded in decoupling rural development from agriculture and local
development from sport. Transformation is by no means complete but it is certainly well
underway as recent findings argue that local partnerships
“have led to better representation of different voices in policy discussions 
about local economic and social development and to important institutional 
modifications to the organisation of local government in the country” (Teague 
& Murphy 2004:31).
The main elements o f this transformation are more local participation, less bureaucracy 
and an enhanced local government system.
There is some evidence to suggest that Sardinia is making some progress in adaptation 
and is slowly moving out of its inertia. Some institutional innovations at a national level 
could enhance leadership capacity in Sardinia in order to further adaptation. Legislation 
in 1999 provided for the direct election of the President o f the Region which gives much 
potential to the emergence of a strong regional leadership.2 *-»? other institutional reforms 
are more ambiguous: the federalist (centre-left) or devolution (centre-right) drive in Italy 
has been highly politicised and neither side o f the fractious bi-polar divide has offered a 
clear, complete solution in the form of legislation.2-»8 In 2001 the centre-left’s bill was 
approved and largely revolved around articles 117 and 118 of the Constitution. Bull 
(2002:187) asserts that this reform is coherent from the point of view of redesigning the 
functions of national and sub-national entities, reshaping their relations and maintaining 
the supremacy of the state. She also maintains (2002:188) that the areas in which state 
and regions have concurrent legislative powers are too numerous and wide-ranging 
especially given that the law does not specify who is responsible for what. This dearth of 
clarity' is likely to lead to conflict which would risk thwarting efficiency in favour of chaos. 
The reform did not explicitly recognise regional variation in capacity and therefore 
rejected any form of consequent variable geometry. Bull forwards that the centre-left 
have adopted this kind of federalism, which is really a form of advanced decentralisation, 
as an answer to the need to generate a more efficient and effective administrative system 
while preserving uniform laws and procedures. In fact, the Bassanini laws showed how
2-r Although political instability continues to hamper the emergence of leadership (Piattoni 2002:132).
- 18 The centre-left version appears more like ‘advanced decentralisation’ in order to harness federalism
to administrative reform. The centre-right version is spearheaded by Bossi’s devolution drive which
appears to be more concerned with reassuring his electorate in ‘Padania’ than a comprehensive reform
proposal. Both are riddled with inconsistencies and lacune especially concerning the role of the Senate
as a Chamber o f the Regions (see Bull 2002).
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the centre-left's approach to federalism was in essence an attempt to harness 
administrative reform to the federalist drive (Bull 2002:189-190).
One important reform introduced by law 59 of 1997 (Bassanini) was the enhancement of 
the hitherto largely ineffective Cabina di Regia (CdR); it was made the fulcrum of co­
ordination and dialogue between the state and the regions. It was further enhanced by a 
legislative decree in the same year (no. 281 of 28 August) which made it obligator}7 for the 
state to consult it on legislative bills and decrees on subjects of regional competence 
(Piattoni 2003:124). Piattoni maintains that the CdR confers awareness of their role to 
regions and has endowed multi-level governance with a deliberative dimension. The 
importance of the revamped CdR has been bolstered by the newly acquired political 
strength of regional presidents and their ability to present a unified position vis-a-vis the 
state (Piattoni 2003:125). In relation to the specific case of Sardinia, adaptation is slow 
due to the experience of extraordinary development from 1950-1992 which generated a 
centralised, politicised method of programme planning that was difficult to overcome. 
Moreover, the real effects and potential benefits of decentralised decision-making have 
not been felt by Sardinia, because as an objective one region, it is still chaperoned by the 
state, especially the DPS (ibid.). These findings support the view that adaptation is 
underway, albeit more slowly than in Ireland and in time more political stability coupled 
with enhanced leadership capacity could lead to more change.
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